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This thesis explores what can be considered magical in contemporary theatre and film 
in an arguably post-magical age. I have taken an exploratory and interdisciplinary 
approach that brings together two diverse strands: the ‘deception’ of magical thinking 
and the ‘truth’ of neuroscience. This approach sees magic as an aesthetic experience 
that can be seen as significant for its immanence rather than its transcendence. Hence, 
I take a “mental-materialist” approach to neuroscience and focus on perception and 
affect as it impacts on the body and the senses. Bridging the diversity between 
magical thinking and neuroscience is the concept of ‘polyphasic consciousness’, an 
experiential and intuitive method of accessing knowledge that expands awareness and 
encompasses altered states. 
 
My involvement as an actor and collaborator with Free Theatre Christchurch forms 
the basis of explorations into magic, which is underpinned by my experience with the 
magical myth of Faust. In addition to examining the Free Theatre production of 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus from 2010, I will discuss Jan Švankmajer’s 1994 film 
Lekce Faust and Werner Fritsch’s film poem Faust Sonnengesang (2012-2015). The 
remaining films and theatre productions contain significant Faustian themes and can 
also be discussed in terms of a magical aesthetic experience. These include five films 
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This thesis seeks to expand the scope of what can be considered magical in 
contemporary theatre and film in an arguably post-magical age. This is not to say that 
magic in a Western context has disappeared – I mean to say the opposite: magic is 
ubiquitous in a way that often strips it of meaning. As anthropologist Ariel Glucklich 
puts it in The End of Magic, “The word magic works far too hard. We reach for it 
frequently, to describe wildly different things” (1997, vii). My explorations into 
magic began at a practical level with simple tricks in the theatre, and as such, the 
thesis that has developed from this starting point will be informed by this experience. 
As I continued to explore ideas about what magic could be, the material soon became 
more complicated. I began to wonder if it was all just illusion and tricks but found 
that it could encompass deeper truths, as it was meant to do in the past when belief in 
magic was more widespread. This thesis explores my search for those truths. 
 
The thesis is underpinned with the myth of Faust, because it grew from my practical 
experience of it as an actor and collaborator with Free Theatre Christchurch.1 It is also 
a myth that mixes magic with serious substantive issues and arose at a time when 
magical beliefs started to be challenged by the rise of scientific thinking. It began as a 
legend about a real scholar called Georg Faust who lived around 1480-1540 but 
quickly developed into a fantastical myth full of magic. It found its way into public 
consciousness via the low-brow media of marketplace puppet plays and a ‘folk-
written’ chapbook, but today, the plays by Marlowe (c.1591) and Goethe (1808) are 
considered the epitome of high art and literary achievement. As such, it has 
penetrated both high and low cultural production and Faustian themes can still be 
found in many popular and artistic forms of entertainment, as it is an endlessly 
                                                
1 Free Theatre is New Zealand’s longest running producer of experimental theatre. Its shows are 
directed by founder and Artistic Director Peter Falkenberg. The company works as an ensemble 
that most often takes its starting place from an idea, cultural situation or text, and over a long 
devising period develops productions that position themselves geographically and culturally in 
the current reality of the troupe. In this way, the interests and concerns of individual troupe 
members are explored collectively, guided always by the director. 
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updatable myth that continues to evolve. I will discuss both Marlowe and Goethe’s 
plays but will also take a broad overview and consider the central themes that drive 
the myth as a whole.  
 
Two Free Theatre productions sparked my interest in Faust and in magic: Faust 
Chroma in 2008, which was inspired by Goethe’s Faust, 2 and Doctor Faustus in 
2010, which was adapted from Christopher Marlowe’s play. The text of Marlowe’s 
play was not the starting point for the latter production. We began by experimenting 
with magic tricks in order to explore their entertainment possibilities. We created 
shadow puppets and learned sleight of hand tricks. We experimented with light and 
shade using the principles of the Magic Lantern. We made short films in the style of 
the early film magician Georges Méliès that played with conjuration and 
metamorphosis using simple editing techniques. We dressed in black and stood in 
front of black curtains, thereby making ourselves appear invisible, and found that by 
moving coloured props or people around, they would appear to levitate and do 
impossible things. We followed instructions on conjuration, examined runes and tried 
out an ouija board. We explored the ways in which an actor can transform behind a 
mask or metamorphose from a goat into a demon with a quick and undetected change 
of mask. We explored the technological magic of creating new selves in Photoshop 
and avatars in computer games. 
 
In the midst of all this we sat down and read through Marlowe’s play, but rejected 
large swathes of it, shifting the focus away from some of the moral or religious 
concerns to highlight instead the role of the show and the showman. These were the 
uncomplicated beginnings of this thesis. I was delighted with how we achieved a 
sense of magical astonishment using these simple methods, some of which were 
                                                
2 In 2008 Free Theatre produced one of its most successful plays: Faust Chroma, which was 
based on a text by Werner Fritsch that took its inspiration from Goethe’s Faust. This production 
explored the life of actor Gustaf Gründgens (1899-1963), who was famous in Germany for 
playing the devil Mephistopheles, but who, in real life, had made somewhat of a Faustian pact of 
his own with the Nazis in order to work in the theatre. I will discuss this production in the 
conclusion. 
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entirely demystified for the spectator but still appeared to be magical. But the 
concerns that drove the production were more profound, as was its effect on me. What 
I found so intriguing, although I had only an inkling of it at the time, was that these 
apparently frivolous magic tricks were being used to explore deeper truths. The 
production asked “What are we selling our soul for? And what sort of hell awaits us?” 
It interrogated the ways in which the distractions and entertainments that saturate our 
lives in a postmodern consumer culture have become its own kind of hell. 
 
Other forms of magic were also explored in the production. In the original text, the 
devil-trickster Mephistopheles gives Faustus a lesson into the secrets of the universe, 
and I was charged with updating this segment with a new kind of magic that brings 
together contemporary New Age spirituality and quantum physics.3 In the lesson 
Faustus is essentially told that reality is an illusion, a trick of perception. Is it possible 
that our perceptual process, one of the most fundamental ways of navigating our 
experience of the world, could be seen as magical in itself? It was this kind of 
question that I wanted to interrogate further and which led me to write this thesis.  
 
In exploring magic in contemporary theatre and film, I will take an exploratory and 
interdisciplinary approach that brings together two diverse strands: the ‘deception’ of 
magical thinking and the ‘truth’ of neuroscience. My approach to magical thinking is 
particularly influenced by both the psychologist Carl Jung and the sociologist Edgar 
Morin. Morin writes, “What characterizes Homo is not so much that he is faber, 
maker of tools, sapiens, rational and ‘realistic,’ but that he is also demens, producer of 
fantasies, myths, ideologies, magics” ([1956] 2005, 222 emphasis original). I have 
concentrated on an approach that considers magic as an aesthetic experience and can 
be seen as significant for its immanence rather than its transcendence. Hence, I will 
take what film scholar Patricia Pisters calls a “mental-materialist” (2009, 225) 
                                                
3 This magic has been created by inflating quantum physics to sensational levels and uniting it 
with New Age spirituality. The material was adapted and compiled from the mystical 
documentary What the #$*! Do We (K)now!? (Arntz et al 2004). 
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approach to neuroscience and focus on affective participation as it impacts on the 
body and the senses. She writes, “with the possibility of visualizing the brain in EEG, 
PET, MRI, fMRI and MEG scans, pictures of the brain are highly influential in 
neuroscientific research and they raise questions that travel back into popular culture 
and philosophy” (2009, 226). How the brain and body responds to theatre and film is 
an area of growing interest, and suggests a degree of ‘truth’ in the universality of 
responses to stimuli below the level of conscious awareness.4  
 
I will try to bridge the diversity between the two strands of magical thinking and 
neuroscience with the concept of “polyphasic consciousness,” (Laughlin et.al. 1990, 
155), which is an experiential and intuitive method of accessing knowledge that 
expands awareness and encompasses altered states. Some of the practices associated 
with altered states, such as hypnosis, hallucination, states of ecstasy, alchemy, 
telepathy, and shamanism, certainly involve imaginative magical thinking and, in 
many cases, have been considered supernatural magic. What neuroscientific research 
suggests, however, is that many of these practices can now be understood as natural 
processes that are available to anyone with guidance and practice. Glucklich writes, 
“The experience of magical events rests first and foremost on the sensory perception 
that all elements in the world are interrelated, not in a mystical union, but in a tapestry 
of natural interactions” (1997, 22). Polyphasic consciousness is a broadening of 
perceptual processes that encompasses multiple ways of accessing knowledge. In this 
way, it can include supernatural magic, but more importantly for my research, it can 
also offer other ways to consider the magical within a context that is not supernatural. 
Unlike in the Middle Ages, science and magic are now normally placed at odds with 
one another, but I will explore ways in which they can be mutually accommodated in 
the theatre productions and films I discuss. I will argue that polyphasic consciousness 
can be seen to encompass both the ‘deception’ of magical thinking and the ‘truth’ of 
neuroscience. I hope this opens up new ways of looking at contemporary theatrical 
and filmic productions that could be seen as magical. 
                                                
4 See Hasson, Uri et al. 2008, Hamzelou, Jessica. 2010, Elliott 2010. 
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Magic has fascinated scholars throughout history and while I will not retrace that 
ground I will consider how magic was engaged with in Marlowe’s time compared to 
how Free Theatre adapted and updated the material in 2010. And while the magical 
tricks of Doctor Faustus were the starting point, this is not a thesis about legerdemain 
and prestidigitation per se. I will focus on Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus in depth as 
it approaches magic both as a problem and a form of entertainment. The other 
Faustian case studies in this thesis are Jan Švankmajer’s 1994 film Lekce Faust and 
Werner Fritsch’s film poem Faust Sonnengesang (2012-2015), which includes 
footage from Free Theatre’s production of Faust Chroma. I will argue that in addition 
to exploring Faustian themes, both the diegetic reality within the films and the 
spectatorial affect can be seen as magical, but for opposite reasons: Lekce Faust 
evokes the ‘deceptive’ magic of early cinema while Faust Sonnengesang looks to the 
future by advocating new ‘truthful’ ways of being in the present.  
 
Other case studies contain more oblique Faustian themes but still carry the argument 
to the heart of the magical aesthetic experience I am exploring. The magic of early 
film magician Georges Méliès is discussed alongside an homage we made for Doctor 
Faustus, and again later when considering the magic of 3D cinema in the film Hugo 
(Scorsese 2011), also an homage to Méliès. The technological magic of creating one’s 
own body is considered in Free Theatre’s production of Frankenstein from 2016, 
another myth with significant parallels to Faust. I will also examine five films by 
Werner Herzog, a director who publicly opposes any connections to magic but whose 
filmmaking methodologies and thematic concerns propel his notion of “ecstatic truth” 
(Herzog 2010, 1), which I will argue can be seen as a magical means of striving for a 
kind of authenticity and depth.  
 
One thing that the myth of Faust teaches us is that magic is dangerously associated 
with evil and devils. Mephistopheles tempts Faustus with magic in order to distract 
him just long enough to claim his soul. The Devil is the original trickster, a con-artist 
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who uses illusion to lure humanity away from God and towards destruction. In a 
performance studies analysis of conjuration magic, Michael Mangan argues that from 
its earliest days Christian orthodoxy has linked the performance of magical tricks with 
the Devil (2007, 28). But the Devil can also be seen as the shadow side of our psyche, 
the wild and irrational aspects of our personality that we repress. Goethe had 
Mephistopheles claim to be, “Ein Teil von jener Kraft, Die stets das Böse will und 
stets das Gute schafft” ([1808] 1961, 158.1336).5 According to Jung, there can be 
value in dealing with our inner demons. Suffice to say that even today, I believe it is 
still seen in some quarters as a bit devilish to deal with magic and I have found I am 
not immune to the discomfort this causes me when discussing my topic, especially 
with the religious branch of the family. 
 
It was the problem of magic that attracted Edgar Morin to the subject of the magical 
in cinema in the 1950s when it was considered a “marginal, epiphenomenal subject 
for a ‘sociologist’ ” ([1956] 2005, 221). He found he was continually fascinated by 
the way the cinema impacted on his own life and began researching a book on the 
subject by trawling through cinematic surveys and studies. Ultimately, though, he 
found himself coming back to his “astonishment before this formidable imaginary 
universe of myths, gods, spirits, a universe not only superimposed on real life, but 
part of this anthroposocial real life” (ibid). What appeals to me in Morin’s ideas about 
cinematic magic is that he takes an academically rigorous approach to imagination, 
magical thinking and perception, and in doing so, he does not want to explain away 
the wonder that magic entails.  
 
Morin published two books on the subject of cinema: Le Cinéma ou l’Homme 
Imaginaire in 1956 and Les Stars in 1957. For this thesis I will concentrate on the 
2005 translated edition of Cinema, or the Imaginary Man. When it was first published 
in the 1950s it was criticised for concentrating on magic and mystery. As Pisters 
notes, film theory at that time was heading down the path of psychoanalysis, 
                                                
5 “Part of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good.” 
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structural linguistics and Marxism, and Morin did not fit (2009, 224-225). Morin’s 
work eschews traditional disciplinary boundaries, allows for complexity, and takes 
magical thinking seriously.  
 
There has been relatively little scholarship around Morin’s cinematic ideas (Mortimer 
2001, 77), despite being mentioned throughout film history by some of its most 
prominent theorists, such as Jean Mitry, Christian Metz and the postmodernist Fredric 
Jameson. I have found, however, that scholars tend to explain away the magic from 
his writing. The most common approach to his work is to concentrate on his 
arguments as they relate to perception and the role of the imaginary in the spectatorial 
process. This is certainly a critical component, and yet it seems to me that few take 
seriously Morin’s argument about how magic and magical thinking fit into ideas 
about perception and the imaginary, and how this might relate to cinema at a 
fundamental level. Film scholars Pisters and Blassnigg are exceptions in this regard 
and do consider the magical in Morin’s work as they discuss conjuration films 
(Pisters, 2009) and clairvoyance (Blassnigg, 2006). In the following example, 
Blassnigg outlines how Morin’s work has often been explained away: 
 
This ability of cinema to enhance the spectator’s perception, to some 
extent more drastically than other art forms have ever achieved, has on 
some occasions been treated ontologically as the ‘magical’ quality of 
cinema. The magical quality in this context has usually meant either the 
technology or the psychological effect or even the precondition of the 
human perception (2006, 106-107, emphasis mine).  
 
I will argue in this thesis for a kind of magical aesthetic experience that can be seen to 
encompass all of these factors. In doing so, I will follow Morin closely, although I 
acknowledge that many of his ideas have been traversed in other forms, separate from 
Morin, throughout film history. Dudley Andrew describes him as “presemiotic” 
(2009, 418). Morin is often cited as a precursor to Christian Metz’s semiotics and 
Andrew argues that “[Metz] owed Morin more than one footnote (although he is the 
first citation) for Le significant imaginaire (1977)” (Andrew 2009, 414). Morin does 
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sound somewhat simplistic in light of the semiotics that was to come later and even 
seems to apologise for this in the 1978 Preface to Cinema or the Imaginary Man, but 
in the end he concludes that his project “stops where semiotics begins [and] begins 
where semiotics stops” ([1956] 2005, 227), a circularity that is typical of his writing. 
 
I intend to take Morin’s argument that all cinema can be seen as fundamentally 
magical more seriously than I believe it has been. Morin’s point is that the perceptual 
process enlists and engages our imagination, which then creates something magical, 
and I will not ignore this point. In the main, I will explore films that take me into the 
midst of the phenomena I am discussing, but the advantage of Morin’s notion of the 
way a magical sensibility lies at the core of our perception of cinema, is that it can be 
tested against all film, from the most fantastical to the most mundane. 
 
Morin’s notion of filmic magic can also extend to other forms of mass 
communication. Diana Wade argues that Morin’s theories are not confined to cinema 
and can be applied throughout the technical evolution of images and into the digital 
era (2011, 203-221). In Chapter Three I will consider technology as magic. Morin’s 
ideas about the cinema emphasise the experience of spectatorial participation. He 
writes: 
 
The magical structures of this universe make us unequivocally recognize 
its subjective structures. All cinematic phenomena tend to confer the 
structures of subjectivity on the objective image. They call into question 
all affective participation. It is the scope of these phenomena that we 
should evaluate, it is the mechanisms of excitation that we should 
analyze ([1956] 2005, 90). 
 
In this way, as well as in both Pisters’ and Blassnigg’s chapters, Morin has been 
brought to bear on a re-evaluation of film theory as it relates to a “mental-materialist” 
approach. Such an approach frequently includes neuroscience, particularly in the way 
it relates to perception, to notions of affect as it impacts the body and the senses 
below the level of awareness, and to phenomena such as synaesthesia and mirror 
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neurons. In this regard, my own project accords with Pisters’ stated goal when she 
writes, “I argue that the re-appreciation of the magical qualities of cinema and the 
illusionary quality of perception can be rethought interdisciplinarily by relating film 
theory to certain developments in neuroscience” (2009, 225). I feel she could have 
gone further than she does in her chapter on the subject but I intend to follow this path 
more fully. To that end I will discuss both the diegetic reality within the film and the 
spectatorial affect where appropriate, without limiting myself to one or the other.  
 
For Pisters, neuroscience as it relates to film theory can include the theories of 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze as well as Morin, while Blassnigg discusses Morin 
alongside philosopher Henri Bergson and Deleuze. Andrew also mentions Bergson 
and Deleuze in his entry on Morin for The Routledge Companion of Philosophy and 
Film (2009). It is well known that Deleuze was influenced by Bergson, so a pairing of 
these two is common. I will argue that Morin also appears to have been influenced by 
Bergson. There is a recent trend in discussing Deleuze in particular with cinema, 
perception and neuroscience, and it stems from his assertions regarding the role of the 
brain and the screen. In an interview he states, “I don’t believe that linguistics or 
psychoanalysis offer a great deal to the cinema. On the contrary, the biology of the 
brain – molecular biology – does” (Flaxman 2000, 366). All three theorists (Morin, 
Bergson & Deleuze) can be considered in a discussion that privileges the role of 
perception and affect as it relates to the body. In this way I agree with Blassnigg’s 
assertion that such an approach can be treated as an event; that is to say, an 
experience (2006, 117). 
 
I first encountered the term “polyphasic consciousness” in John Ryan Haule’s two 
volume work on Jung in the 21st Century (2011). He describes the rationalism that 
typically dominates Western thinking as ‘monophasic’ and compares it with a 
‘polyphasic’ attitude to consciousness as it is described by C.D. Laughlin et.al. in 
Brain, Symbol and Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Human 
Consciousness (1990). The ‘consciousness’ component of this phrase is the trickiest 
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to define. Laughlin et.al. spend a chapter on it, and describe in detail both 
metaphorical and analytical configurations. In a brief summary though, they write that 
consciousness is “a term referring to the ongoing stream of experience that is 
mediated by a functional neural complex. This complex is a continuously 
transforming entrainment and disentrainment of neural networks which, among other 
things, models the world” (1990, 90). Haule argues that any definition of 
consciousness must retain a degree of looseness. A very loose definition from him is 
that “sometimes it designates any psychic phenomenon” (2011, 1:101). He also 
quotes the prominent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and concludes that he appears 
to limit consciousness to “those states in which I know that I know” (ibid), although 
Rossi argues in The Handbook of States of Consciousness that “consciousness, the 
essence of knowing, does not know itself very well” (1986, 97).  
 
I will use these tentative understandings to juxtapose ‘ordinary’ from ‘altered’ states 
of consciousness. During waking reality, awareness and an outer focus usually takes 
precedence, which is our ordinary state of consciousness, although many of our skills, 
such as how to drive a car, have aspects that have become unconscious through habit.6 
I use Jung’s definition of the unconscious as the subliminal content of psychic 
phenomena, or, “the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of 
consciousness” ([1928] 1945, 275). He distinguishes ‘personal unconscious’ (which 
includes lost memories and repressions) from the ‘collective unconscious’ (which 
includes inherited qualities such as instincts and intuition) (ibid, 275-276). 
 
With appropriate arousal or relaxation, we can slip from ordinary consciousness into 
altered states of consciousness such as trance and hypnosis and experience 
phenomena such as hallucinations. This is admittedly a somewhat simplistic 
definition, as Laughlin et.al. point out that Buddhist scriptural sources describe 
                                                
6 Glucklich describes how neurologists and cognitive psychologists call this implicit learning, 
whereas “explicit learning is based on memory, language, and conscious awareness” (2005, 109 
emphasis original). 
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eighty-nine distinct types of consciousness (1990, 80). But it will allow me to move 
into an understanding of polyphasic consciousness as an embodied approach to 
accessing knowledge that broadens perception away from a sole focus on rational 
thinking to include more than is usually accessible by ordinary, waking 
consciousness. In this way it might include altered states of consciousness and other 
forms of perceptual diversity. 
 
Altered states and polyphasic consciousness are thoroughly discussed by the post-
Jungian John Ryan Haule. He argues that recent neuroscientific advances support 
much of Jung’s theoretical framework and particularly interrogates those theories for 
which Jung was labeled a ‘mystic’. When discussing altered states of consciousness 
he argues that Jung was quite correct in believing these were not supernatural 
experiences, but “a universal feature of the human brain and nervous system” (Haule 
2011, 2:2).  
 
Anthropologist Ariel Glucklich also understands magic as a natural human 
experience. In The End of Magic he studies the history of magic in the Academy and 
the magical practices of the people of Banaras, India, where magicians are often 
preferred to medical doctors as healers of conditions mental, spiritual and physical. I 
will not take an anthropological approach to the material but have found his analysis 
invaluable. He surveys the history of magic from its earliest uses in ancient Persia, 
Greece and Italy, to the major contemporary theorists in the field. In charting the 
ways in which magic is explained by science, Glucklich also looks to new science 
such as quantum physics before suggesting a range of approaches that do not rely on 
meaning as much as suggesting where and how we might look for magic. 
 
He examines magic within an ethnographic framework and develops a concept he 
calls ‘magical consciousness’.7 A key component to Glucklich’s magical 
                                                
7 A similar approach is taken by anthropologist Susan Greenwood, who studies Western nature 
religions such as Paganism, New Age and Western Shamanism. They both examine magic within 
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consciousness is that it uses non-rational methods of connecting to the world to give 
rise to an awareness of the interconnectedness of all things, an approach that hinges 
on collective, rather than personal, experience. He argues that this understanding of 
the magical is essentially phenomenological: participatory, experiential and often 
numinous. He writes: 
 
If magic is a matter of perception and is intrinsically subjective, it is 
probably most accurate to avoid using it as a noun. There is no such thing 
as magic, only a magical attitude, and following it a magical rite or 
belief. The noun implies the existence of an objective thing, like 
medicine or meteorology, and we have seen how easily such things can 
be made to disappear. The subjective attitude is the only valid way of 
considering magic; I call it the ‘magical experience,’ or ‘consciousness’ 
(1997, 22-23). 
 
Glucklich’s aims as described in this passage accord with my own and I will bring his 
ideas into my understanding of polyphasic consciousness. 
 
I stated at the beginning that the main theories in this thesis will bring together the 
diverse strands of magical thinking and neuroscience, and that polyphasic 
consciousness will form a bridge between the two. Magical thinking will concentrate 
primarily on Morin’s discussion of its importance and the role of imagination. The 
neuroscientific strand has already been charted by Pisters, Blassnigg and Andrew and 
places Bergson and Deleuze alongside Morin’s arguments about perception. The 
polyphasic consciousness bridge then follows Laughlin et.al, Glucklich and the post-
Jungian Haule. This will bring altered states into the discussion in an attempt to reach 
a deeper understanding of how magic might be considered an aesthetic experience in 
the polyphasic sense.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
an ethnographic framework and separately come up with a concept both call ‘magical 
consciousness’. Greenwood explains the consilience thus, “That we should independently come 
to the same conclusions using different ‘data’ is affirming of our idea that magic is a natural 
process of the human mind” (2005, xii).  
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In the course of exploring polyphasic consciousness, I came across a practice once 
seen as magical that now has a wealth of scientific material written about it: 
shamanism. While I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Two when I look at Werner 
Herzog’s documentary Cave of Forgotten Dreams (2010), I wish to signal here that 
Herzog suggests that the 32,000 year old cave paintings that form the subject of the 
film can be seen as a kind of ‘proto-cinema’. He argues that the urge to go into dark 
spaces to watch moving images is at least as old as the Upper Paleolithic; 
prehistorians Clottes and Lewis-Williams link what is known about the spatial 
organisation and the paintings inside the caves to the magical and performative 
practice of shamanism (1998, 29). It would seem from this possibility that bringing a 
cinematic imagination to the creation of the filmic goes deeper than just film. As a 
space and an experience, it can also be seen as theatrical and performative.   
 
Ernst Kirby argues in Ur-Drama that shamanic performance can be understood as the 
origin of theatre (1975, 2). In a performance sense, the emphasis is on the 
participation of the audience and the affect of ritual, which often includes magic such 
as sleight of hand tricks, and is related to altered states of consciousness such as 
hypnosis, trance and hallucination (ibid, 5).  
 
In this way, theatre and film will be brought together in this thesis with the proto- and 
the ur-. If the concept of polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience 
within the cinema can be seen as an experience of bodily affect, then an element of 
physical excitation and therefore liveness enters the spectatorial event, which suggests 
a performative element. Theatre and film have never been meaningfully separate for 
me as they have in common theories of genre, representation and performance. All of 
the theatre productions I discuss in this thesis had a filmic component and I would 
argue that most of the films can be seen as theatrical.  
 
As signaled earlier, I will begin Chapter One with magic as it is found in one of its 
most academically acceptable forms: the myth of Faust. I will consider the role of 
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magic in Marlowe’s time and will discuss Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus, where I 
played the roles of Cornelius and Covetousness, and operated a devil marionette. I 
will consider the ways in which this production played with magic and explored the 
concept of a magical hell while it searched for deeper truths. Following this starting 
point I will bring in Morin’s argument that cinema can be seen as fundamentally 
magical, and outline how he approaches cinema as a kind of magic. As perception is 
key to this discussion, I will bring in Henri Bergson’s philosophical understanding of 
perception to underpin Morin’s argument. From here a re-appreciation of the filmic 
component of Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus can be examined. The role of film as a 
magical illusion was explored in the production by taking an historical approach to its 
development. It began with a Magic Lantern slide show and progressed through 
examples of Faustian-themed films from early to contemporary cinema. I will pay 
particular attention to the Méliès-style homage that we made for the production. I 
conclude the chapter with a close examination of Jan Švankmajer’s 1994 film Lekce 
Faust, a magical film about the magic of Faust that can be seen to engage with many 
of the concepts Morin discusses as well as the magic of early film techniques. In this 
way I intend to ground the thesis in the theatrical magic of Faust and the cinematic 
magic of early film. 
 
I will begin Chapter Two by looking at psychologist Carl Jung’s insights into both 
Faust and magic. Jung’s work was an early starting point in my research process 
because Goethe’s Faust is profoundly important to him. In addition to affecting him 
on a deep personal level, he saw it as the myth of modern Western culture. While 
Jung’s theories and perspective can be seen as dated, it was essential in leading me to 
the work of John Ryan Haule, whose post-Jungian, scientific approach to 
interrogating Jung’s claims brought me to the notion of polyphasic consciousness. 
 
Following the material found in Haule’s work I began to ask myself if it was possible 
to reevaluate concepts of magic in the 21st century. Could some practices previously 
considered to be supernatural magic, such as telepathy and shamanism, now, with the 
 15 
benefit of advances in neuroscience, be seen as natural processes available to 
everyone? This allowed me to begin to shift the focus away from considering magic 
as a noun (as Glucklich put it) and see it rather as a process that leads towards a 
broader, polyphasic attitude to a magical aesthetic experience, which I outline in 
detail in Chapter Two.  
 
The introduction of neuroscience into the discussion will permit me to talk about the 
cinematic philosophy of Deleuze before considering the theoretical material alongside 
the films of Werner Herzog. While Herzog’s films contain little or no overt magic 
within the diegesis, he is a director that can be seen as theatrical and whose concern to 
present deep and “ecstatic” images I will argue is yet another iteration of a quest for 
the magical.  
 
I will look at four of his films in chronological order in this chapter as they might be 
seen to take a polyphasic attitude to a magical aesthetic experience. I will begin by 
focusing on Deleuze’s crystal image with Heart of Glass (Herzog, 1976) because 
Deleuze declares that this film contains the “greatest crystal images in the history of 
cinema” ([1985] 2005, 73). Nosferatu the Vampyre (Herzog, 1979) will then be 
discussed alongside Antonin Artaud’s concept of the plague from his Theatre of 
Cruelty. Magic is an important part of Artaud’s thinking and given his prominence, 
can therefore be seen as important for modern theatre. I will attempt to bring his 
theatrical ideas to the discussion of this theatrical film. Following Nosferatu, I will 
look at the altered state of shamanism and recent trends in 3D films with a detailed 
examination of Cave of Forgotten Dreams and a brief discussion of two other 3D 
films: Avatar (Cameron, 2009) and Hugo (Scorsese, 2011). The chapter will conclude 
with Herzog’s own concept of “ecstatic truth” as it can be seen to inform the volcano 
documentary Into the Inferno (Herzog, 2016). 
 
I will bring the discussion into the recent past in Chapter Three by considering 
technology as a kind of magic, particularly new technologies. Erik Davis writes in 
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Techgnosis that “technology operates as easily in a magical universe as a rational one; 
indeed, from the perspective of cultural narratives and political power, technology 
often functions as magic” (1998, 172, emphasis original). I will consider virtual 
reality gaming as a hallucinatory experience before completing the discussion of 
Herzog films with his documentary about the internet, Lo and Behold (2016), where I 
will look at the ‘Internet of Me’ as a kind of black magic. From there I will examine 
Free Theatre’s 2016 production of Frankenstein, where technology and magic can be 
seen to intersect in Artaud and Deleuze’s concepts of the ‘body without organs’. I will 
also consider how the character of False Maria, which was modeled after the 
character in Lang’s film Metropolis (1927) could be seen as both a Faustian 
Homunculus and a robotic artificial intelligence. 
 
I will conclude with Werner Fritsch’s two-part abstract film-poem Faust 
Sonnengesang (2012-2015), which I will consider alongside synaesthesia, mirror 
neurons, and his contemporary postmodern approach to Faust. The film includes 
footage of the Free Theatre production of Faust Chroma that sparked my initial 
interest in the myth of Faust. Fritsch uses a unique filmic technique that he developed 
called ‘Faust-Keil’. I will argue this technique provokes a magical aesthetic 
experience in the polyphasic sense. I believe he does this specifically to stimulate 
affective intensities in the spectator in such a way that it can lead to a perception-
altering experience of the moment.  
 
One of the motivating aims for me throughout this thesis has been to find ways of 
approaching the magical in theatre and film that alleviates some of its more negative 
associations with the demonic. I will argue that Fritsch achieves this with a kind of 
‘white’ magic that seeks to raise consciousness, the full experience of which, in 
theatre and film, can lead to what Artaud calls “a constant magic” ([1938] 1958, 8). 
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It is this “constant magic” in a contemporary sense that this thesis ultimately seeks, 
whilst also acknowledging that notions the magical have been with us constantly in 




Chapter One: The Magic of Faust and the Magic of Film 
 
Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus (2010) 
The story of Faust began in Germany in the Middle Ages as a legend about a real 
scholar called Georg Faust who lived around 1480-1540. He had apparently mastered 
occult practices before dying violently. The story was used as an object lesson in the 
dangers of dealing in demonic sorcery (fear of witchcraft being rife), and within 50 
years it had evolved into a myth of popular fantastical tales in which a scholar, 
dissatisfied with the limits of human knowledge, was granted magical powers in a 
pact with the Devil. It became staple marketplace entertainment in the form of puppet 
plays and was first published in a chapbook in 1587 by Johann Spies as the Historia 
von D. Johann Fausten, which allowed it to spread across Europe into England, 
where it was famously taken up and made into a successful play by Christopher 
Marlowe (first performed as The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus circa 1591) and 
later by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (published in 1808). 
 
During the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance in Europe, there was little 
distinction between magic and science. They were both part of what was considered 
natural philosophy, ways of interpreting the relationship between man and the 
universe. Magicians were alchemists, astrologers, fortune tellers, spiritual advisors, 
dream interpreters and healers. They often travelled from town to town across Europe, 
offering their services. Famous names include Paracelsus, Cornelius Agrippa, and 
John Dee. It has been suggested that the real Faust was one of these wandering 
magicians, probably some kind of primitive alchemist (Morys 2010). The birth of 
modern science occurred around the 17th century, shortly after Marlowe’s time, when 
chemistry came to replace alchemy, astronomy replaced astrology, and advances in 
germ theory destabilised the role of the magician-healer. Spiritual matters became the 
sole provenance of the Church. Throughout the Middle Ages and into the 
Renaissance, magician-scientists were subject to increasing suspicion, the concern 
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centering around the fear that they did not practice ‘natural’ but ‘black’ magic, the 
latter involving the assistance of devils. Marlowe biographer David Riggs writes: 
 
The passage from this so-called ‘natural’ magic to idolatrous or ‘black’ 
magic occurred when the practitioner employed talismans, symbolic 
utterances or ritual practices in order to operate a demon (spirit, 
intelligence or demigod) that embodied an occult force. The boundary 
was imprecise, but somewhere along this spectrum the ‘white’ magician 
became an idolater practicing a pagan religion (2004, 176-177). 
 
Faust desires God-like knowledge and this necessitates a contract with the Devil. On a 
BBC Radio programme about the endurance of the Faust myth, Ronald Hutton and 
Osman Durrani state that it was Luther who first condemned the real Faust for dealing 
with the Devil, and it is from Luther that the idea of a demonic pact takes hold in 
popular imagination. Luther believed in a personal devil, and as interest grew into 
what these devils might be like, people eventually came to the view that there were 
many different types, even a specialist devil for every sin. Mephistopheles, who has 
no biblical precedent and is found only in the Faust myth, apparently targeted the 
vulnerable intellectual who was constantly asking questions (Morys 2010). 
 
According to Andrew Sofer in a Theatre Journal article titled “How to Do Things 
with Demons,” Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus may have been a part of cementing public 
concern over the practice of black magic, as it features numerous devils in various 
guises, and includes appearances by Lucifer and Belzebub. He outlines the three-point 
process for conjuring a devil: It requires the precise uttering of a spell, or citation, so 
it could not be done via improvisation. The demon summoned was subsequently 
compelled and could not refuse to appear, so the utterance was an imperative. Thirdly, 
the “magical utterance was autonomous” (Sofer 2009, 4). In other words, it did not 
require faith, only the correct performance, “blur[ring]the distinction between theatre 
and magic” (ibid, 2). To perform Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus requires uttering spells, 
and it was believed that the actor might actually, and inadvertently, cause the magic to 
happen and devils to appear. Sofer argues that this potential accounts for a large part 
 20 
of the appeal of the play, as it “thrilled and alarmed Elizabethan audiences, causing 
them to see devils that were not literally there” (ibid, 3). 
 
One of the perceived problems in dealing with conjured devils is keeping them under 
control. While Mephistopheles may allow Faustus to believe that he is controlling the 
devilish force, Sofer points out that Mephistopheles is interested only in distracting 
him long enough to get to the end of the 24 years without him repenting so that he can 
claim his soul, and so, at all times, he controls Faustus’ adventures, and he does this 
by distracting him with magic (ibid, 16). 
 
When Free Theatre adapted and updated the play for its 2010 production, director 
Peter Falkenberg focused on the magic of distraction and the magic of hell, with 
interesting and unique results. There are two kinds of hell in the conventional reading 
of Doctor Faustus: the otherworldly torture-house of fire and brimstone, into which 
Faustus is finally dragged, and an internal hell, a state of mind suffered by the demon 
Mephistopheles for being deprived of God. The otherworldly hell remains unseen by 
the audience, and Faustus is allowed a dreadful glimpse of it only moments before he 
is taken away forever. This glimpse is described in some detail by the bad angel, who 
acts as local guide: 
 
 Now Faustus, let thine eyes with horror stare 
 Into that vast perpetual torture-house. 
 There are the furies, tossing damned souls 
 On burning forks. Their bodies broil in lead. 
 There are live quarters broiling on the coals, 
 That ne’er can die: this ever-burning chair 
 Is for over-tortured souls to rest them in. 
 These that are fed with sops of flaming fire 
 Were gluttons and loved only delicates 
 And laughed to see the poor starve at their gates. 
 But yet all these are nothing. Thou shalt see 
 Ten thousand tortures that more horrid be (5.2, 115-126). 
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This is spectacular and theatrical imagery for all its invisibility, but the majority of 
scholarship around hell in Doctor Faustus focuses on the internal state of being 
separated from God. Here are two pertinent sections from the play:  
 
Faustus: And what are you that live with Lucifer? 
Mephistopheles: Unhappy spirits that fell with Lucifer, 
 Conspired against our God with Lucifer, 
 And are forever damned with Lucifer. 
Faustus: Where are you damned? 
Mephistopheles: In hell. 
Faustus: How comes it that thou art out of hell? 
Mephistopheles: Why this is hell, nor am I out of it. 
 Think’st thou that I who saw the face of God 
 And tasted the eternal joys of heaven 
 Am not tormented with ten thousand hells 




Mephistopheles: So now Faustus, ask me what thou wilt. 
Faustus: First will I question thee about hell. 
 Tell me, where is the place that men call hell? 
Mephistopheles: Under the heavens. 
Faustus: Aye, so are all things, but whereabouts? 
Mephistopheles: Within the bowels of these elements 
 Where we are tortured and remain forever. 
 Hell hath no limits nor is circumscribed 
 In one self place, but where we are is hell, 
 And where hell is there must we ever be. 
 And to be short, when all the world dissolves 
 And every creature shall be purified 
 All places shall be hell that is not heaven! 
Faustus: I think hell’s a fable. 
Mephistopheles: Aye, think so still – till experience change thy mind 
(2.1, 115-140).  
 
An alternative contemporary reading of “This is hell, nor am I out of it” can be found 
in Peter Falkenberg’s approach to the direction of Free Theatre’s production of the 
play. “What are we selling our soul for? And what sort of hell awaits us?” Falkenberg 
asks in the programme for the show. He does not see hell as a personal or 
psychological condition, but rather as a political and social one, “Where we are is 
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hell,” says Mephistopheles, who clearly knows more than we do. Expanding on this 
idea, hell in Falkenberg’s reading is the distractions and entertainments that have 
become the everyday experience of our lives in a postmodern, capitalist, consumer 
culture. Through Mephistopheles’ magic Faustus spends 24 years indulging in 
limitless luxuries and distracting entertainments. But while he experiences what for 
him appears to be a kind of paradise on earth, it turns out to be a fool’s paradise. 
Desire for knowledge is displaced with the desire to possess beauty and power. 
According to this scenario, the pact with the Devil never goes Faustus’ way, as even 
while Mephistopheles serves his every whim, the distracting experience can be seen 
as hellish. 
 
In a modern reading on Faustian Economics, writer Wendell Berry focuses on a hell 
that “hath no limits” as Mephistopheles claims. Berry links a lack of limitation to an 
attitude that we have a right to pursue, without limit, whatever we desire and that 
greed has been made an honourable motive, normalising ideals of limitless 
knowledge, science, technology, progress, growth, and wealth. Faustus encapsulates 
this problem when he remarks that he wants “all nature’s treasury, to ransack the 
ocean,” which would, if followed through, cause economic meltdown and 
environmental degradation (Berry 2008). And therein lies the problem with 
limitlessness, with pushing every boundary: it can lead to destruction. Science has led 
to the atomic bomb, and economic progress has led to climate change. Because the 
payment for having no limits is never immediate, but always comes much later, writer 
Margaret Atwood refers to the pact with the Devil in Payback as “the first buy-now, 
pay later scheme” (2008, 163). Most of us will be living by this scheme in the form of 
mortgages and credit card debt. Lifestyle choices can also be seen to follow such a 
scheme when we find out, for example, that our use of plastics is contributing to the 
Great Pacific Garbage Patch or that microplastics is contaminating sea salt. Linking 
the Devil with limitlessness and a lack of regard for future consequences appears to 
be the kind of hell on earth supported by the modern Church of Satan. In the Satanic 
Scriptures, Satanist Aaron Gilmore writes, “We are… striving to understand and 
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utilize the universe for our personal indulgence… Anyone who excels in a material 
field has made a pact with Satan, as they have embraced the belief that success in the 
here and now is of the greatest importance” (2007, 195-196, emphasis original). 
 
In Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus the limitlessness of hell is exemplified by the seven 
deadly sins, who are paraded before Faustus for his entertainment.8 Gluttony is 
singled out for special mention both literally and symbolically in the text,9 and this 
makes sense given Faustus’ greedy hunger for knowledge and experiences. But taking 
gluttony to its extreme leads to obesity, the symbolism of which I wish to compare 
with Jean Baudrillard’s political argument about obesity and obscenity in Fatal 
Strategies (1999). Obesity, he posits, can be seen as both a personal and societal state 
of empty inflation. For society to reach the level of obesity, it must have conformed 
with the system to such a degree that it has become gargantuan and filled in all spaces 
with superfluous signs (ibid, 27-28). The companion to this overload, obscenity, is the 
display of all this excess, so that nothing is hidden and the surface of things is 
saturated with meaninglessness. The equivalent in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus would 
be Gluttony’s companion Lust, who lets it all hang out. This display of excess belongs 
to the ‘deception’ of magical thinking. As Baudrillard states, “we never desire the real 
event, but its spectacle, never things, but their sign” (ibid, 76). The spectacle that Lust 
suggests is one of pornography, that obscene state where everything is explicit, 
demonstrative and up-close. In this way she can be compared to the mythic figure of 
Helen of Troy, the image of whom is conjured by Mephistopheles at Faustus’ request. 
As the woman who launched a thousand ships, she can also be seen as a classic 
femme fatale figure, that virtual cinematic siren. In the Faustbuch Faust has sex with 
her, but the impossibility of having sex with an image confines her to the realm of 
                                                
8 Falkenberg based the sins on Otto Dix’s 1933 painting, The Seven Deadly Sins. Dix’s painting 
portrays the sins in grotesque and theatrical fashion, meant as a political satire to be critical of the 
Nazi regime. Envy is shown, for example, wearing a Hitler mask. 
9 The chorus informs the audience at the beginning of the play that Faustus becomes “glutted now 
with learning’s golden gifts” (Prologue, 23). Later the bad angel points out that in hell gluttons 
get fed sops of flaming fire (5.2, 123). 
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pornography, and this was how Helen of Troy was presented in Free Theatre’s 
production. 
 
Through the use of the Devil’s magic, Marlowe’s Faustus is able to indulge in 
distracting entertainments such as flying to Rome, accessing grapes out of season, and 
conjuring up an image of a powerful world leader and the most beautiful woman in 
the world. But these are feats that no longer need magic and are made available and 
normal to us today by technology. We can have grapes, and any other kind of 
produce, out of season, even delivered to our door via an order over the internet (and 
soon our fridge will automatically place the order for us when it detects we are 
running low). But there is a significant catch. In order to meet the demand, these 
grapes have been grown and processed in California by workers who are often 
exploited (Carroll 2016). In order to grow them quickly enough to make a profit and 
keep them fresh, up to 56 types of pesticides have been used (PAN 2010), 
consistently earning non-organic grapes and wine a place on Organics Magazine’s 
Dirty Dozen list, which rates the foods with the highest pesticide residues. In the 2014 
survey grapes topped the list (White 2014). It could be argued that we are poisoning 
ourselves for grapes out of season. Likewise we can fly to Rome, or anywhere else, 
but in doing so a single person would use over seven tonnes of polluting carbon 
emissions for the return flight between New Zealand and Rome. And we can not only 
download or watch on demand hundreds of moving and still images of world leaders 
or beautiful film stars, we can even add horns to their heads with photo-editing 
software, the way Faustus does with magic to the Emperor’s Knight when he angers 
him. And if that is too mundane, we can design for ourselves idealised avatars and 
live a gaming world Second Life online, even if we are not actually living the first.   
 
Scholarship around Faustus’ damnation has focused in large part on his inability to 
repent, despite apparent opportunities. One common argument for this inability is the 
Calvin-inspired concept that one is either predestined for damnation or salvation, and 
repentance is therefore impossible. It is often cited that when Faustus is in his study 
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deciding whether or not to carry on with divinity, he bastardises the Bible by 
including the passages relating to damnation and leaving out the ones that directly 
follow proclaiming salvation is possible. Furthermore, we are told by the Chorus in 
the Prologue that “heavens conspired [Faustus’] overthrow!” (Prologue, 21). In The 
Aesthetics of Antichrist (2007) John Parker investigates the topic and sees a link 
between Faustus’ inevitable damnation and the need for Christ to die to pacify his 
Father’s wrath. He writes that Faustus signs his soul away in blood, “in the same 
manner that the blood of Christ also functions. The Bible, too, is signed in blood. That 
is how Jesus ratified his will and Testament… Faustus bequeaths his soul to Satan, 
that is, just as Christ surrenders to his bloodthirsty Father, whom Satan anyway had 
always imitated” (Parker 2007, 243). Parker’s reading echoes Calvinist readings more 
generally in concluding that there is no possibility of redemption for Faustus, which 
highlights a key problem with the structure of the play. This, in essence, is the 
argument against the need for the middle scenes. If Faustus’ damnation is inevitable, 
why not just have the scenes up to the signing of the pact and then jump straight to 
Faustus being dragged off to hell, in other words, Act One, the very beginning of Act 
Two, and then Act Five? Why the need for so much of the play to be taken up with 
Faustus’ tricks as a black magic entertainer?  
 
This particular debate has spanned decades and focuses on long-standing questions 
about authorship and the differences between the A-text, published in 1604, already 
more than 10 years after the play was written and Marlowe had been murdered, and 
the B-text, published in 1616. It is generally accepted that at least parts of the comic 
scenes were written by one or more collaborators, or even that Marlowe may only 
have written the beginning and ending. Milena Kostic summarises this argument: 
 
[Marlowe] could be considered the author only of the introductory and 
the concluding parts, those ‘mighty’ lines that deal with Faustus’ fearless 
tampering with tabooed knowledge and his final tragic realisation that he 
has been cheated both of ultimate metaphysical answers and of the 
worldly power he hoped to attain. The middle, filled up as it is with 
frivolous episodes involving Faustus’ tricks with the Pope or shows for 
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the Emperor and ending up in the petty and degrading acts of revenge 
upon innocent or merely foolish bystanders, must be, according to these 
critics, the work of a lesser hand than Marlowe’s (2009, 216). 
 
On the other side of the scholarly argument, Cleanth Brooks maintains the unity of 
the text is intact, arguing that the middle scenes develop the character of Faustus and 
are necessary for his “personal self-examination and inner conflict” (1986, 98). As 
with the understanding that Mephistopheles’ hell is an internal state of deprivation, 
this argument sees Faustus’ “fortunes, good or bad” as personal and psychological. 
By contrast, Falkenberg’s political reading of “where we are is hell” elevates the 
significance of the middle scenes to a site where a concrete vision of hell could be 
presented. And just as Marlowe’s Faustus was distracted by the magic of the Devil, 
Falkenberg updated this magic to include the distractions and spectacles of our 
entertainments and the dominance of technologies that simultaneously fill up and 
strip off meaning from our lives.  
 
In performing Faustus in this hell, Falkenberg highlighted the role of the show and the 
showman. Faustus becomes an entertainer, plays dinnertime tricks on the Pope and 
performs sleight of hand magic directly for the audience. These distractions are all 
engineered by Mephistopheles, but Falkenberg points out how easily Faustus is lured 
away from truly probing questions about the universe, or any other potentially 
meaningful pastime. There is one attempt by Faustus to discover the truth about the 
universe, which took the form of an updated version of Mephistopheles’ physics 
lesson. This included the latest theories on relativity and dark matter, and ended with 
a new kind of magic that seeks to join New Age spirituality with quantum physics, 
which was compiled from the mystical documentary What the #$*! Do We 
(K)now!?(Arntz et al. 2004). These theories take some of the assertions of quantum 
physics – that reality at the quantum level is illusory, particles may be in multiple 
places at once and that everything is connected, or entangled, with everything else – 
and inflates them in sensational ways to magical proportions. In Free Theatre’s 
production, this translated into Mephistopheles answering Faustus’ attempts to 
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understand the universe with the tantalising proclamation that Faustus can be “his 
own God” and “can create his own reality.”  
 
For Falkenberg’s subversive reading of hell to be successful, the middle scenes, that 
some argue are unnecessary, become absolutely crucial. It is here that a concrete 
vision of “this is hell, nor am I out of it” is explored. Hell becomes the experience of 
living with a glut of technology, or the nightmare of too much distraction. Slavoj 
Žižek argues in the documentary, The Perverts Guide To Cinema (Fiennes, 2006) that 
the realisation of fantasy does not lead to satisfaction, but to nightmare. In this way, 
the magical distractions that the Devil conjures to realise Faustus’ desires can be seen 
to have created a kind of hell out of the here and the now. Perhaps it could even be 
said that the modern world has accelerated the symbolic state of obesity and obscenity 
to such an extent that the experience of both the “buy now” and the “payback” have 
fused and are currently being experienced at the same time. In this way, illusion and 
tricks were used not only to conjure entertainment, but also to highlight what could be 
seen as the hellish state that our distractions create for us. 
 
The magical distractions in Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus also involved film, 
particularly that of early pioneer Georges Méliès. The beginning of cinema is often 
described as magical. Even if it is not true that people ducked in fright at the first 
Lumière screening in 1895 when a train seemed to come towards them, it must have 
been an awesome experience to gather with others in a darkened room and 
collectively see images of people like themselves move for the first time. Not long 
after Lumière’s first screening, Georges Méliès built his own camera and began 
making fantasy spectacles. He was first and foremost a stage magician, a showman 
who transferred his skills to the new celluloid medium. Most of the over 500 films he 
made included magic or fantasy within the narrative. But more than that, he saw the 
technology as a new kind of magic and developed tricks for the medium of film, such 
as superimposition to create copies of himself, double exposure and the dissolve, 
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which he used to turn one thing into something else, and the simple editing cut, which 
was used to make a person or creature appear or disappear in the blink of an eye. 
 
While Méliès’ screen tricks are considered simple today, they are still remarkably 
effective. I have made some basic appear/disappear vignettes with students of film 
history and they have always found them effective in a magical sense, even though 
the process is completely demystified for them. Despite the fact that they can see the 
trick for what it is, they still engage with, and enjoy it, as something magical. This 
signals an intentional engagement with our imagination in creating this magic, one of 
the cornerstones of Edgar Morin’s argument about the significance of magic in 
cinema, which he outlined in his 1956 book Le Cinéma ou l’Homme Imaginaire. 
 
In this book Morin considers the importance of imagination within our perceptual 
process as it relates to cinema, and finds that it can be seen as fundamentally magical. 
He starts with the photograph and considers the charm of the still image, or 
photogénie, as “[a] quality that is not in life but in the image of life” (Morin [1956] 
2005, 15). He argues that the most mundane image can be given a status beyond its 
original, a process of valorisation that magnifies, enhances, exalts and elevates the 
image into a site of fascination. This is achieved, he argues, by a process of 
psychological projection and concrete, objective alienation (ibid, 23-24). 
 
Morin sees the image as haunted by the specter of the double. His notion of the 
double harks back to archaic and universal myths of such doubles as reflections, 
mirror images, the shadow, dreams, the alter ego, doppelgängers, spirit doubles and 
anthropomorphism. In addition to possessing the quality of photogénie, we pour into 
the double our hopes, dreams, desires and fears. Morin writes: 
 
Before projecting his terrors there, man first of all fixed upon the double 
all his life ambitions – ubiquity, the power of metamorphoses, magical 
omnipotence – and the fundamental ambition concerning his death: 
immortality. He put all his strength there, the best and the worst that he 
has not been able to actualize, all the still-foolish powers of his being. 
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The double is his image, at once accurate and radiating with an aura that 
goes beyond him – his myth (ibid, 26). 
 
The process of valorising this image-double involves imagination, and the 
significance of the double within our mythical consciousness endows it with magical 
qualities. Méliès began experimenting with superimposition during the infancy of the 
cinematograph, and before long, it was doubles of all sorts that sprang up in his films 
– doubles of Méliès himself, or doubles of parts of his body (often his head) along 
with supernatural doubles: ghosts, specters, skeletons and demons. Morin states that 
he gives “ghostly superimposition and doubling pride of place because they have for 
us the familiar traits of ‘magic’ already evoked, but also because they possess the 
characteristics proper to the new world of the cinema” (ibid, 51).  
 
Morin further argues that metamorphosis is a magical concept that, in the form of 
montage, is fundamental to the cinema. All editing, where one scene or image gives 
way to another, is a kind of transformation. Add to this the fluidity of cinematic time, 
where chronology is broken into fragments, where the past and present can become 
indiscernible, and where motion can be accelerated, slowed down or reversed, what is 
given rise to is “a universe that is itself fluid, where everything undergoes 
metamorphosis” (ibid, 58). Added to the metamorphosis of time is the metamorphosis 
of space. As soon as the camera began to move, everything in the mise-en-scene also 
appeared to transform, the inanimate as well as the animate, ultimately giving us the 
“metamorphosis of objects. The screen is literally a magician’s handkerchief, a 
crucible where everything is transformed, appears, and vanishes” (ibid, 62, emphasis 
original). In this way Morin argues that while metamorphosis is overtly visible in 
fantasy films, it is also just as present in realist films, where it is now experienced as 
the ordinary structure of cinema. For Morin, the language and structure of cinema has 
been developed from a basis of magical thinking and imagination. And if the 
metamorphosis of time and space is understood as a magical and ubiquitous part of 
cinema, then all cinema can be seen as magical at this fundamental level.  
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Through familiarity and repetition, Morin argues that what was magical about early 
cinema soon became the ordinary and clichéd language of film. I will return to this 
idea shortly but wish to note that while we quickly become familiar with, and 
naturalise, this language as children, at the time of writing my 5-year old, who had not 
experienced much screen time, was watching a contemporary music video set on a 
dance floor. As the camera swept around the two dancers, he commented that the 
floor was moving. He was seeing the film entirely differently from me. I had 
understood what I was seeing as an effect created by a moving camera as a means of 
psychologically heightening the giddy sentiments of love suggested by the song and 
the dancing, the external artistic expression of an internal feeling. But my 5-year old 
had perceived the imagery from a literal perspective – a perspective that I understand 
as being closer to Morin’s idea of cinematic magic. What my son saw was that the 
floor had transformed into a moving entity as if it had magically come to life, which 
signals another two-pronged aspect of Morin’s notion of cinematic magic – that of 
anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism.  
 
Anthropomorphism is the process of projecting ourselves onto the world. It is a leap 
of imagination that can be seen as magical in that it grants a soul to the inanimate or 
the inhuman. Cosmomorphism is the process of identification with the world, of 
connecting ourselves with the universe. Morin argues that projection and 
identification are the “original energizing nature” of this anthropomorphism and 
cosmomorphism. He writes, “Projection is a universal and multiform process. Our 
needs, our aspirations, our desires, our obsessions, our fears, project themselves not 
only into the void as dreams and imaginings, but onto all things and all beings” (ibid, 
85). Identification is then the process of absorbing the “environment into the self and 
integrat[ing] it affectively” (ibid, 86). Projection and identification, 
anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism oscillate around one another. The two are 
interconnected, dialectical, can be seen in terms of magical thinking, and are 
fundamental to the origin of the way we perceive cinema (ibid, 92).  
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As mentioned briefly above, Morin points out that unless the subject-matter is overtly 
fantastic, we no longer see as magical the cinematic fundamentals of photogénie, 
superimposition, the double, metamorphosis, anthropo-cosmomorphism and the 
transformative nature of montage. Morin describes the way in which Méliès’ 
metamorphosis soon became the poetic effect of the dissolve; disappearance became 
the fade, and superimposition became indicative (ibid, 173). In other words, these 
features developed into the recognisable language of cinema. What was once 
understood as an alienated, fetishised, reified and concrete force, the power of 
objective magic has dimmed and become so devalued that it now only resides in the 
subjective imaginary as soul, sentiment and heart-felt feeling. Morin writes: 
 
Magic is no longer belief taken literally, it has become feeling. Rational 
and objective consciousness makes magic recoil into its den. At the same 
time, ‘interior’ and affective life hypertrophies…The melting of magic 
liberates enormous fluxes of affectivity, a subjective flood. The stage of 
the soul, affective blossoming, succeeds the magical stage. Anthropo-
cosmomorphism that no longer manages to cling on in the real flaps its 
wings into the imaginary (ibid, 88).  
 
Morin sees the zone of internalised soul/sentiment/feelings as a remnant of magic, but 
no longer solid or powerful, the opposite of alienation, so that we are left with 
attractive reflection, entertaining shadow, fond contemplation etc. He writes, “It is not 
the original magic that comes back to life in the cinema, but a reduced, atrophied 
magic, submerged in the higher affective-rational syncretism that is the aesthetic” 
(ibid, 211). Where once the affective power of the image might lead to a feeling that 
would then blossom into an idea (Morin cites Eisenstein to illustrate this point) he 
argues that the common experience of most cinema is for the order of image-affect-
idea to be broken, incomplete, or work backwards merely to provoke sentiment or to 
titillate (ibid, 184-185).  
 
Morin argues, however, that the concrete magic of old is not lost entirely. When 
subjectivity and affective life are excessive enough magic can irrupt in a semifluid or 
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semireified state into what Morin calls “a new magic” (ibid, 89), which he explains 
using the imagery of volcanoes: 
 
A violent burst of energy, and the solfataras once again become 
volcanoes and hurl out matter. Sartre indeed saw that emotion converts 
itself into magic. All exaltation, all lyricism, all élan take on an anthropo-
cosmomorphic shading in their effusion… Extreme subjectivity 
brusquely becomes extreme magic. In the same way, the height of 
subjective vision is hallucination – its objectivation (ibid).  
 
Morin’s use of volcanic imagery to explain such excess within the subterranean 
power of our imagination is poetic, but I mention it only briefly here because of its 
recurring nature throughout this thesis. The theme of the volcano taps into 
magical/mythological thinking (for the Romans, Vulcan was a God). Morin describes 
a spectrum of the magical in cinema as running along a line from the least magical 
zone of affective participation, where projection and identification are still the 
common experience of our imaginative process, through the mixed zone of 
anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism, which still contain shades of a magical 
consciousness, to the most magical end of the spectrum where doubling, 
metamorphosis and hallucination can be found (ibid, 113).  
 
Morin concludes his book, The Cinema, or the Imaginary Man, with a discussion of 
the significance of the imaginary in perception. In this way he could be seen to bring 
the ‘deception’ of magical thinking together with the ‘truth’ of neuroscience, although 
he predates modern neuroscience and does not refer to it as such. His was an early 
acknowledgement that not only was all thought and matter image, brought to us by 
our perceptual system, but that the whole body is implicated in the process of 
perception, not just the eye and brain. In this, he appears to be influenced by the 
French philosopher Henri Bergson, of whom he makes several brief mentions in the 
book.10 
                                                
10 Both Dudley Andrew (2009, 413) and Roland Bélanger (1997, 377) also suggest that Morin 
appears to be influenced by Bergson, although neither goes into great detail on this point. 
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Durée is the key factor in discussing Bergson alongside Morin. In basic terms, ‘durée’ 
means, and is usually translated as, ‘duration’, but the complexity of Bergson’s 
concept of time is greater than the word ‘duration’ suggests, so I will continue to use 
‘durée’ to distinguish Bergson’s thinking. He shifts the focus of our understanding of 
the world from one involving fixed bodies in space, and matter that is supposedly 
inert and dead, to one where time becomes the critically important factor. He sees the 
universe as consisting of dynamically vibrating fields of energy that we perceive 
unconsciously and absorb into the body as an affect before making conscious sense of 
it by way of our memory. I will return to each of these notions individually but first it 
is important to understand that for Bergson, this process of our experience of the 
world takes place within the dynamism of ever-shifting, but enduring, time. For him it 
is a mistake to think of the distinction between subject and object in terms of space 
but rather in terms of time and movement (Bergson [1896] 1912, 77). Morin clearly 
sees movement similarly, as when, for example, he states that “movement is the 
decisive power of reality: it is in it, through it, that time and space are real” ([1956] 
2005, 118). The dynamism of durée and creative becoming is important to Bergson. 
He writes, “The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we 
shall comprehend that [durée] means invention, the creation of forms, the continual 
elaboration of the absolutely new” ([1907] 2001, 10, emphasis original). Durée is the 
psychological sense of time within our perceptual process, and as such, is not like the 
mathematical regularity of clock time. Hence consciousness flows in a durée that may 
appear to speed up or slow down depending on the situation (for example, the same 
period of time can appear to ‘fly by’ or ‘drag on’).  
 
In Matter and Memory, Bergson’s pivotal second book, he posits that it is our 
memory that makes sense of the matter we perceive in/as/through time. Bringing 
perception into consciousness is done via memory in time, and this process turns the 
matter that has been perceived into an image. Every image is realised for us by all 
kinds of memory, from recent experience to habitual patterning and deeply buried 
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instincts. Bergson argues that within the concept of durée all “matter and memory” 
takes place in qualitative time and through movement, but it is also this process that 
doubles and virtualises matter into an image. While the virtual double of matter is not 
necessarily the same as Morin’s magical double, which, as discussed, is connected to 
our magical/mythological thinking about doubles such as doppelgängers and specters, 
the virtual double can be seen as a fundamental process of both perception and 
cinema. Bergson calls matter “the aggregate of images” ([1896] 1912, 8, emphasis 
original). He is not claiming there is no material universe ‘out there’, but, as part of 
overcoming Cartesian duality, he asserts that matter cannot be inert or fixed within 
the dynamism of durée. 
 
To illustrate the proximity between Morin and Bergson, consider this quote of 
Morin’s on the perceptual process and the cinema: 
 
The only reality of which we are certain is the representation, that is, the 
image, that is, nonreality, since the image refers to an unknown reality. 
Of course, these images are articulated, organized, not only according to 
external stimuli, but also according to our logic, our ideology, that is to 
say also, our culture. All that is perceived as real thus passes through the 
image form. Then it is reborn as memory, that is, an image of an image. 
Therefore, the cinema, like all visual representation (painting, drawing), 
is one image of an image, but, like the photo, it is an image of the 
perceptive image, and, better than the photo, it is an animated – that is – 
living image. It is as representation of living representation that cinema 
invites us to reflect on the imaginary of reality and the reality of the 
imaginary ([1956] 2005, 223, emphasis original). 
 
The body is the central subjective point for all experience and perception in Bergson’s 
philosophy. The completed sentence that I began earlier reads, “I call matter the 
aggregate of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the 
eventual action of one particular image, my body” (Bergson [1896] 1912, 8, emphasis 
original). This focus on a subjective experience from the position of the body has 
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elements in common with phenomenology, which was to come after Bergson.11 But 
Moulard-Leonard points out in Bergson-Deleuze Encounters that Bergson’s 
philosophy differs from phenomenology in that it is based on the primacy of memory 
rather than Merleau-Ponty’s primacy of perception (2008, 145). And in Deleuze: A 
Critical Reader, Boundas has noted that Bergson’s movement has primacy over the 
body, arguing that “movement is not subordinate to a subject which performs it or 
undergoes it… We are dealing here with a ‘pre-human’ or ‘inhuman’ world having a 
privilege over the human-all-too-human world of phenomenology” (Boundas 1996, 
84). 
 
“There is no perception without affection,” Bergson writes ([1896] 1912, 60). He 
postulates that images are perceived within our bodies by excitations that are then 
recognised and organised by memory. An affect need not be extreme (it usually is 
not) and may simply be, for example, the ear hearing a word spoken, which memory 
then recognises as a known word, allowing our perceptual system to understand it and 
organise an appropriate response. But this affect does always have a direct impact on 
the body, which, Bergson says, absorbs some of the action (ibid, 57). The point of 
affect is therefore the initial response or event as it is experienced rather than 
represented, for to represent the image means it has already been virtualised and 
removed from direct experience. To shift the focus of film theory from representation 
to bodily affect is also to shift the focus away from a concentration on judgement and 
towards the experience of the situational event. The film image that has already been 
doubled and represented virtually can still be experienced affectively at the point 
where it comes into contact with the spectator, who has yet to make his or her own 
virtual double of the screen image.  
 
Bergson describes the interval between the initial “pure” affect and the intervention of 
memory as a “zone of indetermination” where the brain must “filter” and decide on 
                                                
11 The Phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty later held Bergson’s position at the Collège de France 
(Barnard 2001, xxii). 
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what interests it and what it will eliminate ([1896] 1912, 32). If the brain were to 
accept all possible perceptions it would become overwhelmed and unable to function 
effectively, so Bergson argues that the brain’s processing function necessarily 
involves both a diminution and a delay (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 22-26). This delay is 
as much as half a second, according to Libet’s studies in the 1970s, as discussed by 
Brian Massumi in Parables of the Virtual (2002, 195). Bergson concentrates on the 
intervention of memory into the delay, but Massumi argues, from a perspective that 
includes, but is not limited to, Bergson, that the thought that fills in the gap is often 
fiction, exaggeration and even hallucination. As an example Massumi cites a 
scientific study where participants were asked to try and remember the colour of a 
friend’s eyes. Researchers found they “almost always” chose an exaggerated shade. 
Massumi concludes that “the remembering of a color is not effectively a reproduction 
of a perception, but a transformation or becoming of it” (2002, 210). And in terms of 
gap filling, he writes: 
 
Libet determined that thought covers up its lag: the awareness is 
‘backdated’ so that each thought experiences itself to have been at the 
precise time the stimulus was applied. Thought hallucinates that it 
coincides with itself. So, the simplest perception of the simplest stimulus 
is already a fairly elaborate hoax, from the point of view of a theory of 
cognitive authenticity that sees truth in plain and present reflection 
(Massumi 2002, 195). 
 
Massumi suggests that our basic thought processes involve not only imagination but a 
degree of deception in the hallucinatory sense. In other words, this view of the ‘truth’ 
of perception already involves a ‘deception’ – but can it be linked to the deception of 
magical thinking? Later Massumi writes: 
 
The ‘backdating’ of matter-driven consciousness is also an argument that 
there is no essential difference between perception, cognition, and 
hallucination. This is a realist materialism with a paradoxically creative 
edge, summed up in the mantra: involuntary and elicited. The 
involuntary and elicited no-difference between perception, cognition and 
hallucination can in turn be summed up in a single word: imagination 
(ibid, 206-207, emphasis original).  
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As we have seen, the cornerstone of Morin’s argument in Cinema or the Imaginary 
Man is that imagination plays a significant role in our normal perceptive process and 
is indelibly saturated with magical/mythological thinking. Massumi argues that our 
worldview is functionally energised by imaginative hallucination. For Morin, 
hallucination is the objective end of a concrete and reified magic; seeing something 
that is literally not there. Massumi suggests, however, that the creative input required 
by our perceptual process in order to realise any image situates hallucination as just 
another function of our normal perceptual process. This is an interesting blurring of 
the distinction between the ‘truth’ of neuroscience and the ‘deception’ of magical 
thinking. I mean to be careful here to equate the two without inflating them. Thinking 
is not always magical in the mythic sense, but it can be. Our normal perceptual 
process may include hallucination but it is not always excessive or magical. But 
perhaps it could be. I am reminded of Mephistopheles’ temptations from Free 
Theatre’s physics lesson that all perception is illusion and Faustus can create his own 
reality. 
 
To return to Morin’s arguments with the addition of Bergson, one can see that the 
deceptive and unfamiliar nature of early cinematographic images affected the senses 
in new and destabilising ways. But once these cinematic images developed into the 
normal language of film, that is to say, once our memory intervened to make sense of 
the symbolic norms of montage and movement and so on, the affect dulled into that 
which predominates today – its shirt-tail relative Morin calls affective-participation. 
In this state the subjective phenomena of projection-identification is commonly 
experienced, or the slightly more magical anthropo-cosmomorphism. Morin argues 
that these zones are characterised by emotion, sentiment, soul, heart and feeling. 
Morin gives the example of love on screen, where we might identify with, and 
psychologically project ourselves onto, the loved one, or identify inanimate objects 
with a person or character in such a way that it generates “festishizations, venerations, 
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and cults” ([1956] 2005, 90). There is a hint of magic left but it is channeled into 
unproductive entertainments. 
 
By contrast, affect that lies in the zone of indetermination before memory intervenes 
can still hold the magical power of cinema in its undiagnosed affect, particularly if the 
affect is excessive enough, destabilising and original enough for the subjective to 
become objective (the realm of doubles and metamorphoses). When images affect us 
in an undiagnosed way, provoking our participation in the experience in such a way 
that they are subsequently allowed to blossom into a fresh idea, these images can still 
be considered magical. This is a significant point for me in terms of magical thinking, 
as without the dulling effect of cliché helping memory make sense of an experience, 
the affect that excites the body and disrupts the ordering of our sense-making systems, 
can allow for creative becoming, and these new becomings are potentially powerful 
transformative experiences. On the other hand, cinematic affect that is designed to 
dissolve into sentiment or pleasant contemplation is useless because it immediately 
falls back on habitual memory and only leads to a festished image that lazily wallows 
in pleasant reflection. Whenever the cinema uses its affective powers in clichéd ways 
only to arouse entertaining sentiment, magical thinking is diminished. In this watered 
down affective-participation Morin describes cinema as a robot of the imaginary, a 
machine that does our imagining for us (ibid, 202), a position similar to Bergson’s 
assertions about the cinema. 
 
In Creative Evolution, first published in 1907, Bergson reveals his distaste for the 
cinematograph. He sees it as a “contrivance” depicting a false movement using what 
would later become known as persistence of vision – static frames put through a 
projector in such a way that they appear to move, except that Bergson is adamant that 
they never could. He writes, “with immobility set beside immobility, even endlessly, 
we could never make movement” ([1907] 2001, 294). For Bergson, movement on 
screen is an artificial externalising of the psychologically variable nature of durée and 
the dynamic process of creative becoming. Lazy or clichéd thinking works in a 
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similar way by simply putting together static snapshots of the already known. It is at 
this point that he concludes with the quote that “the mechanism of our ordinary 
knowledge is of a cinematographical kind” (ibid, 295, emphasis original). Perhaps 
Morin is referring to this quote when he writes that from Bergson we learn that film 
shows us “the very movement of conceptual thought” (Morin [1956] 2005, 180). 
Later he refers, in a similar vein, to “this little cinema that we have in our head” (ibid, 
203, emphasis original). Ultimately, in equating the usual process of perception with 
the cinematic image, Morin does not move beyond Bergson’s assertion that the 
cinema shows us the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge, but this is precisely the 
leap made by Gilles Deleuze, as I will discuss in the next chapter. For now, though, I 
wish to return to Doctor Faustus with the benefit of Morin and Bergson’s insights. 
 
In Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus, the role of film as a magical illusion was explored. 
It took the form of an historical progression that began with the pre-filmic devices of 
shadow puppetry and the Magic Lantern, the latter of which Mangan states was first 
invented in the 17th century, although writings about experiments into light and 
shadow stretch back as far as Aristotle (2007, 121). In Free Theatre’s production, 
explorations into filmic magic progressed through examples of Faustian-themed films 
from early to contemporary cinema. For these sequences the apparatus that produced 
the magic was always made visible so that the operation of these devices could be 
seen. A data projector was rolled out for the Magic Lantern sequence and we brought 
onto the stage a 16mm projector to show a clip from Murnau’s Faust (1926). In this 
way, it was intended that by showing the workings of the magic, the sense that the 
machines themselves could be seen as something magical might be restored. This is in 
contrast to the way the apparatus that produces the magic is usually disappeared 
behind a surface of invisibility, which is the common experience of Hollywood 
movies, or of technology more generally. Morin writes that film magic exists when 
the image “tends to enrich a participation that does not decline into complacencies of 
the soul, but concentrates all its sap into the blossoming of an idea” ([1956] 2005, 
184). To see the operation of the film and the Magic Lantern elevates the participation 
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of the viewer, requiring multiple levels of engagement and imagination, and thereby 
raising the possibility of giving it a magical quality. This was certainly my experience 
with the way the film students responded to making the Méliès-style appear/disappear 
vignettes, as mentioned earlier. It could be argued that to disguise magic by masking 
its operation devalues its potency. 
 
Towards the end of the production, the technology was further updated when Faustus 
presented a clip from YouTube depicting the then fugitive Osama bin Laden 
magically morphing into the image of President Obama, whilst relaying a warning 
that the most powerful man in the world at the time was actually the Islamic terrorist 
in disguise. The video had achieved this transformation using a readily available, and 
simple to use, software programme. In the use of this video Falkenberg was tapping 
into mythological thinking that Osama was the devil of the time, living as he had in a 
cave in the bowels of the earth (hell). While Marlowe’s text ends with Faustus being 
dragged into hell, Falkenberg’s production ended with an escalating montage of fiery 
cinematic and media imagery. An avatar of Faustus that I had created ran through a 
video game hell fighting demons; documentary footage showed lava spewing from 
volcanoes; the iconic images from 9/11 were replayed; a plane flew over a landscape 
of flowing lava, and cities were torched and disintegrated in scenes from disaster 
movies. One image of fiery destruction transformed into another in a relentless and 
omnipotent manner, highlighting the mythical/magical thinking that the concept of 
hell is deeply linked with the spectacle of fire and volcanoes, and deeply affective in 
its excess.  
 
A short film called Dr Faustus Entertains was made for the production and screened 
in the middle of the play.12 It was an homage to Georges Méliès’ Les Cartes Vivantes 
from 1905, a film where the magician Méliès plays card tricks on the audience. The 
intention to refer to Méliès in the production was due to his connection to the theatre, 
                                                
12 The Méliès-style short film Dr Faustus Entertains that was made for Free Theatre’s production 
of Doctor Faustus can be viewed at www.freetheatre.org.nz/doctor-faustus.html.  
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to stage magic and to the way the new technology of film was quickly appropriated 
for the spectacle of the fantastic and the magical. The short film features the same 
actor who played Faustus, and objects and people are made to appear and disappear 
using the same principles Méliès used of substitution splicing and the double 
exposure of the dissolve. Faustus is seen performing card tricks and turns the King of 
Spades into Alexander the Great, who is then revealed to be a double of Faustus in 
disguise (the equivalent happens in Méliès’ film). At the very end the ‘screen Faustus’ 
clicks his fingers, and at that moment, the ‘stage Faustus’ would burst through the 
paper screen on which the film was projected, thereby appearing to ‘come to life’. In 
this way the show was brought back into a live context.13  
 
In Morinian terms, ‘screen Faustus’ possessed a magical quality as the double of 
‘stage Faustus’, further layered within the film by the prestidigitation that doubles 
him again as Alexander the Great. The moment Faustus bursts through the screen and 
comes back to his stage life, the alienated image of the screen double is violated. 
While the magic of Faustus coming to life is revealed to be just another trick of the 
showman, the transformation is an extreme one: from live actor onstage to alienated 
and valorised screen object only to become a superreal live subject again, but one that 
has overcome mortality and is able to bring his immortal image back from the dead to 
live again.  
 
The ‘screen Faustus’ becomes Alexander the Great by the magic of metamorphosis. 
In reality it was achieved by the trick effect of multiple exposure. This effect was 
developed by Méliès, who would physically wind the film back so that a new image 
could be filmed over the original. The Free Theatre technician achieved the same 
result by using a simple feature offered by the editing programme Final Cut Pro that 
created the effect instantly. Metamorphosis can be seen as the magic of vanishings 
and apparitions, of transferring visible and invisible, but also, and more importantly to 
                                                
13 Méliès too once burst through the screen at a 1929 gala held in his honour (Ezra 2000, 58). 
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Morin, of transmutations and transformations (or creative becoming in Bergsonian 
terms). Morin argues that while metamorphosis is overtly present in the fantasy films 
of Méliès, it also heralds the transformation of the cinematograph into the cinema and 
becomes, in the process, the first and most essential cinematic effect (ibid, 53-54). He 
writes, “if originally, essentially, the Lumière cinematograph is doubling, the cinema 
of Méliès is originally, essentially, metamorphosis” (ibid, 55). Both of these filmic 
effects are fundamental to cinema, and both can be seen as magical in the imaginative 
sense, whether or not the content overtly depicts magic.  
 
Morin argues that once the more magical fundamentals of early film, such as the 
double and metamorphosis, became the normal language of film, the sense of the 
filmic image as something magical became instead the affective-participation of our 
imaginative process, dulled by heart-felt feelings and sentiment. But perhaps through 
an examination of the magical in productions such as Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus, 
we can re-evaluate what it is that was so magical about the technology and the 
process of early film, and while ‘that old movie magic’ has become clichéd and 
ordinary, perhaps a kind of magic can still be found in the cinema of filmmakers such 
as Jan Švankmajer. 
 
Švankmajer’s Lekce Faust (1994) 
In Faust: Icon of Modern Culture, Durrani points out that while the first published 
version of the myth appeared as a chapbook in 1587, puppet versions based loosely 
on a combination of the chapbook and Marlowe’s play, with Punch-and-Judy-like 
additions, flourished throughout Europe in the 17th century. In this way they became 
part of folk tradition, as they were commonly performed at fairs and in marketplaces 
(2004, 85). Puppetry has remained a technique for transmitting the story ever since, 
and Durrani suggests its use is particularly effective since Faust “functions as the 
devil’s puppet” (ibid, 200). Theatre scholar Ernst Kirby points out more generally that 
puppets have been used throughout history to depict the magic of spirit possession 
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(1975, 18) and this also fits thematically and magically with Faustian issues of 
conjuration, free will and devilish trickery.  
 
Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus made use of puppets in two ways: a shadow puppetry 
sequence illustrated the play’s prologue and a devil marionette tempted audience 
members as they arrived at the theatre and seated themselves. This marionette was 
operated by me and the puppet and I would sidle up to audience members with such 
temptations as, “shall I have thy soul? I’ll be thy slave, and give thee all the treasures 
of the world, even more than thou hast wit to ask, power, greater than kings and 
emperors. Think of honour and of wealth. So, shall I have thy soul?” At all times I 
was visibly the operator of the marionette and I based the performance on Jan 
Švankmajer’s 1994 film Lekce Faust (The Lesson of Faust) which combines live 
action with stop-motion animation and puppetry. 
 
Derek Katz declares it appropriate to view Lekce Faust “as a radical staging of the 
puppet play. This is what provides by far the greatest portion of the script and 
supplies the structure for its narrative” (Katz 2004, 340). Švankmajer’s early career 
was spent as a puppeteer with Prague’s Laterna Magika (Sorfa 2003, 102) and the 
tradition of folk puppetry has a rich history in Central Europe (Petek 2009, 80). In an 
interview with Peter Hames in Dark Alchemy, Švankmajer declares that the “puppet 
theatre has its own special kind of magic” (1995, 96-97). Through its uncanny 
unreality, puppetry can, like film, achieve the fantastic and the magical. 
 
Scholarship on Lekce Faust has convincingly focused on Surrealism, psychoanalysis 
and abjection (for example O’Pray 1994; Hames 1995; Jackson 1997; Shera 2001; 
Hedges 2005; Petek 2009; Owen 2011) all of which, it could be argued, are types of 
magical thinking. Švankmajer is a committed member of the Czech Surrealist Group 
but describes his approach to Surrealism in similar terms to puppetry, as neither art 
movement nor aesthetic, but rather as a kind of magic. In the same interview with 
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Peter Hames, Švankmajer describes Surrealism as a collective “journey into the 
depths of the soul, like alchemy or psychoanalysis” (1995, 104).  
 
Lekce Faust begins on the streets of present-day Prague. Suggesting a political 
dimension from the start, two men, who turn out to be agents of the Devil, are seen 
handing out what appears to be leaflets, agitprop style, but on closer inspection turns 
out to be a mysterious map. The film centres on a typical middle-class man ground 
down by late capitalist society. The map’s incomprehensibility is irresistible to 
someone living in a society where everything can be interpreted, quantified, packaged 
and consumed, and the film’s magic revels in opposing everyday order with the 
inexplicable and the unexpected. The anonymous man becomes Faust when he 
follows the map handed him, which leads him into a theatre. There he puts on a 
costume, reaches for a script and begins to read lines from Marlowe’s play, in which 
he resolves to commit himself to alchemy. The effect is that of a spell. He brings the 
play, and his role as its protagonist, into being, merely by reciting the correct words, 
recalling Sofer’s argument about performativity. It is revealed that Faust may be just a 
role; but crucially, it is a role that anyone can play as long as the correct words are 
recited. The mundane contrasts with the magical in the way the banality of real life 
opposes the artificiality of the theatre, and yet, it is in the magical space of the theatre 
that the man can truly explore the human condition. 
 
Lekce Faust highlights why the myth of Faust is still relevant and why we continue to 
be entertained by it. In this way, it accords with Morin’s desire to recognise and re-
evaluate our significant, meaning-giving myths. It is based on many sources: 
Marlowe, Goethe, Grabbe’s Don Juan and Faust, Gounod’s opera, and the Faust 
puppet traditions (Katz 2004, 339). Švankmajer looks back to the earliest form of the 
myth in his bawdy use of marionettes.  
 
As with the devil marionette in Free Theatre’s production, the operation of the puppet 
is often made explicit in Lekce Faust, as in the example of the life-sized Bad Angel. 
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Its entrance is heralded by an image of hands shaking a metal board to make the 
sound effect of thunder, followed by the marionette’s head rolling across a forest floor 
before being wound into place on the body of the puppet and lowered onto the stage 
in front of Faust. There is no attempt to hide or mask either the construction or 
operation of the marionette and the thunder sound effect. We frequently see the hand 
that operates the puppet, just as the apparatus that produced the magic was always 
displayed in Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus, as a way of engaging with the 
imagination process in producing the magic rather than trying to hide it.  
 
For Švankmajer, the process of animation is one that involves magical thinking. He 
states in a BBC documentary: 
 
Animation enables me to give magical powers to things. In my films, I 
move many objects, real objects. Suddenly, everyday contact with things 
which people are used to acquires a new dimension and in this way casts 
a doubt over reality (quoted in Wells 1998, 11). 
 
Švankmajer’s preferred method of animation is stop-motion, another technique that 
can be created with the most basic film equipment. While stop-motion is rarely, if 
ever, totally smooth, Švankmajer’s is deliberately jagged and jarring, making the 
transformation process obvious and strained. Just like the visible puppeteer, I think 
the obviousness of the animation can be seen to make it more magical because it 
draws attention to the ‘truth’ of its unnaturalness and its struggle to live, rather than 
hiding its operation within seamless, natural motions. Švankmajer also uses this 
technique to animate the live actor. In post-production he drops frames from the 
footage so that the movement and speech of a live actor becomes stilted and 
unnatural. In this way a live actor becomes a kind of puppet. 
 
The most widely available version of Lekce Faust has been dubbed into English, 
which makes this unnaturalness particularly pronounced, as words and mouth 
movement are out of sync with one another, giving the sense that the voice is 
disembodied, a magical ‘voice from the beyond’. Even in the original Czech version a 
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lesser degree of disembodiment can be seen in Mephistopheles, as his live movements 
have been animated for that stilted effect. Sound is also used throughout in this way, 
made strange by extreme heightening or contrasting starkly with silence. Despite the 
presence of well-known lines from Faust source texts, there are very few words 
spoken throughout the film, and long periods of almost total silence. While 
Hollywood usually uses sound to provide emotional reassurance and guidance, 
Švankmajer’s ultrafocus on sounds like sucking and slurping is unnerving, bringing it 
closer to the disruptive force of affect in Bergson’s perception and Morin’s film 
magic. The affect that is provoked is one of abjection.  
 
Abjection, as articulated by Julia Kristeva in Powers of Horror (1980), has been 
convincingly discussed in Shera’s reading of the film (2001) but can take on a slightly 
different emphasis with a Morinian/Bergsonian reading. Morin argues that magic is 
still present in film when a visceral response is evoked below the level of rational 
awareness, and abject content has the ability to affect us in this way. For Morin, film 
magic is well articulated by Eisenstein’s approach to montage, where the raw image 
provokes a visceral affect before progressing on to the blossoming of an idea. In the 
outdoor pub scene of Lekce Faust, Faust eats a dumpling dish that in its appearance 
mirrors the severed leg that an old man is holding (which later becomes Faust’s leg).14 
The affect is heightened by presenting the eating in extreme close-up, complete with 
slurping noises. The initial gut reaction of revulsion is a response to the suggestion of 
cannibalism. Close-ups and noisy eating are common in Švankmajer’s oeuvre, and 
evoke an abject response even without cannibalistic references. The aim is to 
defamiliarise our everyday habits. Puppetry is also used to provoke this feeling in the 
film. When Faust signs the pact with the Devil, he is in the form of a life-sized 
marionette, and he dips his quill repeatedly and explicitly into wet blood from a deep 
slit in his (wooden) wrist. Our imagination provokes a ‘deceptive’ response, filling in 
                                                
14 In a gruesome twist at the very end of the film, the severed leg that Faust encounters at the 
outdoor pub becomes his severed leg when he is run over and killed as he leaves the theatre. 
While time is always fluid in a cinematic sense and, Morin argues, could therefore be seen as 
magical, at the end of Lekce Faust, it is revealed to be out of joint. 
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the gaps between what we see as wood and red liquid, and the magical thinking that 
imagines what it would be like to have a sharp object stabbed deeply into a vulnerable 
body part.  
 
Shera argues that puppetry in Lekce Faust is presented with the abject horror of the 
soulless corpse, but one that is brought to life, its animation making it a “corpse 
reversed” (2001, 136). A male devil puppet transforms into a puppet version of Helen 
of Troy15 while Faust transforms at various points from live actor to life-sized 
marionette to animated live actor. Similarly, the clay face of Mephistopheles is rarely 
fixed and visibly morphs from a monstrous devil to a mirror-image of Faust. The 
magic of transformation and creative becoming is a constant but its overt and 
laboured nature is cinematically closer to Méliès than the seamlessness of Hollywood. 
 
Seeking to escape the theatre, Faust slits the painted backdrop with his knife and 
climbs through it – except that the world he enters behind the curtain is not outside 
the theatre but the colonnade depicted on the painted backdrop magically become 
real. This leads him to the alchemist’s lab, a place of transformation and 
metamorphosis, a magical staple in Faust imagery but also metaphorically a process 
of artistry and enlightenment in Švankmajer’s view. He says, “In my work, like the 
old alchemists I am continually distilling the water of my experiences – from 
childhood, my obsessions, idiosyncrasies, anxieties – in order that, with this process, 
the ‘heavy water’ of knowledge, essential for the transmutation of life, begins to 
flow” (Hames 1995, 105). 
 
This transmutation in the lab is achieved through the simple shock of stop-motion, by 
the vision of strange creatures that are alive but should not be, and by a creation made 
out of clay. This Homunculus is manufactured in a flask as in Goethe’s Faust, but by 
a bewildered Faust rather than his servant Wagner. The metamorphosis of the creature 
                                                
15 In Marlowe’s original text Helen is a succubus who would have been played by a male actor 
(Sofer 2009, 17). 
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is a parody of the womb to tomb trajectory. Using claymation, the creature progresses 
from an amorphous lump into a baby. He is ‘birthed’ by Faust smashing the glass jar 
and feeding him a piece of paper on which the appropriate spell has been written. The 
baby’s body is left in an infantile state while before our eyes its head matures into 
adulthood, takes on Faust’s countenance and then decays into a snapping skull, still 
attached to the body of the baby. Horrified, Faust beats the creature to a pulpy death, 
again evoking an abject response, as the body being destroyed still looks much like a 
baby, but it also contains the horror of the magical double, so he is beating his own 
(helpless) self. Similarly, the strange creatures that scuttle around the lab are an 
amalgamation of different skeletons and taxidermied animal parts and also provoke a 
response in their inexplicable uncanniness. An important component of Morin’s ideas 
about cinematic magic is that it is not always clear to our rational minds what we are 
seeing or why, and this ‘deception’ is perceptually destabilising. In this case, 
‘deception’ plays a positive role in provoking different kinds of recognition, possibly 
even deeper truths.  
 
The scene that conjures Mephistopheles is also confounding in this way, and offers 
the most spectacular example of Morinian cinematic magic, with both form and 
content dwelling on the magical act of conjuring. The beginning is familiar to the 
viewer in its use of a magic circle and runes, but it becomes increasingly unfamiliar 
and strange. It is hard to keep a rational hold on the barrage of startling images. 
Brooms appear and sweep themselves, drums and arms appear out of the ground and 
beat in a discordant, disembodied cacophony, crossbows are similarly fired from 
disembodied arms and a burning wagon drives itself. But it is the way locations 
change in baffling and ‘deceptive’ ways that renders this scene closest to Méliès in its 
structure. It is the simplest of editing that creates this magic. Faust begins in his magic 
circle in an abandoned warehouse. The shot shows a close-up of Faust beating a whip 
against a broom that sweeps itself; in the next shot Faust stands up and finds himself 
in a moonlit forest. As Faust is shot at by the crossbows, he crouches down to protect 
his head, rising to discover he is now impossibly perched on the pinnacle of a stack of 
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pancake rocks. In the next shot he is a tiny speck in a snow-covered field, then a 
waterfall descends from a mossy rock in a forest, drenching Faust, except that he is 
not in this forest but back in the warehouse. All of this is created by cutting scenes 
from different locations together, sometimes with a close-up of Faust inbetween to 
mask the change, and Faust appears to have magically shifted through space. This 
destabilising technique is also employed on other occasions, such as in the reworked 
Mothers’ scene, where a troupe of ballerinas leave the theatre’s wings and head out 
onto the stage but instead emerge in an outside field doing a ridiculous ballet that 
involves raking straw, eating stew and running through mud. Again, the lack of 
certainty and clarity about why this is happening ensures that the viewer does not end 
up in a complacent frame of mind where every intended meaning is made obvious and 
explicit.  
 
When Faust finally does manage to conjure Mephistopheles, he appears in a 
monstrous form but quickly transforms his face (via claymation) so that it is a direct 
copy of Faust’s. Mephistopheles takes this doubled mirror-form in every subsequent 
dealing he has with Faust. In one discussion the human Faust sits at a dresser talking 
to a Mephistopheles-Faust through a three-way mirror, a common cinematic (and 
psychoanalytic) sign of the fractured psyche. While this suggests more of a 
psychological rather than perceptual reading of the film, both can be accommodated 
when considering its magical aspects. As discussed, Morin’s notion of the magical 
double harks back to archaic and universal myths. From Bergson and Morin we 
understand that the affective power is in the image, not the original, and that this 
image is always a double of reality. In this case, magic has conjured a literal double 
into Faust’s waking consciousness who can be seen to have come from the depths of 
hell (or his unconscious). As such, Mephistopheles has all the power of the double 
Morin grants to cinematic magic.  
 
It is not possible for us to view a film with the fresh eyes of Méliès’ time, or as if we 
had never seen such technology before. Morin argues that the foundation of film was 
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magical because of the way our perceptual process creates an image informed by the 
magical/mythical thinking of our imaginary. Švankmajer, however, can be seen to 
provoke the ‘deceptive’ magic of early cinema in the way he uses metamorphoses, 
doubles and editing techniques. But in the case of Lekce Faust, the magic in both 
form and content resists the escapism that devalued magic in later film and allows 
images to remain strange by not giving the viewer an immediate guide to their 
meaning. Instead they are left to affect us in an undiagnosed way below the level of 
our consciousness, which, as articulated in Bergson’s perceptual theory more 
generally, is a process that reformulates the represented image into a situational event, 
rather than falling back onto the habits of cliché, and provokes our participation in the 
experience of the image. In this way, the magical affect of early cinema is reinstated 
by Švankmajer. 
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Chapter Two: Polyphasic Consciousness as a Magical Experience 
 
Treatments of the myth of Faust from the first chapbook onwards evolved to reflect 
the concerns of each era, so that by the time Goethe’s version was published in 1808 
the focus had changed dramatically from Marlowe’s 1591 play. In Faust: Icon of 
Modern Culture, Durrani explains the shift thus:  
 
No longer would Faustus be seen as a benighted alchemist with leanings 
toward black magic and a penchant for mildly entertaining clownish tricks. 
The gross mockery of secular scholarship that had been a characteristic of 
the chapbook, parts of Marlowe, and most of the puppet plays was 
incompatible with an age which thirsted after fresh insights into man’s 
spiritual roots… Faust needed to outgrow his role as a warning to 
Christians if he was to become something more than a historical oddity of 
severely restricted appeal. Once this had been achieved his name became 
associated with progress, with striving (2004, 125). 
 
To psychologist Carl Jung, Faust can be seen as the myth of modern Western culture. 
Jung saw Goethe as a kind of godfather and prophet after the young Swiss was 
profoundly affected when he first read Faust at 15 years old (Jung 1963, 93, 68). He 
felt that Goethe had written “virtually a basic outline and pattern of my own conflicts 
and solutions. The dichotomy of Faust-Mephistopheles came together within myself 
into a single person, and I was that person” (ibid, 222). He continued to meditate on it 
throughout his life. 
 
Several publications have been written on the importance of Faust to Jung (for 
example Jantz 1962; Edinger 1990; Lowinsky 2009). Jung would use the myth to 
illustrate concepts such as the shadow/double, alchemy, transformation, 
projection/anthropomorphism, and the descent into the underworld of the psyche. As 




Jung felt that contemporary Western culture had replaced meaning-giving myths with 
the poor substitute of logic and materialism, with the result that “the white man had 
become an anxious, hollow-eyed searcher who no longer knew what he wanted” 
(Haule 2011, 1:161). Goethe’s Faust realises this problem in the characters of Faust 
and Mephistopheles, whom Jung understood not as two separate entities, but as the 
psyche of the modern individual who has lost ‘his’ roots and is metaphorically 
fractured. Goethe already knew that the Devil is not a separate physical entity but a 
struggle that resides within us when he has Faust say, “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in 
meiner Brust” ([1808] 1961, 144.1112).16  From a Jungian perspective, 
Mephistopheles is Faust’s shadow side, repressed into the unconscious and dismissed 
as evil, irrational and sinful. Faust, on the other hand, is overly ordered, materialistic, 
never satisfied, and always striving for progress, representing the conscious rational 
mind. Jung found him to be an immoral, characterless “windbag” and a “vapid and 
unthinking careerist” (Jung 1959, 183) while the character of Mephistopheles held far 
more significance for the drama. It is Mephistopheles, writes Jung, “who in spite of 
his negating disposition represents the true spirit of life” (1963, 222). For Jung, the 
‘Faustian split’ is akin to a mythical drama involving the hero and the shadow, which 
requires the hero to battle his dangerous, dark unconscious before emerging 
triumphant (Jung 1964, 118).  
 
In addition to his approach to Faust, Jung also discusses magic and magical thinking 
in his work. Jung argues that magical practices still accompany humanity and have 
become part of the heritage of our collective unconscious. He writes: 
 
In so far as through our unconscious we have a share in the historical 
collective psyche, we live naturally and unconsciously in a world of 
werewolves, demons, magicians, etc., for these are things which all 
previous ages have invested with tremendous affectivity ([1917, 1928] 
1953, 92.150).  
 
                                                
16 “Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast.”  
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In response to a request to define “magical” and “demonic” as they relate to artistic 
creation, Jung makes an interesting distinction between white and black magic that 
can be applied to Faust. He explains that when society becomes too constraining, 
disorder will find ways to irrupt into being, and artistic creation is one such irruption. 
If the ideas that result hold the destructive forces at bay and promote the collective, it 
is white magic, whereas if it revels in the destruction and serves only the individual, it 
is black magic. The demonic is the unconscious force of negation that uses this black 
magic ([1952] 1973, 82). Edinger points out in Goethe’s Faust: notes for a Jungian 
commentary that in this way, dealing with the demonic in the guise of Mephistopheles 
can be seen as, “having commerce with evil, the forbidden thing, the irrational, the 
repressed, the denied, the despicable – in a word, with the unconscious” (1990, 32). 
Freedom for Jung could not be achieved unless these wild, darker elements within the 
unconscious had been acknowledged and dealt with, as to deny these forces is 
dangerous and causes, “your devils [to] grow fatter and fatter” (Jung 1984, 53). 
 
Švankmajer’s Lekce Faust approaches the relationship between Faust and 
Mephistopheles in this way. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when Faust 
conjures Mephistopheles, he appears in a monstrous form but quickly adjusts his face 
so that it is a direct copy of Faust’s. Thereafter Mephistopheles takes this doubled 
Faust-form in all their subsequent dealings. From Morin we learned that it is the 
double that holds the affective power of the image, and in the case of Faust, this 
power lies with the shadow-double Mephistopheles. For Faust to have commerce with 
this demon, and for that demon to be revealed as himself, sets the stage for a 
psychological battle of archetypal significance. 
 
Despite their different approaches, there are many shared concerns between Jung and 
Morin, particularly the importance of myth and magic to the imaginary. It seems 
likely that Morin, at least, was familiar with Jung, as he began publishing only 
towards the end of Jung’s formidable career, but there is no mention of Jung in 
Cinema and the Imaginary Man. They do share common ground by taking inspiration 
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from thinkers such as Henri Bergson and Lévy-Bruhl. It was from Lévy-Bruhl, who 
wrote about the magical practices of “archaic” societies, that Morin developed his 
ideas about complex thought and anthropo-cosmomorphism (Mortimer in Morin 
2005, xxii, xxiv). In a similar way, Jung adapted Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of participation 
mystique, which is useful for understanding his approach to magical thinking. In 
describing how participation mystique works, Jung writes: 
 
When there is no consciousness of the difference between subject and 
object, an unconscious identity prevails. The unconscious is then projected 
into the object, and the object is introjected into the subject, becoming part 
of his psychology. Then plants and animals behave like human beings, 
human beings are at the same time animals, and everything is alive with 
ghosts and gods. Civilized man naturally thinks he is miles above these 
things… He too has a remnant of primitive unconsciousness, of non-
differentiation between subject and object. Because of this, he is magically 
affected by all manner of people, things, and circumstances, he is beset by 
disturbing influences nearly as much as the primitive and therefore needs 
just as many apotropaic charms. He no longer works magic with medicine 
bags, amulets, and animal sacrifices, but with tranquilizers, neuroses, 
rationalism, cult of the will, etc. (1967, 45.66). 
 
In John Ryan Haule’s two volumes titled Jung in the 21st Century (2011) the post-
Jungian Haule demonstrates how recent scientific advances support Jung’s theoretical 
framework in areas such as archeology, evolutionary biology, quantum mechanics, 
psychology and neurobiology. Haule particularly interrogates the theories for which 
Jung was labeled a “mystic” such as synchronicity, shamanism and parapsychology. 
He also spends large portions of the books discussing altered states of consciousness, 
which he says Jung believed were not supernatural, but “a universal feature of the 
human brain and nervous system” (Haule 2011, 2:2) and with which the modern West 
has largely lost contact. For the purpose of this thesis, an altered state is any state not 
normally associated with ordinary, waking consciousness, such as dreaming, 
hallucination, mystical rapture and shamanism. Haule writes, “Altered states are 
valuable less for supporting the world of ordinary experience than for opening the 
way to unexpected depth and engaged meaning” (ibid, 1:167). 
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Haule points out that altered states flourished in societies that valued “polyphasic 
consciousness,” a phrase that appears to derive from C.D. Laughlin et.al.’s book 
Brain, Symbol and Experience: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Human 
Consciousness (1990). They write, “The ethnographic literature amply demonstrates 
that people in most [non-Western] societies operate psychologically within the 
context of a cosmos composed of multiple realities… And these realities are 
frequently coded as experiential. Such people experience polyphasic consciousness” 
(155 emphasis original). It seems the term “polyphasic consciousness” is largely 
interchangeable with “perceptual diversity,” “expanded awareness,” “polyphasic 
attitude,” or “multiphasic consciousness”. Tara Lumpkin describes it thus in the 
abstract of an article on the subject (although she calls it “perceptual diversity”): 
 
Perceptual diversity allows human beings to access knowledge through a 
variety of perceptual processes, rather than merely through everyday, 
waking reality. Many of these perceptual processes are transrational, 
altered states of consciousness (meditation, trance, dreams, imagination, 
transformation) and are not considered valid processes for accessing 
knowledge by science (which is based primarily upon quantification, 
reductionism, and the experimental method)… Transrational 
consciousness is being devalued in many societies as it is simultaneously 
being replaced by the monophasic consciousness of “developed” nations 
(2001, 37).  
 
It seems to me that some of the practices that were considered supernatural magic in 
the past can be understood today as practices associated with altered states and 
polyphasic consciousness. These include shamanism, alchemy, visions, 
hallucinations, states of ecstasy or trance, meditation, mediumship, and hypnosis. In 
the Academy these states reside in a liminal zone when it comes to science, but Haule 
argues that recent neuroscience suggests they can be seen as tools available to anyone 
with guidance and practice (Haule 2:4). Polyphasic consciousness can include 
supernatural magic, but it can also offer other ways to consider the magical within a 
context that is not supernatural. 
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As discussed in the Introduction, I will also incorporate Glucklich’s concept of the 
“magical experience” or “magical consciousness” (1997, 23) into my understanding 
of polyphasic consciousness. Glucklich understands magical consciousness as a 
natural process that uses non-rational methods to dissolve the sense of self (examples 
of which include chanting, singing, drumming and dancing, as well as altered states of 
consciousness). It also removes inhibitions, expands awareness and gives rise to a 
cosmomorphic understanding of the interconnectedness of all things. Glucklich 
emphasises the bridging of physiology and psychology in the experiential sense and 
promotes a phenomenological approach that advocates experience via participation 
(ibid, 108-110). 
 
For Glucklich, four components are required in order to reach a magical experience: 
the heightening of perception, weakening of the ego, the embodiment of thinking and 
the performance of some kind of ritual or programme (ibid, 112). It could be argued 
that these conditions can be met in theatre and film if the affect is profound enough to 
destabilise rational, ordered thinking, and if perception is broadened in the polyphasic 
sense. As for ritual, the performance of viewing a play or film has often been 
discussed in ritual terms. In the 1970s it was a particular concern of film theorists 
writing on genre, as summarised and discussed by Rick Altman ([1986] 2003, 30-40). 
Rachel Moore argues in Savage Theory for an analogy between ritual and cinema and 
sees it as a significant foundation for a theory of cinematic magic (2000, 6). One 
strand of the wider discussion considers the way in which the experience of going to 
the cinema can be equated with the social and spiritual function of the Church service. 
Similarly, theatre has often been discussed in ritual terms as a social drama, beginning 
with Aristotle in a Western context. More recently this has been discussed by 
prominent Performance Studies scholars such as Victor Turner (From Ritual to 
Theatre 1982) and Richard Schechner (The Future of Ritual 1993). 
 
Also able to be brought back into the discussion at this point is the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson. He was a contemporary of Jung’s and in an article about the pair, 
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Gunter points out that Jung openly acknowledged developing some of his theories 
with inspiration from Bergson’s ideas. While both use different methodologies, 
Gunter writes that “during the period 1913-1920 Jung specifically equates Bergson’s 
ideas with his own concepts of instinct, intuition, the (limited) function of the human 
intellect, reaction-formation, and introversion-extroversion” (1982, 643). Gunter goes 
on to outline further conceptual connections between Jung’s theory of libido and 
Bergson’s concept of élan vital (ibid, 642). I would posit that Bergson talks of 
memory in a way that can accommodate Jung’s concept of the archetypes of the 
collective unconscious, that is to say, of deep memories buried in our genetic makeup 
that foster instinct and intuition. Jung refers to archetypes as images and I believe he 
means it in the Bergsonian sense of the word. My reading of Bergson’s theories can 
also accommodate a more ‘mystical’ approach, as has been outlined by thinkers such 
as William Barnard, Pete Gunter and Robert Grogin. 
 
There is evidence that Bergson was interested in at least some aspects of psychical 
phenomena, although Barnard describes tensions between his clear interest and what 
appears to be a playing down of this interest in public (2011, 251, 253). Nevertheless, 
Bergson was elected president of the British Society for Psychical Research in 1913, 
joined the Institut Général Psychologique, which studied non-ordinary phenomena, 
and he apparently took part in six séances (Grogin 1988, 51-52). Robert Grogin writes 
about the milieu from which Bergson emerged and argues that a backlash against 
mechanistic determinism, positivism and dogmatic religious orders, coupled with a 
fashionable interest in symbolism, spiritualism, mysticism and psychical phenomena, 
is vital to understanding the climate into which his work became popular (ibid, 6). By 
the time Bergson wrote The Two Sources of Religion and Morality (1932), he is 
directly discussing mysticism and psi phenomena,17 although he suggests a 
distanciation when he writes the term “psychical research” inside quotation marks. 
The main thrust of this book is a reflection on the evolution of religion, but along the 
                                                
17 Psi phenomena is described by Krippner and George as an amalgam of altered states such as 
precognition, telepathy and psychokinesis (Wolman 1986, 332). 
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way he discusses traditional magic, arguing from an evolutionary perspective that it is 
a natural part of our human development and experience, albeit a misguided one 
([1932] 1956, 165-180). He places science, religion and magic mostly at odds with 
one another, but what The Two Sources does highlight is the work of religious 
mystics in providing valuable insights into social action and positive moral behavior. 
Where a mystic might have been treated as “mentally diseased” or “abnormal” 
Bergson argues rather that these states are a “prelude to the ultimate transformation. 
[Mystics] talk of their visions, their ecstasies, their raptures” (ibid, 228). I will return 
to, and expand on, transformation shortly, with particular focus to how Bergson 
intersects in this regard with Jung.  
 
There is a further interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy that I wish to consider, 
outlined by William Barnard in Living Consciousness: The Metaphysical Vision of 
Henri Bergson (2011). Barnard develops a neo-Bergsonian reading that goes into 
metaphysical and mystical realms by examining the implications of Bergson’s 
philosophy on the likes of non-ordinary experiences such as altered states, and argues 
that from this perspective, “a range of ‘magical’ phenomena and healing abilities 
should be possible” (ibid, 242). To outline this reading I will start with Bergson’s 
assertion that matter is not inert but contains at least a latent consciousness. In Matter 
and Memory he writes, “the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images, 
is a kind of consciousness” ([1896] 1912, 313). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
within the durée of a conscious universe, it is not the job of our brains to house our 
thinking minds but rather to “filter” out the massive amount of energy surrounding us 
so that we can function effectively without being overwhelmed with too much 
information. Barnard writes: 
 
Bergson postulates that the neurochemical activity of the brain does not 
produce consciousness, but rather enables the brain to “tune into” 
appropriate “frequencies” of preexisting levels of consciousness – that is, 
the states of consciousness that correspond to waking life, dreaming, 
deep sleep, trance, as well as, at least potentially, the consciousnesses of 
other beings (2011, xxxiii). 
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Barnard finds direct speculation on such a possibility in Bergson’s Creative Mind 
(1934) when he writes on the consciousness choices our filtering brains make within a 
universe where durée is paramount. Bergson writes: 
 
Nothing would prevent other worlds, corresponding to another choice, 
from existing with it, in the same place and the same time: in this way 
twenty different broadcasting stations throw out simultaneously twenty 
different concerts which coexist without any one of them mingling its 
sounds with the music of another, each one being heard, complete and 
alone, in the apparatus which has chosen for its reception the wave-length 
of that particular station ([1934] 1946, 69-70). 
 
Barnard calls this Bergson’s “radio reception theory of consciousness” (2011, 237) 
and he uses it to argue that Bergson’s philosophy can include non-ordinary 
phenomena such as ESP, hypnosis, mysticism and mediumship if one understands his 
notion of consciousness as different planes or rhythms of durée interacting with a 
conscious universe. Barnard writes, “telepathy, clairvoyance, mediumship, visionary 
encounters, and so on… are moments when, for a variety of reason, individuals 
‘change channels’ and tune into dimensions of reality with which they are already 
connected subconsciously” (ibid, 238). From this perspective, Barnard argues, we can 
take the visionary experiences of the likes of shamans and mystics seriously. Such 
experiences usually pass beneath the level of our conscious awareness, but Barnard 
postulates, following Bergson, that it can happen accidentally when the brain’s filter 
function fails to work properly, or when our personal consciousness is not kept in 
check and overlaps with the consciousness of others (ibid, 256). But it might also be 
achievable to some extent using Bergson’s method of intuition.  
 
Bergson developed the process he calls methodological intuition in order to access 
this hitherto unconscious material and apprehend the affect as pure perception. In 
discussing mystics in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson explains 
that states of ecstasy and rapture, where visions are experienced, are the risky 
encounter between unconscious and conscious states that have the transformational 
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potential of achieving a “systematic readjustment with a view to equilibrium on a 
higher level” ([1932] 1956, 229). 
 
Jung also discusses the value of transformation in a way that fits well with Bergson. 
For him, psychological transformation is a powerful experience and one that is a 
necessary part of the development of a whole and healthy psyche, which he called the 
individuation process. It involves dealing with the unconscious, in order to, as Haule 
puts it, “do battle with the figures we encounter there. What we learn in these 
encounters will change us. We will have integrated a bit of our psychic process that 
has been unconscious” (2011, 1:85). This process is part of Jung’s “constructive 
method,” which he explicitly links with Bergson’s intuitive method (Gunter 1982, 
638). Jung writes: 
 
Bergson’s philosophy suggests another way of explanation, where the 
factor of “intuition” comes in. Intuition, as a psychological function, is 
also an unconscious process. Just as instinct is the intrusion of an 
unconsciously motivated impulse to conscious action, so intuition is the 
intrusion of an unconscious content, or “image” into conscious 
apperception. Intuition is a process of unconscious perception, either of 
subjective unconscious contents, or of objective but subliminal facts 
([1928] 1945, 274).  
 
Both Bergson and Jung advocate a method of enquiry that has the potential to 
penetrate deeper than can be accessed by the conscious and rational intellect. 
Transformation is destabilising and Haule argues, following Jung, that profound 
transformation is not available in ordinary states of consciousness because “all our 
cultural training resists transformation” (2011, 1:168). It is, however, available in 
altered states of consciousness, which can bring about transformation in an 
individual’s worldview and understanding of self. While the altering of our 
consciousness is already a transforming experience by definition, not every 
experience of an altered state will result in a profound transformation, but Jung 
developed a process of “active imagination” or “original thinking” to effect the kind 
of altered state that could lead to a reorganisation in the understanding of self and 
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world (ibid, 1:162). This process involves applying a level of yogic concentration in 
order to apprehend images at the point of unconscious affect and paying attention to 
these images before memory intervenes to redirect them into the safety of our 
conscious habits. For Jung, the contents of the unconscious offerings that were 
brought up were of a symbolic kind that he linked with our cultural, collective myths 
in such tomes as Symbols of Transformation (1952). 
 
While it may be possible to consider mysticism and non-ordinary phenomena within 
Bergson’s theories, in no way is his philosophy linked with anything magical in a 
supernatural sense. On the contrary, in the first chapter of Matter and Memory 
Bergson argues that it is the apparently materialistic notion of the Cartesian split that 
he sees as a kind of fantasy magic, particularly once the position of the subjective 
body is removed from the object in question and matter is treated as inert and separate 
from the experiencing body. He writes, “Here I am confronted by a transformation 
scene from fairyland. The material world which surrounds the body, the body which 
shelters the brain, the brain in which we distinguish centres, he abruptly dismisses… 
as by a magician’s wand” ([1896] 1912, 33).  
 
Both Bergson’s methodological intuition and Jung’s constructive method can be 
incorporated into the perceptual diversity of polyphasic consciousness. My 
understanding of this concept now includes altered states of consciousness such as psi 
phenomena and shamanism, the ‘magical experience’ or ‘magical consciousness’ as 
described by Glucklich, and Bergson and Jung’s approaches to intuition and 
transformation. They form a bridge between the ‘deception’ of magical thinking and 
the ‘truth’ of neuroscience because they have all been, or still are, associated with a 
kind of magic, but, with the benefit of recent advances in neuroscience, can also be 
seen as natural processes. In this way, polyphasic consciousness can be understood as 




The philosopher Gilles Deleuze begins the first of his two Cinema books, Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image (1983) with a critique of Bergson’s position on the 
cinematograph.18 Deleuze champions insights from Matter and Memory into the 
virtuality of the image and the role of durée, but argues that here already Bergson had 
proved that cinema was not like natural perception, so to later claim that it did in 
Creative Evolution amounted to an illogical u-turn. Deleuze argues that we don’t see 
immobile sections of cinema, like screenshots or the animated film without the 
animation. Essentially rejecting the notion of persistence of vision, he argues that 
what we see is movement and we understand that movement in terms of a perspective 
in time. He writes, “natural perception introduces halts, moorings, fixed points, and 
separated points of view, moving bodies or even distinct vehicles, whilst 
cinematographic perception works continuously, in a single movement whose very 
halts are an integral part of it and are only a vibration on to itself” ([1983] 2005, 23).  
 
I argued in Chapter One that Morin does not move beyond Bergson’s assertion that 
the normal process of perception can be equated with the cinematic image. Yet there 
are hints that Morin almost reached a similar conclusion to Deleuze about the quality 
of movement and time in the cinema when he writes: 
 
Time in the cinematograph was precisely real chronological time. The 
cinema, by contrast, expurgates and breaks up chronology; it puts 
temporal fragments in harmony and continuity according to a particular 
rhythm, which is one not of action but of images of action. Montage 
unites and arranges the discontinuous and heterogeneous succession of 
shots in a continuum. It is this rhythm that, starting from a temporal 
series of tiny, chopped-up morsels, reconstitutes a new, fluid time” 
(Morin [1956] 2005, 56, emphasis original). 
 
This new fluid time that includes montage and movement as integral cannot be 
Bergson’s false movement and brings Morin closer to Deleuze on this point.  
 
                                                
18 Bergson argues that “the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical 
kind” ([1907] 2001, 295, emphasis original).   
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Deleuze argues that Bergson’s mistake is to locate movement in the mechanical 
apparatus of the cinematograph rather than understanding that the movement-image 
shows us pure movement that goes beyond normal perception in a fundamental way 
because it frees it from its grounding in the “sensory-motor schema,” upsetting and 
deterritorialising that which it already knows ([1983] 2005, 24). Deleuze gives 
examples from films where the camera leaves a character and focuses elsewhere, 
liberating it from its body-centred perspective.  
 
In Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985) Deleuze shifts the focus away from the 
movement-image to consider the experience of cinematic images as they developed 
after the second World War, particularly in experimental or art cinema. Deleuze 
argues that the movement-image had become plagued by “the multiplication of 
clichés, the events that hardly concern those they happen to, in short the slackening of 
the sensory-motor connections” ([1985] 2005, 3). Morin similarly argues that cinema 
stupefied itself with clichés that became the recognisable language of cinema. 
 
I will expand on this very brief introduction to Deleuze’s approach to the cinema 
throughout the remainder of this chapter as I consider four of the films of German 
director Werner Herzog, whose career spans fifty-five years at the time of writing. 
With a relentless search for authentic images he aims for what he calls an “ecstatic 
truth.” I would argue this amounts to another iteration of the drive towards a magical 
aesthetic experience in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Alongside Morin, 
Bergson, Jung and Deleuze, I will also bring in actor and writer Antonin Artaud. Like 
Herzog, his work is also informed by a drive for authenticity, but unlike Herzog, 
Artaud freely sees the drive as a magical one. 
 
In the conclusion to Volume One of Jung in the 21st Century, Haule mentions that 
when he discusses his work with other psychologists, they often complain that his 
scientific approach has killed the “magic” from Jung (2011, 1:259). It may be, 
though, that he has simply dispensed with the supernatural in favour of the magical 
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experience. Following Bergson, Morin and Deleuze, what emerges is an 
acknowledgement of the significance of imagination within the normal process of 
image creation. The focus turns to affective intensities as they impact on the senses 
within an embodied approach to an event or situation. Add the perceptual diversity of 
polyphasic consciousness and this approach to a magical aesthetic experience has the 
potential to lead to deeper truths and to transformation and creative becoming. 
 
Heart of Glass (Herzog, 1976) 
I will consider Heart of Glass in terms of the ‘magic’ of hypnosis and clairvoyance, 
and Deleuze’s crystal image. The film begins with the cowherd Hias sitting immobile 
in the foreground with his back to us, looking across the vagueness of a foggy field of 
cows. After a closer shot of the cows, we return to the establishing shot, but now Hias 
is staring directly at the camera. We have still not seen him move. It transpires that he 
possesses the magical power of clairvoyance, of seeing the future. He is also one of 
the seers that characterises Deleuze’s concept of the postwar time-image: unable to 
move the action forward, he can only sit and watch, or sit and describe his apocalyptic 
visions. A series of unconnected images follows as Hias prophesises:  
 
I look into the distance, to the end of the world. Before the day is over, 
the end will come. First, time will tumble, and then the earth. The clouds 
begin to race, the earth boils over; this is the sign. This is the beginning 
of the end. The world’s edge begins to crumble, everything starts to 
collapse, tumbles, falls, crumbles, and collapses. I look into the cataract. 
I feel an undertow, it draws me – it sucks me down. I begin to fall.  
 
In the DVD commentary Herzog describes the images that accompany this sequence 
as “archetypes”: a close-up of a waterfall, forested hills with rolling clouds, boiling 
mud. While some appear to correspond to the Bavarian landscape where the film is 
set, Herzog states in the commentary that many are images of Alaska. Archetypal 
images appear again later in the film: pastoral scenes of Ireland, hot pools in 
California’s Yellowstone National Park, desert images from Monument Valley, and 
the final coda of the film takes place on an isolated, windswept island in Scotland. 
 65 
Sounding like a magician in the act of conjuring, Herzog states in the commentary 
that “it doesn’t matter where, these images are inside all of us. I invoke them, awaken 
images that are already in us.” Within the concept of polyphasic consciousness, 
archetypal images can be understood in Jungian terms to appeal to our non-rational or 
analogical experience of the world, as symbols buried in our collective memory. 
These images can also be seen as features of Deleuze’s time-image: stand alone, 
fragmented, ‘deterritorialised’, ‘any-space-whatevers’, all of which could have been 
edited in any order without significantly changing the experience or the meaning 
(rather than continuity editing that keeps the movement-image active and rational).  
 
At the heart of the film is the search for the alchemical secret of the ruby glass, lost 
with the death of one of the glass workers. The Master of the Glassworks, who goes 
insane with the search, states that the ruby glass protects him from the evil of the 
universe, that it is the soul of the people and will save them. This has a purely 
practical aspect to it, as the Glassworks is the main industry in the village, but in this 
way, the search for the ruby glass becomes cosmic and magical in a Morinian sense. 
The glass is anthropomorphised into a force of potential becoming and 
cosmomorphised into the wider search, as Deleuze puts it about the film, “for cosmic 
limits, as the highest tension of the spirit and the deepest level of reality” ([1985] 
2005, 72-73). 
 
The pre-industrial mise-en-scène indicates the film takes place in the 18th century, but 
in several ways, the world in the film exists in its own sense of time (or durée). Time 
is treated strangely in the slow pacing of the images and the actions, which together 
with Hias delivering his prophecies in a rhythmic, stream-of-consciousness manner, 
begins to slow the spectator into the altered state of hypnosis. A close-up of a 
fragment of a waterfall begins to have a hypnotic effect on the spectator while Hias 
talks of tumbling and falling (into a hypnotic state). This was Herzog’s aim, as stated 
in the commentary. He initially wanted to appear onscreen as an MC before the actual 
film starts, in order to hypnotise the audience, but thought it would be “too 
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dangerous.” He decided instead to let the film itself work this “magic” but he did 
hypnotise most of the actors. Their somnambulic state works with the archetypal 
imagery and the slow pacing of the film to add to the hypnotic effect. Herzog rejects 
the notion that there is anything mysterious about hypnosis and he states in the 
commentary that he fired the original hypnotist for his “bullshit New Age ideas about 
evoking cosmic powers.” In typical Herzog style, he took over the job of hypnotising 
the actors himself. As previously mentioned, hypnosis is one of the more common 
altered states within a polyphasic consciousness approach to accessing knowledge. 
 
In a fitting description of the acting and behaviour of the characters in Heart of Glass, 
Deleuze describes a new type of actor within his concept of the time-image, that 
“might be called professional non-actors, or, better, ‘actor-mediums’, capable of 
seeing and showing rather than acting, and either remaining dumb or undertaking 
some neverending conversation, rather than of replying or following a dialogue” 
([1985] 2005, 19). Hias’ endless prophesies contrast with other characters who remain 
entirely dumb throughout. Deleuze says characters in the time-image have become 
“seers” (ibid, xi) and this is literally the case with the clairvoyant Hias, but also to a 
lesser extent the servant girl Ludmilla, who delivers an apocalyptic vision whilst 
polishing ruby glass, and a worker from the glassworks who is invited to present his 
utopian visions of the glass at the Master’s dinnertable. In Heart of Glass, most of the 
actors are completely non-professional, chosen for their susceptibility to hypnosis and 
their Bavarian background. Some of the dialogue is unscripted, as Herzog would paint 
a general scenario for the hypnotised actors and film the response (DVD 
commentary). Ludmilla’s vision, for example, was improvised in this manner, making 
the actors true mediums for Herzog’s vision. Deleuze writes that the actor in the time-
image is “prey to a vision, pursued by it or pursuing it, rather than engaging in action” 
([1985] 2005, 3). With one notable exception in the form of an imaginary bear that 
Hias must slay, all he is able to do is spew forth apocalyptic prophecies and attempt to 
convince others of the imminent danger. His inability to act is striking in the film. In 
addition to remaining dumb, many of the actors are also entirely immobile, like the 
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man in the tavern who is frozen stiff, holding a hand of playing cards, or the tableaux 
of characters standing in groups staring at the camera: on the mountainside, in the 
tavern, in the glassworks. One of Hias’ prophecies literalises this when he predicts, “I 
see the trees burning like matchsticks. I see many people running up a hill. Breathless, 
they stop at the top and, paralysed, they turn to stone, one beside the other. A whole 
forest of stone.”  
 
In the commentary Herzog states that he was after a “prophetic tone”. When 
questioned, he rejects the idea that he has experienced clairvoyance himself, but states 
in the commentary that there were moments where he saw some things “very, very 
clearly. I wouldn’t call it clairvoyance but where I saw my fate very clearly in front of 
me.” Herzog’s problem with anything remotely ‘magical’ seems to be semantic. After 
all, he displays considerable magical thinking in his book Of Walking on Ice (1978). 
The book describes his walk from Munich to Paris to visit ailing friend and film 
theorist Lotte Eisner. He decided to walk the entire length of the journey rather than 
drive or fly because he believed that the physical effort would keep her alive. That 
said, both positions are accommodated in my thesis. Hypnosis is not magic; it is an 
altered state available to everyone, but the altering of our rational state is what 




in [the film], the Bavarian landscape harbours the hypnotic creation of 
the glass ruby, but goes still further beyond itself into hallucinatory 
landscapes which summon to the search for the great abyss of the 
Universe. Hence the Large is realised as pure Idea, in the double nature 
of the landscape and the actions ([1983] 2005, 189). 
 
Several doubles of this nature can be seen in the film. The local Bavarian landscape 
doubles with archetypal landscapes. Hypnosis doubles with clairvoyance, two ways of 
seeing, of perceiving: one inward and reflective; the other outward and far sighted. 
The actor playing Hias was the only one not hypnotised (apart from the glassblowers 
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purely for safety reasons when they were working with ultra-hot material). Hias’ far-
sighted and penetrating gaze looks completely different from the inward trance of the 
villagers. The most direct and magical doubling, however, is with Hias and the 
invisible bear. 
 
Towards the end of the film, Hias hunts down and fights this invisible bear, mostly 
using the strength of his own bear-like body. As he fights his magical double, he and 
the imaginary bear literally and symbolically become One. This is why he is unable to 
find anyone to help him slay the creature, and why the fight must involve Hias 
embracing the bear during the struggle, rather than shooting at it from a safe distance. 
Jung would see this as Hias accepting and coming to terms with his shadow self, 
another iteration of the double, but Deleuze would not focus on a psychological 
reading. In a discussion of Beckett’s Film (1965), for example, Deleuze concentrates 
on the formal elements of the camera movement relative to the main character and 
analyses the moment this character is confronted by his literal double, which comes as 
a surprise for the character as well as the spectator. Deleuze writes of this moment, 
“we are in the domain of the perception of affection, the most terrifying… it is the 
perception of self by self, the affection-image” (ibid, 70). This is consilient with 
Morin’s descriptions of a confrontation with a magical double. For him, it is the most 
terrifying and most objectively magical aspect of the double on screen. 
 
In Cinema 2: the time-image Deleuze declares that Heart of Glass contains the 
“greatest crystal images in the history of cinema” (ibid, 73). In explaining the crystal 
image, Deleuze describes the way cinema is prone to surrounding itself with a 
coherent world of memory images in the Bergsonian sense, from whence we get the 
cinematic clichés we know so well. But in the crystal image, as a feature of the time-
image, we lose the reference to a recollected world because the time between the 
perception of actual and virtual images is crystallised in a moment that is the shortest 
circuit possible between actual and virtual, or what Bergson calls the memory of the 
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present, the first memory associated with the object. This is a kind of pure description 
of an image that is free of the baggage of memory.  
 
Here lies a critical component of the crystal image – without a substantial memory 
image to refer to, the actual and the virtual fuse together, still distinct but 
indiscernible from one another. The real no longer refers to an independent object but 
“stands for its object, replaces it, both creates and erases it… and constantly gives 
way to other descriptions which contradict, displace, or modify the preceding ones” 
(ibid, 122). The seer Hias presents us with a stream of visions, some accompanied by 
images and others merely announced. It is their simple description and endless 
potentials, without distinction between actual and virtual, that elevates them to crystal 
images. The film realises time in the purest sense as images are piled on top of each 
other, not building a narrative coherence but as a series of affective intensities that are 
arresting because the perceptual process (affect-memory-action) has been reduced to 
its smallest circuit, “We see time in the crystal,” says Deleuze, “a bit of time in the 
pure state” (ibid, 79). 
 
Time is integral to every aspect of Heart of Glass’ realisation. It runs differently 
under hypnosis, as does the pacing of the film compared to a Hollywood action 
movie, and issues of past and future inform its present concerns. The threat of 
modernisation spells doom to the heart of the village, and Hias’ prophecies predict an 
apocalyptic future, while the past, represented by the ruby glass, is seen to hold the 
key to a more authentic way of life. As Powell puts it in Deleuze: Altered States and 
Film, the loss of the secret of the ruby glass causes the village to fall “under 
enchantment as though itself trapped within a crystal world” (2007, 151). The world 
inside the film exists in its own strange, crystallised vacuum. This is a typical device 
of Herzog’s. He often films in rugged and remote places where he creates a sense of 
isolation from the outside world.  
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The crystal image does not refer to anything real but to itself or to other images. 
Deleuze says, “You get falsity when the distinction between real and unreal becomes 
indiscernible. But then, where there’s falsity, truth itself becomes undecidable. Falsity 
isn’t a mistake or confusion, but a power that makes truth undecidable” (1995, 66). 
Deleuze calls these ‘powers of the false’ liberating. In other words, it is an affect 
without the usual sensory-motor extension or recourse to cliché and habit that we are 
familiar with. Pisters posits that Deleuze’s concept of the ‘powers of the false’ allows 
for a re-evaluation of magical illusion in film (2009, 236). In terms of polyphasic 
consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience, the ‘powers of the false’ within the 
crystal image allows for something significant to emerge because within this scheme 
we can create our own reality, as Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus was promised in his 
physics lesson. Deleuze writes, “there is no more truth in one life than in the other; 
there is only becoming, and becoming is the power of the false of life, the will to 
power” ([1985] 2005, 137). This has implications for the reading of film in terms of 
narrative, which Deleuze cautions against because of its connection with systems of 
judgement, arguing instead that becoming is always innocent and endlessly creative 
rather than fixed by ‘truth’ or representation (ibid). Becoming has a connection to the 
unconscious in the sense of polyphasic consciousness, in that it favours intuition and 
the forces of affective-intensities.  
 
Herzog states in the commentary that anything could stand in for the ruby glass, “the 
stone of wisdom, for example,” a reference to the ‘truth’ of the magical alchemical 
philosopher’s stone. Yet again this suggests the quest for the ruby glass is associated 
with authenticity. Other readings of the film discuss, for example, social inequality, 
the myth of origins, the Heimatfilm, and the Romantic sublime (see Heringman 2012). 
Deleuze, however, sees no possibility for such ‘truths’; instead the ‘powers of the 
false’ activate the creative potential of multiple visions, all of which are possible.  
 
In Negotiations, Deleuze is asked why he doesn’t talk about the imaginary in his 
Cinema books. In his answer, he shifts the focus back to the crystal-image, arguing 
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that the imaginary is only a partial form of the crystal image, within which we see the 
‘powers of the false’ and time itself ([1990] 1995, 66-67). He states, “To imagine is to 
construct crystal-images, to make the image behave like a crystal” (ibid, 66). For 
Deleuze, the imaginary, like ‘truth’, ceases to be useful, as the crystal is the more 
important notion upon which to place attention. He continues, “What I set out to do in 
these books on cinema was not to reflect on the imaginary but something more 
practical: to disseminate time crystals. It’s something you can do in the cinema but 
also in the arts, the sciences, and philosophy” (ibid, 67).  
 
I place a higher value on the role of the imaginary than Deleuze; indeed, the notion of 
polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience relies on it, especially as 
it has been developed with Morin’s Cinema, or the Imaginary Man. In the original 
1956 publication Morin maintains the distinction between subject and object, the real 
is associated with movement and objective ‘truth’, and the unreal with the virtual and 
imaginary. But in the preface to the 1978 version of the book, Morin clarifies what he 
considers the “nub” of the issues in the book. He argues that the process of perception 
gives us an “image-reflection” or double which can contain a distanciation and 
objectivation but in their opposition and competition is also a confusion between 
‘truth’ and ‘deception’, the real and the imaginary ([1956] 2005, 223-224). Hence, 
like Deleuze, Morin maintains there is always a separation between the two but there 
can also be a confusion about which is which. Morin writes, “the very mode of 
prevailing thought conceals the complex unity and complementarity of the real and 
the imaginary, one of these notions necessarily excluding the other” (ibid, 224). 
Likewise, Deleuze argues that while it is not possible to discern what is actual and 
virtual in the crystal-image, they always maintain a doubled separation and at any 
moment, one or the other will come to the fore without it being clear which is which 
([1985] 2005, 68). 
 
As mentioned previously, pure affect for Bergson and Morin is an unconscious 
sensation experienced by the body. Once memory intervenes and makes sense of the 
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affect, the image becomes virtual and represented. If totally objectified this may lead 
to the magic of hallucinations, doubles and metamorphoses, but it is more likely, via 
affective-participation, to lead to mere shades of magical experiences such as 
projection/identification and anthropo-cosmomorphism. Cinematic affect that is 
designed to dissolve into sentiment or pleasant contemplation is not magical because 
it immediately falls back on habitual memory and only leads to a festished image that 
lazily wallows in sentimentality and pleasant reflection. In this watered down 
affective-participation Morin describes cinema as a “robot of the imaginary,” ([1956] 
2005, 202). The perceptual process as a whole is Morin’s imaginary, and this 
perceptual process always involves a doubling from actual to virtual. In Deleuze’s 
movement-image, the double can be a literal and magical moment of terror, as it is in 
Beckett’s Film when the main character is confronted with himself. But in the time-
image, doubling in the perceptual process involves the shortest circuit possible with 
regards to the intervention of memory, just affective intensities without a substantial 
memory to refer to. Without a grounding in a known real, the distinction between the 
‘truth’ and ‘deception’ of Hias’ prophecies becomes redundant, instead opening up 
the potential for creative becomings, transformations and metamorphoses. 
 
Nosferatu the Vampyre (Herzog, 1979)  
Nosferatu the Vampyre is Herzog’s remaking of Murnau’s celebrated silent film from 
1922. While the mythical creature of Nosferatu is a supernatural demonic figure, there 
is remarkably little overt magic seen in the film beyond a clairvoyant connection 
between the vampire and the protagonist’s wife Lucy. Most of the supernatural 
aspects of the film’s magic are only discussed or implied, but I will argue that it can 
be seen as a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense when considered 
alongside Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty and the plague. In an interview, 
Herzog states that for him, the vampire film has an “intensive, almost dreamlike, 
stylization on screen… There is fantasy, hallucination, dreams and nightmares, 
visions, fear and, of course, mythology” (Cronin 2002, 151), a fruitful set of magical 
experiences to set out with. 
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The character of Nosferatu can be seen from a Jungian point of view as a 
Mephistophelian figure, a monstrous force lurking in our unconscious that must be 
confronted and overcome. Viewed through a Jungian lens, the protagonist Jonathan 
Harker is seen to leave the ordered stability of his home life (his conscious rational 
world) to travel (or transition) into an unknown and wild mountainous environment of 
strange customs and nocturnal mysteries (a journey down the depths of his repressed 
unconscious). As Prager points out in A Companion to Werner Herzog, Nosferatu’s 
castle may exist only in Jonathan’s imagination, as Nosferatu is clearly his double, or 
“doppelgänger” (2007, 102-103). Jonathan fails to defeat his magical double and is 
therefore unable to integrate this force into his psyche in a healthy way, resulting in 
his deterioration into an increasingly vegetative state (the triumph of his 
unconscious), the end result of which sees him fully taken over by this force as he is 
turned into the next incarnation of demonic evil, perpetuating the immortality of both 
the creature and the myth. 
 
Nosferatu is a horror film and to a certain degree it follows many of the expected 
conventions of the genre, such as the trip to a haunted house, eerie soundscapes, the 
presence of an unnatural monster, chiaroscuro lighting with plenty of looming 
shadow-doubles of Nosferatu, and death. But the film avoids overt shock or gore, and 
instead focuses the majority of its unsettling affects on the figure of Nosferatu’s body, 
which is a slowly twisting and rasping pain-body with elongated, sharp points and 
pale, waxy skin. Herzog has stated that he wished to “humanise” the vampire and 
portray an “existential anguish” (Cronin 2002, 155). Most threatening is the predatory 
nature of his sexual desire. From a Deleuzian perspective, the bodies of Nosferatu and 
Jonathan play out the drama of transformative becomings. Jonathan begins a strong 
and healthy man with a stable identity and a body that strides forward, but through his 
too-close encounter with the threatening/desiring body of Nosferatu, Jonathan’s 
stability is disrupted and his body becomes haggard and immobilised before 
metamorphosing into the next immortal vampire. In a stark before and after contrast, 
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Jonathan’s new body signals its arrival by realigning itself with the twisted postures 
that had belonged to the previous Nosferatu.  
 
When the ship containing Nosferatu arrives in the town of Wismar, the townsfolk are 
displayed in a series of tableaux, a common device of Herzog’s that is also used in 
Heart of Glass. The tableaux could be read from the perspective of Deleuze’s time-
image as depicting exhausted characters who are unable to act in a narrative sense. 
Del Rio proposes the tableau be read from a Deleuzian perspective as a “tense 
compression of vital affective energies” (2008, 83).19  This allows the tableaux in 
Nosferatu to be seen as a kind of repression or inhibition that is then contrasted with 
the carnivalesque activity that comes later with the plague, which releases the tension 
in an excessive frenzy of transformative becomings. 
 
It is the affliction of the plague unleashed by Nosferatu that I wish to concentrate on, 
using Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, where he argues that theatre can be like 
the plague. Artaud formulated his ideas about the theatre in the 1930s and outlined 
them in The Theatre and Its Double (1938). While Artaud is writing about theatre 
rather than film, Herzog can be seen as a theatrical film director in several ways. He 
has never filmed inside a studio, or with a false set. He prefers long takes, which 
allows for narrative development to take place within the diegetic space and 
encourages the actors to engage with one another as they would in theatre. By 
privileging the acting and the performance, Herzog reinvests a sense of presence into 
film. His fiction films often become a kind of “fantastic documentary,” where the 
director sets up a scenario and then films it, often in one take, as if documenting a 
“unique” event. 
 
Perhaps most significant for a discussion about the magical as an experience is that 
Artaud’s description of the ideal actor as athlete is Herzog’s description of the ideal 
                                                
19 Del Rio discusses the tableau in relation to Fassbinder’s film, The Marriage of Maria Braun 
(1979). 
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filmmaker as athlete. For both, the path to knowing is through physicality, a theatrical 
approach that, for Herzog, includes working out each shot in the doing rather than in 
the imagination. He dislikes storyboards and insists on physically experiencing the 
space being filmed. When working out scenes, he takes the place normally reserved 
for stand-ins. If a prop needs shifting, he does it himself. For large crowd scenes, he 
runs instructions back and forth (Herzog 1982, DVD commentary). The following 
quote from Filmmaker Volker Schlöndorff in Werner Herzog could equally be 
applied to Artaud, “Werner experi-ences [sic] everything with the body first, and he 
expects the same of the actors. The metaphysical comes as a give-away, or an act of 
mercy, if one doesn’t cheat on the physical” (Presser 2002, 29). For the filming of 
Fitzcarraldo (Herzog, 1982) this meant a three-storey steamboat had to be pulled over 
a mountain, for real. And the rats in the plague scenes in Nosferatu were also real. 
10,000 were brought in especially for the filming (Cronin 2002, 157).  
 
Artaud makes many references to magic in his writing. For him, an authentic 
experience can be transformative and therefore magical. At a fundamental level, the 
magical double is omnipresent in his Theatre of Cruelty, but he radically upends the 
expected perceptual order of theatre as a faithful and unchallenging copy of reality. 
Instead he positions the Theatre of Cruelty as the truly authentic space, while the 
‘truth’ of the life outside the theatre is the inauthentic double. It is the oppressive 
nature of the ‘real world’, the (non-)life outside the theatre that he sees as ‘deceptive’ 
because it prevents us from being free. This is a Gnostic ontology, as discussed by 
Goodall in Artaud and the Gnostic Drama, in which “the world of forms is a false 
creation, that… continues to be governed and directed through the work of evil” 
(1994b, 17). Artaud feels that we are blind to the world and our own suffering, that 
the known world dulls the senses and stifles that which is magical, blocking the way 
to an authentic life. Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty as the plague aims to implicate both 
actor and spectator in a spectacular alchemical transformation. 
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Artaud envisages the plague as a volatile, anarchic force that lies within us at all 
times, but which is kept in a repressed and dormant state by social constraint. The 
plague has often been associated with magical thinking and was commonly seen as an 
act of God. By contrast, Artaud sees it as an organic upheaval, a magical “psychic 
entity” that only appears in sick societies (Artaud [1938] 1958, 18). Herzog chose the 
Netherlands town of Delft in which to set the Wismar town scenes where the plague 
erupts. Ringed with controlled canals that have tamed a river, the town is, as Casper 
and Linville note, the very picture of “bourgeois respectability and orderliness…a 
sense of stagnation, of life sacrificed to routine… In other words, Wismar is already 
the virtual land of the living dead” (1991, 21). The perfect stage for an Artaudian 
wake-up call, a devastating plague erupts with the arrival of Nosferatu and his army 
of rats. But while the rats and demonic nature of Nosferatu are supposedly the cause 
of the plague, in an Artaudian sense the plague can be seen as a physical, psychical 
and social disease.  
 
Artaud describes what happens once the plague has taken hold of the body and is 
running rampant. Fluids become “crazed,” the pulse slows one minute and races the 
next, the head boils and the tongue swells. Once it has completely exhausted itself it 
begins to thicken and clog the arteries, shutting the body down and leaving it in a 
petrified state ([1938] 1958, 19-20). Goodall points out the alchemical process in this 
transformation, one that “plays between the volatile and the fixed. [The plague] 
volatilises the organs of the body in order to effect transubstantiations, then returns 
them to a fixed state” (1994a, 59). Artaud advocates a homeopathic approach, one 
that consciously fights like with like. The medicine, in his case, is theatre. Goodall 
writes, “The theatre operates homeopathically by being the equivalent of the plague 
but with its force harnessed to the cruelty of human consciousness instead of to a 
tyrannical fatality” (ibid, 61). If the actor admits this psychic plague, the equivalent of 
“the conflicts, struggles, cataclysms and debacles our lives afford us,” (Artaud [1938] 
1958, 25) and rigorously applies conscious effort to its material aspect (its volatile 
cruelty), he or she can perform the ordeal and perhaps effect a deterritorialising shift 
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away from the empty distractions of the real world, the start of a process of 
purification and transformation in the alchemical sense. Performing the ordeal starts 
the trouble. The propelling agent for achieving such a profound shift comes by way of 
affect. 
 
Artaud wants to affect the senses with, “a spectacle unafraid of going as far as 
necessary in the exploration of our nervous sensibility” (ibid, 87). To this end, he 
outlines a complete manifesto to reinvent the way theatre can be conducted and 
experienced. This includes finding the points of the body, like acupuncture points, 
that will elicit an affective response, which he links with the experience of an altered 
state. He writes, “To know in advance what points of the body to touch is the key to 
throwing the spectator into magical trances. And it is this invaluable kind of science 
that poetry in the theater has been without for a long time. To know the points of 
localization in the body is thus to reforge the magical chain” (ibid, 140). This is a 
magical aesthetic experience that engulfs the audience in a physically affective 
experience (ibid, 96). 
 
The actor, and by extension, the audience, then experience the ‘cruelty’, which, as 
Artaud writes, “disturbs the senses’ repose, frees the repressed unconscious, incites a 
kind of virtual revolt (which moreover can have its full effect only if it remains 
virtual), and imposes on the assembled collectivity an attitude that is both difficult 
and heroic” (ibid, 28). The task of the actor in appealing to the senses in this way is 
demanding and Artaud argues that it requires a physically astute and athletic actor 
who can operate as a kind of magical conduit. Artaud refers to such an actor in double 
terms as “a perpetual specter from which the affective powers radiate” (ibid, 134). In 
this way, the plague can be seen as facilitating a physically affective and destabilising 
(magical aesthetic) experience.  
 
During the volatile stage of the plague, Artaud describes how anarchy reigns, both 
inside and outside the body. He writes, “The last of the living are in a frenzy: the 
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obedient and virtuous son kills his father; the chaste man performs sodomy upon his 
neighbours. The lecher becomes pure. The miser throws his gold in handfuls out the 
window. The warrior hero sets fire to the city he once risked his life to save” (ibid, 
24). In Nosferatu the revelry that breaks out with the plague is similarly anarchic, and 
can be compared to Bakhtin’s description of the carnival in Rabelais and His World 
as the performance of transgression where authority is mocked and the social order is 
temporarily dissolved. As with Artaud’s theatre, Bakhtin notes that the carnival is not 
just a spectacle but an experience. He writes, “[the people] live in it, and everyone 
participates because its very idea embraces all the people” ([1940] 1984, 7). In 
Nosferatu, the plagued townsfolk congregate in the town square to drink, dance and 
mock social taboos. One man plays a French horn to a chicken while another mounts 
a goat. Bakhtin describes how a second life is experienced during carnival, “as a 
liberation from the prevailing truth and the established order” (ibid, 10). The plague 
in Nosferatu has equalised the townsfolk and disrupted all ordering functions, which 
opens up the possibility of transformation and becoming in a Deleuzian sense, as 
befitting Artaud’s vision of an oozing and disregulating plague.  
 
The heroine Lucy walks through the revelry, unaffected since she alone understands 
the plague’s true nature, and comes across an elegantly dressed group feasting at a 
fine table, while rats scuttle in the background. “We have all contracted the plague,” 
one man tells her, “let’s enjoy whatever time we have to live” (emphasis mine). The 
feast was a central component of carnival, a time where the people “entered the 
utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and abundance” (ibid, 9). The scene 
cuts briefly to concentrate on dozens of rats in the background before returning to the 
feasting table, except that the group has magically disappeared and rats now swarm 
the table. As this sequence is shot from Lucy’s perspective while she walks through 
the revelry, the sudden disappearance of the group recalls the magical disappearances 
of Méliès films.  
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The people in Herzog’s Nosferatu, however, prefer to remain only in the ecstatic 
stage of the carnival and hence fail to affect a kind of deterritorialising in the 
Deleuzian sense of breaking away from comfortable habits, or in the Artaudian sense 
of embracing chaos in order to explore a creative principle that might allow for new 
becomings (Artaud [1938] 1958, 90). Artaud is dismayed at “gratuitous” theatre, 
which he sees as an “epidemic” of useless actions where an actor has experienced a 
“paroxysm” of emotions but nothing comes of it (ibid, 24-25). This mirrors Morin’s 
understanding of the direction cinema took into similarly safe and escapist pursuits. 
Morin explicitly links this decline with the diminishing of magic and Artaud argues 
that if our lives lack “a constant magic” (ibid, 8) it is because we are confined by the 
conventions and distractions of ‘civilised’ society and avoid really experiencing life. 
Like the concept of intuition for Jung and Bergson, ‘Cruelty’ requires concentration 
and work. Artaud writes, “Cruelty signifies rigor, implacable intention and decision, 
irreversible and absolute determination” (ibid, 101). Ultimately, Artaud’s theatre is 
meant to change people, to have a meaningful and lasting impact. Carnival, by 
contrast, is a temporary phenomenon where order is eventually restored. A 
carnivalesque approach to the plague will therefore not be successful and ultimately 
the people of Wismar fail to defeat the plague for this reason. They do not harness the 
torment and rigorously work their way through the ordeal. This is also a problem 
afflicting film in Artaud’s opinion, and he was critical of the way it avoids the 
confrontational work required of ‘Cruelty’. In this way, the demon Nosferatu cannot 
be seen as entirely evil since he at least provokes a release from societal confines. The 
failure of the townsfolk can therefore be seen to serve as a warning: avoiding the 
‘truth’ of the ordeal of the plague will not conquer the ‘deception’ of an inauthentic 
life.  
 
Cave of Forgotten Dreams (Herzog, 2010) 
Cave of Forgotten Dreams is a documentary about the 32,000 year old paintings 
recently discovered in the Chauvet-Pont-d’Arc Cave of Southern France. Like a 
modern-day shaman, Herzog leads us down into the cave to view, what he calls, our 
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“collective dreams.” He identifies with the cave painters as proto-filmmakers and the 
space of the cave as proto-cinema. I would also like to discuss it as it could be seen to 
relate to the ‘magical’ practice of shamanism. 
 
In the film, renowned prehistorian Jean Clottes briefly suggests that the images in the 
Chauvet Cave might be associated with spiritual rituals. He is the co-author, along 
with David Lewis-Williams, of The Shamans of Prehistory: Trance and Magic in the 
Painted Caves (1998). Shamanism is the process of going into a deep trance in order 
to, from a magical/mythological perspective, explore other- or spirit-worlds. Initially 
it involves an introverted state of turning inwards to oneself, facilitated by a ritual 
practice such as drumming, dancing, chanting, exposure to extreme cold, or ingesting 
psycho-active drugs, before breaking through to the ‘other side’, where, in a state of 
ecstasy, the shaman flies free of his or her body and undertakes a visionary journey 
either by descending to the underworld or ascending to a celestial realm. To quote 
C.D. Laughlin et.al. from Brain, Symbol and Experience, the world of the shaman “is 
made of ritual, symbol, and myth generating a phenomenological cosmos with depths 
below and heights above the world of normal consciousness. This nonprofane world 
is approached first through a phenomenological descent and then a magical flight” 
(1990, 270).  
 
Shamanism can be understood as a magical experience, but it is also a neurobiological 
process that all humans have access to. This point is critical. In Haule’s books on 
Jung, shamanism is discussed as a “hard-wired” capability of our neurocognitive and 
physiological development, an “ability to tune our autonomic nervous system… alter 
our consciousness and explore what appears before our inner eyes as a greater 
cosmos” (Haule 2011 2:9). Over time, those of us living in the West and in cultures 
that value monophasic rationalism have largely lost touch with the practice. 
 
Using a Jungian symbolic reading, shamanism can also be linked to Faust and 
Mephistopheles can be seen as a shaman. Jung writes: 
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One of the archetypes that is almost invariably met within the projection 
of unconscious collective contents is the ‘magic demon’ with mysterious 
powers… in Faust he is the actual hero. The image of this demon forms 
one of the lowest and most ancient stages in the conception of God. It is 
the type of primitive tribal sorcerer or medicine-man, a peculiarly gifted 
personality endowed with magical power ([1917, 1928] 1953, 94-95).  
 
In this way, the shamanic journey can be understood as a trip into the unconscious 
where it would be common to have to deal with symbolic images from one’s psyche 
in the form of creatures or spirits. In Goethe’s Faust Part Two, Mephistopheles 
facilitates a shamanic journey for Faust when he gives him a key that allows him to 
journey to the underworld realm of the Mothers. Here lies “the creative aspect of the 
unconscious” (Jung [1952] 1956, 125.182). Faust is able to evoke the images of Paris 
and Helen and consummate the “royal marriage” in the alchemical sense (ibid).  
 
According to Clottes and Lewis-Williams, caves are used for shamanic rituals 
because entry into a cave replicates the journey down a kind of Alice in Wonderland 
‘rabbit hole’, passing through the portal of a dark entrance to another world. They 
write: 
 
They would have believed that caves led into that subterranean tier of the 
cosmos. The walls, ceilings, and floors of the caves were therefore little 
more than a thin membrane between themselves and the creatures and 
happenings of the underworld. The caves were awesome, liminal places 
in which to be: Literally, they took one into the underworld (1998, 85-
86). 
 
Furthermore, the very act of being in a cave may induce an altered state. They write, 
“The social isolation, sensory deprivation, and cold that characterise caves are… 
important factors in the induction of trance. During the Upper Palaeolithic, entry into 
an actual cave may therefore have been seen as virtually the same thing as entry into 
deep trance via the vortex” (ibid, 29). They argue that without even trying, these 
conditions provoke the senses to hallucinate. 
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The paintings in Herzog’s film include handprints, animals, a few humans, and 
magical creatures in the form of animal-human hybrids. In the shamanic world, 
animals are often seen anthropomorphically as spirit guides and either accompany the 
shaman or merge with him or her during the process. Many of the images inside the 
Chauvet Cave are partial and incomplete, such as a horse’s head painted on a 
protruding rock that makes it look as if it is breaking through from the ‘other side’; 
coming out of the wall towards the viewer. The many painted handprints in the cave 
could also be seen as a way of reaching towards or attempting to touch the ‘other 
side’. Lewis-Williams, who later expanded upon Clottes theories in The Mind in the 
Cave (2002), points out that nodules might form the eye of an animal, or a stalactite 
might be a hind leg. Often images appear to float or are not realistic (211). 
 
Lewis-Williams suggests that while individual shamans probably used the caves and 
the images to help enter a shamanic state, there are large caverns big enough for a 
community to gather and view the images collectively, which they may have done to 
learn about their mythscape (ibid, 208). It is in this way that the cave-space can be 
seen as a kind of proto-cinematic space. 
 
The obvious association with cave painting as a cinematic process is Plato’s Cave, but 
as Klinger notes in Film Quarterly, “Herzog rejects Plato’s definition of these 
shadows as deceptive phantoms. It is their mysteries, rather than their realities, that 
are compelling” (2012, 42). Some of the paintings that appear on the walls of the cave 
in Herzog’s film depict a single animal in a series of progressive movements, like a 
bison with eight legs, similar to the way movement is depicted frame by frame in an 
animated film. Herzog points out that under the dancing firelight of a flaming torch, 
these animals might have appeared to move then as film does for us today. While 
Herzog says no more on the matter, there are many connections to cinema that can be 
made from reading the works of Clottes and Lewis-Williams. I would argue, for 
example, that there is editing and direction in evidence in the caves, because the 
whole cannot be perceived at once. Lewis-Williams points out that in many caves the 
 83 
light must be in a particular place for the proper effect to be experienced, and in some 
cases, a shadow completes the image, as they were not painted on a smooth surface. 
Prehistoric torches only illuminated a small area and not particularly brightly by our 
standards, so Lewis-Williams argues it must have been a powerful experience to 
move through the caves with images leaping out at you (2002, 222). There was 
probably also surround sound experienced. Instruments like the ‘bull-roarer’ have 
been found, which was a flat piece of bone or wood that was “attached to a cord and 
swung round and round to produce a powerful humming sound” (ibid, 224). 
 
There are problems, however, with comparing cinema to shamanism. The shaman 
flies free of his or her body and travels through a mythic world that is presented as 
either vividly real or intensely dreamlike. Such imagery may be depicted in certain 
films or even a trance-like state experienced by the viewer, but crucially, this is an 
advanced stage in the drama of shamanism, and before one gets that far there is a 
painful period to undergo, akin to Artaud’s performance of the plague. In shamanism 
it is variously described as a death (or perhaps the annihilation of the conscious ego), 
a period of blackening (as it would be understood in alchemy), internal fragmentation 
or dismemberment, the cutting to pieces by shadowy entities, or painful despair and 
doubt (Laughlin et.al. 1990, 271). It is nothing short of an ordeal for the shaman to 
navigate this difficult terrain before reaching the mythic world, known as the ‘third 
stage’. Crucially, the experience of watching a film bypasses the work and the 
mastery required by a dedicated shaman, and goes directly to the exciting parts. It 
seems that, like Morin’s cinematic magic, the cinema as a shamanic space can only 
allude to a fraction of the affective experience associated with full-blown shamanism. 
 
But the play of depth and protrusion on the uneven surface of the rock walls suggests 
a particular type of cinema: 3D. While 3D may seem to be a fairly recent 
phenomenon, Higgins points out in a Film History article that it began in the 1950s 
with features like de Toth’s House of Wax in 1953 and Hitchcock’s Dial M for 
Murder in 1954 (2012, 196). The current trend began with The Polar Express in 2004 
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(Zemeckis) but truly cemented its place in 2009 with the box office success of James 
Cameron’s Avatar (ibid). In another Film History article, William Paul describes 3D 
as “the process that most closely approximate[s] the reality of our binocular vision” 
(1993, 336). This binocular vision allows us to see and estimate depth. A 3D image is 
filmed either with two cameras or one camera with two lenses. The further apart the 
lenses, the interocular distance, the larger the image’s volume of space or appearance 
of roundness. It is the point at which the two images seem to converge into one that 
determines if the image appears to protrude from the screen (negative parallax) or add 
depth behind it (positive parallax).  
 
One of the aims of 3D film is said to be immersion, but this is often seen as troubling 
in relation to protrusion. When an object seems to leap out towards the viewer, rather 
than feeling immersed, we are made aware of the screen surface from which the 
image has protruded. In Paul's article on the subject, which was written before the 
latest incarnation of 3D, he writes that “moving beyond the frame demands some 
notion that there is a frame to move beyond: [protrusion] depends on a sense of 
violation for its effect” (1993, 335, emphasis original). More recently, Higgins puts it 
similarly, “Protrusion may be 3D’s signature effect, but the price paid is an acute 
awareness of the frame as a boundary, and of cinema’s artifice in general” (2012, 
197). Accusations of artifice fuel much of the criticism of 3D; protrusion in particular 
is often seen as a distracting, aggressive, cheap thrill and that a trend in cinema 
towards the production of 3D is therefore “déclassé” (ibid). But there is a significant 
shift in recent 3D films, as argued by Higgins. By and large, the level of protrusion 
has become quite conservative, with images keeping closer to the screen surface. 
Instead the trend is towards positive parallax (ibid). 
 
Because the cave walls are not a flat surface like a film screen, it was a profoundly 
different experience watching Cave of Forgotten Dreams in 3D rather than 2D, and 
that difference can be summed up in one word: depth. It is simply not possible to fully 
appreciate the paintings in 2D because the camera flattens the images. You can still 
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see undulations in the wall, aided in particular by lighting, but what you fail to see are 
the deep hollows in the rock wall; the places where the head of an animal is painted 
on a deep recess while its fat belly protrudes. Every aspect of the animals seem to fit 
perfectly with the surface of the rock wall. Only after seeing it in 3D could I fully 
understand why Wigley has reported Herzog as stating, “This film is the only 3D film 
where I really know it was imperative to do it in 3D. I was and I still am a skeptic of 
3D, but the moment I saw the cave it was absolutely clear it had to be done in 3D, no 
question, no discussion about it” (Wigley 2011, 28-30). Several times Herzog 
switches between positive and negative parallax, so that I could no longer tell if the 
painted head of the animal receded while its belly protruded, or if it was the other way 
around, because he shows it both ways at different times. And in one startling shot, he 
appears to shift the parallax within the shot. I was looking at a head receding and 
suddenly it was protruding. Either that, or the viewing experience had tricked my 
senses and I had begun to hallucinate. I can only presume Herzog is playing with our 
perception of depth. 
 
The depth of the images in Chauvet fits well with the concept of shamanism. The 
experience of going into the cave, the possible meaning behind images that appear to 
be breaking through the walls, and the perceptual challenges in viewing these images, 
could be seen as a cinematic version of the altered state of shamanism, a magical 
aesthetic experience in the expansive, polyphasic consciousness sense. 
 
It becomes possible at this point to compare shamanism with many other 3D films 
that emphasise depth, especially given the proliferation of narratives involving other 
worlds or alternative realities. I will briefly mention two: Avatar (Cameron, 2009) and 
Hugo (Scorsese, 2011). Cameron has stated that Avatar was heavily influenced by his 
experience as a deep-sea diver (MTV 2012), which could be understood as a journey 
deep down into a different kind of underworld realm. The shamanic journey within 
the narrative of Avatar is overt. The protagonist Jake enters a medically induced 
dreamworld before speeding through a vortex while his consciousness is downloaded 
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into a new being: his Na’vi avatar. In this form the normally paraplegic Jake can do 
the impossible: he can walk. It is common for the shaman to take on another form 
when in a trance state. Often these creatures are human-animal hybrids, as reflected in 
cave paintings as well as mythology from around the world. While the Na’vi are 
obviously their own race of beings, they are humanoid with animal features such as a 
tail and ears that twitch. 
 
The Na’vi’s world is explicitly shamanic. The voices of ancestors can be heard in the 
trees and the people listen to earth spirits. These spirits help to save the planet of 
Pandora by mobilising its creatures to fight the invading humans. Just as a shaman 
can be seen to take a magical flight through other worlds, the Na’vi navigate the 
forest in giant leaps and fly on the backs of the dragon-like ikran. Mirroring an 
apprentice shaman’s development, Jake must initially overcome fearsome creatures 
and a hostile and sometimes seductive environment, before he finds his spirit guide in 
the form of the female Na’vi Neytiri, whom I believe Jung would see as Jake’s anima, 
and who must awaken him so that he can ‘see’ and learn to navigate this Other World. 
This is realised towards the end when he tames and bonds with the monstrous 
‘dragon’ taruk, one instance among several of Na’vi-animal hybridisation.  
 
Avatar employs protrusion to add atmospheric effects or to heighten the aggression of 
weaponry. The machinery of war protrudes, and when the Home Tree is felled by 
incendiary weapons, leaves and bark fly towards the audience. But the depth of the 
world seems to be more important than the shock and awe of protrusion; that is to say, 
its shamanic significance lies with the ‘subterranean’ world that reaches back into the 
screen. Where Avatar seems most magical is in scenes of the Other World of the 
Na’vi, where the internal logic of the 3D imagery is maintained. CGI-ed Na’vi fit into 
their CGI-ed environment. On the other hand, while the interocular distance of 
camera lenses adds volume and roundness to human characters, this seems to make 
the more realistic-looking humans in the foreground become separated from the rest 
of the mise-en-scène. The humans don’t fit the environment and oddly appear more 
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unreal than the CGI-ed Na’vi. Perhaps this is appropriate given their status as 
invading colonisers. 
 
This sense of a disconnect between the foreground character and the rest of the mise-
en-scène became particularly distracting when viewing the 3D version of Scorsese’s 
Hugo (2011) which is a film that pays tribute to the magical cinema of Méliès. It 
makes heavy use of shallow focus, the cinematic dramaturgy of intimacy, but in 3D 
this seems to make the characters in the foreground appear hyperreal in relation to 
their less substantial, computer generated background. The naturalistic acting style 
seems to clash with such an environment, so that I found myself not immersed in the 
narrative but watching the acting instead. They are, after all, inside a studio, on a 
flimsy set, surrounded by green screens. Concentration is needed for the magic of 
shamanism to work and 3D is not as effective when there is a distracting distanciation 
between the ‘truth’ of a live actor and the ‘deception’ of a fake environment. 
 
On the other hand, the three-dimensionality in Hugo seems most magical when 
watching the films of Georges Méliès that have either been recreated or converted 
into 3D. The theatrical flats in Méliès films never tried to look like anything other 
than what they were: set pieces. They were layered to create depth and 3D brings 
volume and space to this layering, so that it looks as if we are watching a magical 
show with a deep stage, complete with actors who are not trying to pretend that either 
their acting or their environment is real. This sense of authenticity lends weight to the 
emphasis on filmic magic and the magic of film. 
 
Extending the idea of film as magic beyond Méliès and into film in general, Hugo 
presents a tribute to cinema that includes a screening of the Lumière train film, 
complete with an audience that ducks out of the way, as well as films from many 
other pioneers such as Buster Keaton, Charlie Chaplin, Edison, Harold Lloyd and 
Pabst. Through the enchanted reaction shots of the young protagonist, Hugo, and his 
friend, Isobelle, we are encouraged to see that cinema has been, and should always be, 
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a kind of magic. The times when 3D enhances the magic is when this new technology 
refreshes the old magical films of Méliès so that we are offered a new sense of spatial 
depth and a new way of viewing the beginning of film.  
 
I had my own magical moment when I saw Avatar in the cinema. It was the first 3D 
film for many in the audience, myself included, and at the end several tweens ran up 
to the front and tried to touch the illusory images. They stood there with arms floating 
in the air like the paintings of handprints on the cave walls in Herzog’s film, 
completely entranced. They were not mistaking the images for reality. It was more 
like they were trying to break through the screen wall to the magical world beyond. 
 
Into the Inferno (Herzog, 2016) 
I will consider Herzog’s own concept of “ecstatic truth” as magical in his volcano 
documentary, Into the Inferno. It opens with an establishing shot that flies up a 
mountain slope to the choral music of monks singing Gitnik’s Unfailing Light. It 
would be a traditional fly-over that establishes location, except that we are flying up 
the mountain in slow motion, an impossible act that has a dreamlike quality to it. As 
the camera gets closer to the summit, apprehension rises as the music swells and it 
becomes clear that there is something beyond the mountaintop that we cannot yet see. 
As the camera approaches the top ridgeline, five tiny figures, dwarfed by the scale of 
their environment, come into view. At this point we begin to feel the relaxed 
dreamlike quality is beginning to take on a nightmarish tone as the tension rises along 
with the advance of the flying camera, which never falters as it moves towards some 
kind of awesome abyss. 
 
Finally the camera reaches the top and looks down over the edge of a vast sheer drop. 
This is an arresting moment, as far below we are presented with an image that is so 
powerful and terrifying it is almost unbearable to watch in its beauty and its horror: a 
roiling, boiling pit of red-black lava. Alarmingly, the camera continues over the 
precipice towards the lava lake as if we have leapt off the edge. But in an instant (an 
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edited cut) we must have free-fallen and be boiling alive because now we are down 
with the lake itself, in the horror of its restless surging as it leaps and crashes and 
folds over onto itself. The affect of being confronted with, and then seeming to join, 
the terrifying boiling pit is destabilising and it takes a moment even to make rational 
sense of what is being viewed. 
 
This initial sequence and several others like it actualise Deleuze’s point about the way 
the pure optical-sound image wallows in the intolerable and unbearable beauty of the 
moment, without any recourse to action. He writes: 
 
It is a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too 
beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities. 
Stromboli: a beauty which is too great for us, like too strong a pain. It can be a 
limit-situation, the eruption of a volcano, but also the most banal, a plain 
factory, a wasteland ([1985] 2005, 17, emphasis original). 
 
In a deterritorialising move, we are given the opportunity to consider the fiery pit 
anew as Herzog forces us to stare into the molten pit for too long. The imagery is 
presented as a “thing in itself” with no need of justification and can, in this way, be 
appreciated in its most abstract kinetic form.  
 
Herzog has criticised the use of worn out and superficial images across media and 
argues that war should be declared against commercials. From his perspective, the 
lack of “adequate images” in our society can be compared to global problems such as 
the nuclear threat and overpopulation (Blank, 1980). While he states that he is not 
necessarily after images no one has ever seen before, he is looking for “absolute 
images that reflect our civilization as a whole and our own deep inner voices” 
(Wenders, 1985). Herzog has often described this depth as a search for an “ecstatic 
truth.” This could be understood as a magical aesthetic experience, a raising of the 
spectator into a situation of sublimity, described by Herzog as a state where 
“something deeper become[s] possible, a kind of truth that is the enemy of the merely 
factual. Ecstatic truth, I call it” (Herzog 2010, 1). He peppers descriptions of “ecstatic 
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truth” with words like “poetic,” “mysterious,” a “kind of illumination.” His thinking 
on “ecstatic truth” is inspired by the first century literary critic Dionysus Longinus, 
who equates the experience of the sublime with a state of ecstasy that comes on like a 
“spell” (ibid, 10). Herzog explains that he “uses the concept of ekstasis, a person’s 
stepping out of himself into an elevated state” (ibid). This sounds distinctly like the 
experience of an altered state.  
 
Deleuze writes that it is difficult to escape cliché and requires something very 
powerful. He writes, “It is not enough to disturb the sensory-motor connections. It is 
necessary to combine the optical-sound image with the enormous forces that are not 
those of a simply intellectual consciousness, or of the social one, but of a profound, 
vital intution [sic]” ([1985] 2005, 21). The fiery pit of the volcano is just such an 
image with enormous force. As we have seen, it is a recurring symbol in our 
mythological imagination associated with hell, Mephistopheles, the unconscious and 
the shamanic underworld. 
 
Herzog focuses most of his attention in Into the Inferno on three things: sublime 
images of volcanoes, the scientists who get very excited about them, and the way 
these volcanoes form the foundations of magical myths for the cultures that live in 
their wake. Herzog states in the film, “Obviously there was a scientific side to our 
journey, but what we were really chasing was the magical side, the demons, the new 
gods.” Chief Moses of Endu in Vanuatu explains that the dead go to live in their 
volcano and “the lava expresses the anger of the devils who are living in that fire.” In 
Indonesia we are shown a ritual designed to appease a monstrous demon produced by 
the union between a Sultan and the Queen of the South Seas that now occupies a 
dangerous volcano. Herzog tells us all the volcanoes in Indonesia are connected to a 
belief system and bear magical names such as “The Night Market of the Ghosts” and 
the “Dancing Place of the Spirits.” In Iceland, we learn that volcanoes have 
influenced mythical poetry and Herzog reads a passage with apocalyptic imagery that 
describes a volcanic eruption and a prophecy involving the end of pagan gods. In 
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North Korea, we visit Mt Paektu, the mythical birthplace of the Korean nation and 
witness university students rejoicing in its power and singing fervently to its glory. 
And the final location in the film is Tanna Island in Vanuatu, where the volcano is 
believed to have created a new God, an American GI who descended from the clouds 
and who, the film tells us, “promises to return with copious cargos of consumer 
goods.” In this way, Herzog’s imagery offers up the connection between magical 
myths and volcanoes, but also the connection between magic and the sublime, 
particularly in the way he sets choral, string and operatic music to lingering images 
that are too beautiful, terrifying and awesome. 
 
To the sound of opera, a gigantic river of lava races along at an unbelievable speed, 
too close to the woman walking along its edge. In the next shot a tiny person stands in 
front of a curtain of raining fire. These images are sickeningly stunning, especially as 
we learn that the volcanologist-couple depicted in them, who were famous for such 
imagery, were both killed when they got too close to a volcano that erupted. For 
Herzog, danger is the yardstick by which he measures authenticity, and for Jung, any 
commerce with the ‘underworld’ of the unconscious is dangerous as it lets loose the 
darker forces we usually keep hidden. The film concludes with an apocalyptic vision 
of the end of the world brought about by a volcano, an interesting prospect if one 
considers the volcano part of our unconscious. As Herzog admits towards the end of 
the film, “it’s hard to take your eyes off the fire that burns deep under our feet… It is 
a fire that wants to burst forth.”  
 
Herzog rails against the destruction of powerful images in contemporary society. Like 
Morin’s description of the watered-down affective-participation that replaced 
powerful magic in cinema, Herzog feels that the superficial and clichéd images that 
proliferate today contain no deeper truths and instead seek to numb and distract. 
Artaud is similarly dismayed at the way the machinations of the ‘real’ world stifle the 
ability to truly live an authentic life. But perhaps the magical aesthetic experience of 
polyphasic consciousness, encompassing altered states and intuition, as well as an 
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embodied, rigorous and experiential approach, can open up the “constant magic” of 
creative becoming. 
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Chapter Three: Technology as magic 
 
The theme of this thesis has been to rethink the magical in theatre and film by 
bringing together a “mental-materialist” approach and the concept of polyphasic 
consciousness. “Mental-materialism” focuses on neuroscience, perception, and 
spectatorial, affective-participation as it impacts on the body and the senses. 
Polyphasic consciousness is a way of accessing knowledge that encompasses altered 
states. It is an embodied experience that gives rise to an awareness of 
interconnectedness and hinges on collective experience rather than personal. The 
thesis has moved through the shamanic beginnings of ur-drama and proto-cinema, 
considered magic in the 16th century as it functions in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus and, 
following Edgar Morin, has regarded the beginning of cinema itself as magical. The 
trajectory has continued into the recent past and this chapter will examine the ways in 
which technology can be seen as a kind of magic.  
 
In Eros and Magic in the Renaissance, Ioan Couliano argues that technology has 
merely realised what was considered magic in the past. He writes, “Historians have 
been wrong in concluding that magic disappeared with the advent of ‘quantitative 
science.’ The latter has simply substituted itself for a part of magic while extending 
its dreams and its goals by means of technology” (1987, 104). In Techgnosis, Davis 
argues that technology balances science and magical thinking. As an example he 
points out that advertising can be seen as a professional form of magical 
demonstration that is borne of empirical marketing methods and designed to 
manipulate our imaginations (1998, 175). It is common for television advertising to 
perform a kind of magic. To decide to buy the product is to engage with the magical 
thinking that its magic could work for you too. 
 
Despite understanding that there is a solid scientific basis for our modern 
technological devices, we do not tend to think about the operation of electromagnetic 
radiation when we heat food in seconds or flip a switch and the lights come on. It is 
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just a kind of instant ‘magic’ that we have become used to. Recalling my discussion 
in Chapter One about the magic from Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, flying to Rome or 
accessing grapes out of season may have been magical in the 16th century, but we are 
quite used to such things these days. Cinema seemed to be a kind of magic when it 
first appeared at the turn of the 20th century, and arguably became so again when it 
popped out with 3D. The magic now is that these experiences can come to us. We can 
take a flight simulator to Rome and then visit any part of the city without leaving 
home. Cinematic magic is no longer even as far away as the screen. Virtual reality 
brings it to us.  
 
While marketed as offering an immersive and interactive experience, virtual reality is 
potentially magical in the polyphasic sense because of the way in which the body’s 
senses are engaged with. The subject is placed at the centre of the surrounding action 
in such a way that it is common for the senses to be tricked. The body disappears and 
is usually replaced by only a pair of hands holding the controllers. This ‘body without 
an image’20 has been described by Popat in an article titled “Missing in Action” as 
“presence-absence” (2016, 365). The experience, she says, is like having phantom 
limbs that you can feel but cannot see (ibid). This means that when a subject falls off 
a cliff or takes a rocket to the moon, the feeling is somewhat similar to that of a 
rollercoaster ride, despite the fact that there is little or no movement in the body.  
 
Popat describes adrenalin flowing and muscles tightening as she raised her arms 
against a virtual hot-air balloon crash (ibid, 361). One of the most interesting 
discussions around virtual reality is whether or not it ‘reembodies’ or ‘disembodies’, 
as noted by Sobchack in Carnal Thoughts (2004, 202). Popat suggests, “The problem 
is not one of disembodiment, as so many earlier assumptions about [virtual reality] 
                                                
20 I have borrowed the phrase ‘body without an image’ from Brian Massumi, who uses it when 
discussing proprioception in Parables of the Virtual (2002, 58). He does not discuss the 
technology of virtual reality and is not discussed by Popat in her “Missing in Action” article, but I 
feel it is an appropriate phrase to describe the way the body continues to experience sensation but 
cannot see itself. 
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suggest; instead… the problem is in the proprioceptive mismatch between the 
embodied experience of self and the perception of the disembodied ‘Other’ – an 
ethical asymmetry” (2016, 377).21  
 
I have discussed hallucination in the previous chapters with regards to perception, 
altered states of consciousness and a magical aesthetic experience. There is an 
obvious hallucination in virtual reality – the real world disappears and an entirely 
different illusory world is laid out in all directions. In New Philosophies for New 
Media, Hansen and Lenoir discuss the issue of hallucination as it relates to Bergson’s 
assertion that perception and affect need, and centre around, a body. Virtual reality is 
a visual medium that disappears the body but still has an affect upon it. Hansen and 
Lenoir write that “[it] brings to material fruition the thesis that perception is 
simulation – a process of construction or data-rendering that takes place in the body-
brain” (2004, 166). This is not Massumi’s hallucination as the imaginative thought 
that fills the gap between perception and cognition that I discussed in Chapter One 
(2002, 206). He argues that our normal perceptual process always includes 
hallucination. The kind of hallucination inside virtual reality is closer to Morin, who 
describes it as seeing something that is literally not there. For him, it is the objective 
end of a concrete and reified magic.  
 
My own experiences testing a range of games at a virtual reality lounge left me with 
the impression that in 2017 this fledgling technology is still too basic to be considered 
magical in any kind of polyphasic sense and had more in common with gaming 
predecessors such as Kinect and Xbox 360, which promote movement as their main 
point of difference. With those platforms, only a relatively limited amount of 
movement was possible and I wondered at the time (it was 2013) if I was moving or 
just going through the motions. Similarly, in virtual reality the player must stay within 
                                                
21 Massumi defines proprioception as “the sensibility proper to the muscles and ligaments” (2002, 
58) and goes on to describe it as “translat[ing] the exertions and ease of the body’s encounters 
with objects into a muscular memory of relationality” (ibid, 59).  
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a predefined cubic space. Two steps in any direction and blue grid lines appear as a 
warning of the limits of the bulky headset’s range, breaking any sense of immersion I 
might have felt. I could choose to bring the environment to me from any direction I 
wanted, which differs greatly from Kinect and Xbox 360, but the limits of each virtual 
world were very quickly reached. I tried to exceed boundaries and refuse to do what 
the games dictate, but the virtual reality ‘world’ would quickly reset itself and try to 
put me ‘back on track’.  
 
Virtual reality is a totally illusory experience that takes you anywhere without 
actually taking you anywhere, while it tricks the body’s senses into experiencing 
sensations such as falling. This can be compared to the shamanism discussion in 
Chapter Two, which is a similarly fully immersive and affective experience. The 
process of shamanism involves the sense of flying to fantastical places where it is 
common for a shaman to transform into other beings. This is also done whilst the 
shaman’s body does not actually go anywhere. But the shaman has considerably more 
freedom inside the fantastical world than the player in virtual reality, where a finite 
virtual world has already been created by designers and programmers. Shamanism 
also requires no equipment other than the body, and is a practice Jung understood as 
available to anyone, not just those who can afford it.  
 
Sobchack argues that “Each technology not only differently mediates our figurations 
of bodily existence but also constitutes them. That is, each offers our lived bodies 
radically different ways of ‘being-in-the-world’ ” (2004, 173). It would seem that the 
way in which virtual reality mediates and constitutes figurations of bodily existence 
is, like Kinect and Xbox 360, to turn bodies into machines, despite the heavy 
emphasis on ‘you’ as the controller. Bodies are stepped through a series of relatively 
small, pre-programmed movements that cannot deviate greatly from narrow confines. 
This is the opposite of the spontaneous agency suggested by creative becoming, 
despite the tickling and tricking of the senses. Certainly virtual reality exposes and 
prioritises the affective basis of perception, as Hanson and Lenoir argue (2004, 168), 
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but it falls short of a magical aesthetic experience in a polyphasic sense because of the 
lack of freedom within the environment. The body is certainly at the centre of 
everything and most striking to me was the way in which the virtual worlds rushed to 
me, swirled around me, and happened because of me. This suggests an ego-driven 
magical development in technology that I will discuss in the course of exploring 
Herzog’s 2016 documentary, Lo and Behold: Reveries of a Connected World. 
 
Lo and Behold: Reveries of a Connected World (Herzog, 2016) 
A magical tone is immediately set at the beginning of Herzog’s film about the 
internet. To the heralding sound of the prelude to Wagner’s Das Rheingold, a new 
dawn is announced as internet pioneer Leonard Kleinrock describes the magical 
moment when the internet was created in a lab at UCLA. He leads us into a plain 
room and tells us, “We are now entering a sacred location. It’s the location where the 
internet began. It’s a holy place and we’ve just come back to 1969 when the critical 
events of the origin began.” This shrine to the internet contrasts the bland with the 
sacred and the sober scientist with the fantastical magician. It is a Faustian 
alchemist’s lab where unnatural things are constructed and brought to life. The ugly 
insides of the first computer are spilled out for us to appreciate its grotesqueness, “so 
ugly it’s beautiful,” says Kleinrock. As we learned from Faust, when scientists create 
unnatural life, the devils step in. Davis argues that as soon as computers developed in 
the 1950s, they were associated with life and with animation, and cites the 
autonomous nature of viruses, worms, Trojan horses and bots (1998, 187). Add to this 
the looming threat of completely autonomous artificial intelligence and I think it is 
fair to say that this lab-created life is often associated with dangerous and possibly 
destructive entities that are out-of-control. 
 
Kleinrock explains that the first word transmitted across the internet was supposed to 
be ‘log’ but the system crashed after ‘lo’. Of this he remarks in the film, “We couldn’t 
have asked for a more succinct, more powerful, more prophetic message than lo”. The 
tone is set for Herzog to focus on the mythical/magical nature of the internet, its 
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“glory” as he puts it. The viewing of the film itself does not particularly engender the 
more radical elements of altered states, or affect the spectator in such a way as to 
possibly lead to a magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic sense (apart from 
some sublime imagery of solar flares) but the issues discussed suggest some 
interesting ways to consider the internet as a kind of magic.  
 
The experience of telepathy, another aspect of polyphasic consciousness previously 
thought to be some kind of magic, is discussed when Herzog interviews brain 
researcher Marcel Just. He explains that it is already possible for a computer 
programme to read thoughts using an MRI scanner; that is to say, for thoughts to 
jump a few millimeters from the brain to the machine. Just argues it is only a matter 
of time before this technology becomes portable (described as something like a 
telepathy cap) and expands its range so that we will be able to communicate across 
thousands of miles using our thoughts. With this development, telepathy can no 
longer be dismissed as a supernatural magical practice and can be studied 
scientifically, which is something Jung hoped for (Haule 2011, 2:72). It does suggest, 
however, that the intervention of a machine into the process (the telepathy cap) will 
fall short of Jung’s assertion that telepathy is already possible with appropriate 
guidance and practice, without the need for bodies to be turned into machines. 
 
The magical thinking of anthropomorphism is evident when Kleinrock explains his 
hopes for the internet’s future. In the film he states: 
 
This room should know I’m here… I should be able to talk to it and it 
should be able to give me an answer. It should respond to me in a natural 
way, using gestures, touch, and even smell, all my senses to interact in a 
very humanistic way. And once it’s embedded in our walls, in our desks, 
in our bodies, in our fingernails, in our cars, in our offices, in our homes, 
it should disappear and become invisible. 
 
Technology works to make effort invisible, and while this description of the internet 
makes it sound like a living but unseen spirit-double working away in the 
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background, I am reminded of my argument from Chapter One that invisibility 
degrades the magical aesthetic experience when it tries to disguise the ‘truth’ of its 
existence and pass the unnatural off as natural. An embedded internet as described by 
Kleinrock will at first appear spectacularly magical precisely because of its 
invisibility. But this will, like the beginning of cinema or flying to Rome, quickly 
become completely normal and lose its magic.  
 
Another invisible development in technology that is likely to affect one’s sense of 
reality in a different way is the concept of the Internet of Me. Security Analyst Sam 
Curry describes it in Lo and Behold thus:  
 
It is a world where when you walk into a room the lights dim to your 
preference level, you may have music that starts up, it may even have 
complex protocols for how to interact with somebody else’s ‘internet of 
me’. That’s interesting, and the world that will emerge as a result, 
eventually you won’t even need phones, the environment will be so 
wired that your experience will be brought to you… We tell children 
very often, you have to play with others, you have to share, your 
worldview isn’t unique, but when the world, the objects in it, start to tell 
you that you are, that you’re different, that’s egotistical. But it’ll also be 
a magical world, one where a wave of a hand will create doors moving 
and objects changing position. Imagine a generation that’s never known 
anything else but that. 
 
In the previous chapter I considered Jung’s discussions in a letter to Horst 
Scharschuch on the difference between white and black magic as it relates to artistic 
practice. He writes that creativity that serves to hold back destructive forces while 
promoting the collective is white magic, while black magic revels in the destruction 
and serves only the individual ([1952] 1973, 82). The Internet of Me is the logical 
progression of the Internet of Things, where everyday objects, and even our bodies, 
are digitised so they can connect to the internet to serve the needs of the individual. 
Curry is describing a world where we will be seduced into the comfort of our own 
habits, where no effort, negotiation or compromise is required because everything is 
brought to the individual in an affirming way. In this environment, we will never have 
to seek out, or be exposed to, the other, or even people who hold opinions that differ 
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from our own. This way of living is the opposite of the intuitive and creative 
becoming that Bergson, Deleuze and Jung advocate, which is a rigorous environment 
that requires attention, concentration, bodily intuition and a willingness to embrace 
the unfamiliar. The Internet of Me suggests an extreme version of Bergson’s assertion 
of the centrality of the body, as it is an environment that, like virtual reality, rushes to 
you, swirls around you, and happens because of you. 
 
One of the conditions for considering polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic 
experience is the way in which a polyphasic attitude can give rise to an awareness of 
interconnectedness, an experience that hinges on the collective rather than the 
personal. It could be argued that the internet is a collective experience of the 
interconnectedness of all things, especially if pretty much all our things have been 
connected to the internet. To this end, the film gives clear examples of positive online 
experiences of connection. Herzog shows us, for example, how a community of 
hundreds of thousands of internet gamers worked together to play a game that 
ultimately assisted scientists with the intricate folding of RNA molecules, something 
that had, up until that point, eluded scientists using supercomputers. The results have 
a real-world application for the likes of cancer research. 
 
On the other hand, in a chapter about social media, Fenton notes that by and large the 
experience of the internet is: 
 
No more than an incessant version of a ‘daily me’… that personalizes 
and depoliticises public issues and simply re-emphasises old inequalities 
while feeding corporations the necessary data for online marketing, 
business promotion and the exploitation of private affairs – a specifically 
anti-democratic turn leading to civic privatism (2016, 146). 
 
This is the experience of distraction, which I have previously linked with the 
‘deceptive’ tricks of the demonic. Fenton goes on to argue that this neoliberal 
environment predominantly reinforces existing hierarchies. In privileging 
consumption over community it lends itself to the production of self, to “personhood 
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rather than citizenship” (2016, 157). Social media, and the internet in general, has 
been outstandingly effective in this regard. 
 
Jung’s definition of black magic contains two components: it serves only the 
individual and is motivated by destruction. The ego-driven nature of the Internet of 
Me can be seen to fit the first requirement but can it be seen to revel in destruction? 
We are already familiar with negative and harmful experiences of the internet, and 
Herzog specifically considers some of these, such as gaming addiction and threats to 
cybersecurity. Herzog shows us the family of a young woman who was killed in a car 
crash and explains that images of the woman’s nearly decapitated body went viral on 
social media. Her mother concludes from this experience that the internet is demonic 
in nature. She proclaims it to be the “manifestation of the anti-Christ, of evil itself. It 
is the spirit of evil and I feel like it’s running through everybody on earth and it’s 
claiming its victories in those people that are also evil.” The degree to which the 
internet is unregulated and out-of-control is an oft-discussed issue. In Techgnosis, 
Davis argues that “magic is technology’s unconscious, its own arational spell” (1998, 
38). Such an association once again links this kind of magic with the demonic 
(Mephistophelean) unconscious. 
 
The Internet of Me, where our bodies and our homes are embedded with devices that 
monitor our interests and health and so on, suggests a kind of state of possession in 
the magical sense. What has taken over the body, however, is not a ghost or demonic 
spirit, but machines controlled by corporations or governments, at least until the 
predicted arrival of the singularity when artificial intelligence takes over and 
functions entirely independently. It is interesting to consider the implications of 
possession in relation to a body that has literally been taken over by superintelligent, 
autonomous entities. Such posthuman notions certainly constitute a new figuration of 
bodily existence in the way Sobchack outlines (2004, 173). In terms of black magic, I 
would posit that this signals the most destructive aspect of the Internet of Me: loss of 
autonomy associated with the experiencing body. 
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The autonomy threatened by such an invasion affects not only the personal body, but 
the social one as well. Even without the Internet of Me the ubiquity of state 
surveillance is phenomenal in scale, and propaganda techniques such as the 
spinternet22, astroturfing23 and social bots24 are on the rise. Practices that are designed 
to maintain existing hierarchies, influence public opinion on sensitive topics, and 
promote extreme corporatisation, point to a loss of autonomy. I agree with Fenton 
when she argues the notion that the internet promotes freedom and community can be 
challenged by evidence and experience to the contrary (2016, 165).  The Internet of 
Me promises a world where we will appear to have the power to create our own 
reality, one that rushes to serve the slightest whim, but it is an illusory reality full of 
the tricks of advertising and the media of spin, controlled by large corporations and 
governments. It will appear to be private but our actions (and even potentially our 
thoughts, the telepathy discussion implies) could be thoroughly monitored by vested 
interests. 
 
Herzog examines our reliance on the internet and concludes that if a solar flare, 
natural disaster or artificial intelligence were to knock the internet out of our reach, 
society would quickly collapse. Even the most basic requirements for living, such as 
the distribution of food, are now organised entirely online. With this conclusion, 
Herzog finds refuge in a small community that lives offline. He implies that here lies 
the key to an authentic way of life — playing live music around a campfire. It may be 
a nostalgic and unrealistically idealised image, but it is one that is free of the 
internet’s black magic. 
 
                                                
22 Morozov explains that the spinternet is “a Web with little censorship but lots of spin and 
propaganda – which reinforces [government and corporate] ideological supremacy” (2011, 120). 
23 Astroturfing is a political tool of corporates used to “fak[e] support from the grass roots to seek 
political or corporate benefits” (Morozov 2011, 134). 
24 Social bots are “automated programmes, or bots, on social media aimed at influencing opinion 
and politics” (Neudert 2017). These bots masquerade as real people. 
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In the film Curry asks us to imagine a child who has grown up with the Internet of 
Me. If normalised, it is unlikely to appear magical. And yet, this child may never be 
required to “turn inwards” towards the body’s senses, if these senses are being 
monitored by machines. The magical aesthetic experience, as it impacts on the 
experiencing body, requires precisely this type of inward tuning. The Internet of Me 
signals instead a new era of the posthuman. But there are interesting and magical 
possibilities associated with moving away from the natural body, which I will discuss 
in relation to Free Theatre’s Frankenstein. 
 
Frankenstein (Falkenberg, 2016) 
Scientist and artist Dr Frankenstein invites you to be part of one of the 
most exciting projects of modern times as he is on the brink of creating a 
perfect human being. With your generous support, he can take this final 
step and create a new man. Come and hear the Doctor talk about his 
remarkable discoveries and see the extraordinary prototypes that have led 
to this exciting possibility (Frankenstein Press Release 2016). 
 
In this production, Dr Frankenstein’s great, great, great, great, great Grandson, also 
called Dr Frankenstein, attempted to resuscitate his family’s maligned image by 
convincing the audience to support his quest to create a “better, more perfect human 
being” (Falkenberg 2016). The devised show used Shelley’s novel as a starting point 
from which to explore the evolution of the Frankenstein myth and its contemporary 
implications, as it has appeared in theatre, film, performance art and popular 
imagination.  
 
The audience was brought into a theatrical replica of Dr Frankenstein’s Antarctic lab, 
complete with snow (actually salt) cascading through a large hourglass construction 
onto the middle of the floor. It transpired that Dr Frankenstein had shifted his 
operation from the Arctic of Shelley’s novel to the Antarctic, and in doing so, had 
encountered Maori, “in these parts,” as Dr Frankenstein put it. Hence, the show began 
with a Maori creation myth in the darkness of Po, the timeless state before creation, 
when the sky-father Ranginui and the earth-mother Papatūānuku were locked in a 
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close embrace. In the myth their children, cramped inside the embrace, rebel against 
their confines and force them apart. In Free Theatre’s Frankenstein, a circle of 
creatures enacted a synchronised ritual around the hourglass that involved the 
growing breath as the creatures swelled and came into their own. In beginning this 
way, Falkenberg immediately linked the magic of Maori mythology with 
Frankenstein’s science, and foreshadowed not only the rebellious nature of the 
monster from Shelley’s Frankenstein, but also the rebellious and chaotic nature of 
humanity to both create and destroy. 
 
The production was presented as a sales pitch in the style of a TED Talk, such as 
might be given by a technology magician like Elon Musk or Steve Jobs. Dr 
Frankenstein was boldly attempting to garner support and raise money for his 
ambitious project and in this way, implicated the audience in his efforts. A range of 
less-than-perfect prototypes were exhibited, including False Maria, inspired by the 
robot from Metropolis (Lang, 1927), Pandora, styled after The Bride of Frankenstein 
(Whale, 1935), a human-fly resembling the protagonist in The Fly (Cronenberg, 
1986), a hunchbacked servant called Igor, Prometheus and an acrobat called Ariel, 
from the character in Shakespeare’s The Tempest. Excerpts from a variety of 
Frankenstein films were also projected, including James Whale’s 1931 version, Andy 
Warhol’s Flesh for Frankenstein (1973) and Alex Garland’s Ex Machina (2015), as 
well as images and clips of performance artists such as Orlan25 and Stelarc.26 
                                                
25 In the 1990s performance artist Orlan explored cosmetic surgery as a site of feminist resistance 
and utopia, interrogating both conventional standards of beauty and exploring a progressive sense 
of freedom, because “molding one’s own skin means shaping one’s destiny” (O’Bryan 2004, 10). 
A portrait of Orlan titled Official Portrait with Bride of Frankenstein Wig was presented during 
the Free Theatre show. It is an image taken after her third surgery in 1990, both beautiful and 
foreboding at once. As O’Bryan writes, “the interrogation of ideal beauty will prove to demand 
that she play between the extremes – ideal beauty and the monstrous feminine” (2004, 20). The 
drive for Orlan is on the dynamics of becoming as opposed to the finished state of perfection. She 
champions the temporary, the transitional, and, in her insistence on being photographed during 
surgery and immediately after, when her face is still bruised and swollen, the inbetween.  
26 Stelarc declares the natural body to be “obsolete” in the face of improvements that can be made 
using technology, and experiments with machine-body interfaces and hybrids to augment the 
natural body (Stelarc n.d.). His performances have included surgically constructing an extra ear 
on his arm, adding an ambidextrous, fully bendable third arm, and transforming himself into an 
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Shelley’s novel is grounded in the Faustian notion of the diabolical scientist who 
strives for knowledge beyond natural boundaries, without sufficient regard for 
consequences. The devilry in this magic centres around an unnatural, blighted and 
murderous creation that turns against its maker. The act that creates the monster is 
magical but wishes to be seen as cold, hard science: stitched up pieces of dead bodies 
animated via electricity. In Techgnosis, Davis argues that electricity has always 
tapped into the magical and the mythological, a kind of union of alchemy and 
imagination he calls our “electromagnetic imaginary” (1998, 41). He writes, 
“Vibrating in the gap between life and physics, between matter and the unseen ether, 
electricity inhabits a liminal zone that calls down spirits and sublimities out of thin 
air” (ibid, 40). In the case of this Faustian scientist, the target is the limitations of the 
natural body, particularly the body that withers and dies. As Morin points out, the 
double and the quest for immortality are great universal myths, and both can be seen 
in Shelley’s novel. Dr Frankenstein wishes to overcome death and his monster can be 
understood as his psychological double, brought up from the dark and dangerous 
depths of his unconscious. 
 
Rather than focusing on overcoming death per se, Free Theatre’s Dr Frankenstein was 
concerned more with creating a superior body. He also wished to grant his subjects 
the freedom to choose their own constructions, and I will argue that it is this aim that 
offers magical possibilities. In creating their own bodies, Dr Frankenstein’s creatures 
could also create their own reality and, in this respect, are their own Gods. In this way 
the lure of the New Age/quantum physics magic discussed in Free Theatre’s Doctor 
Faustus received a concrete focus in the form of the freely constructed body. It can be 
seen as every bit as diabolical as Mephistopheles’ magical temptations, or as a way to 
overcome the constraints of both the natural and social bodies. Dr Frankenstein stated, 
                                                                                                                                            




for example, that after his attempt to create a mate for himself spiraled out-of-control 
(Pandora and her box) he decided to go beyond the notion of gender altogether. His 
wish was to overcome, by dissolution, notions of gender, race and even species27 to 
create a ‘New Man’,28 which he outlined thus: 
 
1. The New Man has to be strong to survive. Therefore I want to create 
him in a laboratory of ice. 
2. The New Man has no sex or gender. It is not divided into man or 
woman. It has a body without organs. In my laboratory theatre I want 
not to imitate but to create – gender is always created by imitation. 
3. The New Man has to sing and dance his thoughts rather than burying 
them in books. 
 
The “body without organs” is a concept from Artaud’s 1947 radio play To Have Done 
with the Judgment of God, where Artaud seeks a new human authenticity and freedom 
from what he considers the useless “automatic reactions” of a “badly constructed” 
body (1976, 570-571). Artaud’s concept is multi-layered and, as Dolphijn argues in 
“Man is Ill Because He Is Badly Constructed,” is in part a protest against the Word of 
God (2011, 21), but it is also aimed at the failing condition of his own body at this 
point in his life. He finished the recording of the radio play two months before his 
death in 1948. In the play he states: 
 
I do know that space, time, dimension, becoming, future, 
destiny, being, non-being, self, non-self, are nothing to me; but 
there is a thing which is something, only one thing which is 
something, and which I feel because it wants TO GET OUT: 
the presence of my bodily suffering ([1947] 1976, 566, 
emphasis original).  
 
Artaud argues in the play that “man is sick because he is badly constructed” (ibid, 
570), both in the practical sense of the body that fails and dies and in the sense of 
bodies that are enslaved to the automatic reactions of the stable, socially controlled 
                                                
27 While this is a problematic notion, a thorough exploration of how feminist theory, among 
others, would intersect with such a privileged fantasy is outside the scope of this thesis. 
28 The New Man concept was adapted from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra ([1883-1892] 
2006, 5). 
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body. To find freedom, Artaud believes, we need to totally disrupt these ordering 
functions. The play ends, “When you will have made him a body without organs; then 
you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his 
true freedom. Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out; as in the frenzy 
of dance halls; and this wrong side out will be his real place” (ibid, 571). Artaud’s 
body without organs is a body that is free from the tyranny of societal control and free 
to make itself howsoever it wishes.  
 
Alongside Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze takes up Artaud’s idea of the 
body without organs (now the BwO), and focuses on finding ways of disorganising 
the body in an attempt to free it from the stability (and rigidity) of the ordering bodies 
of society. They write: 
 
A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a 
body upon which that which serves as organs… is distributed according 
to crowd phenomena… in the form of molecular multiplicities… Thus 
the body without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to the 
organization of the organs insofar as it composes an organism. The body 
without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and 
teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization (1987, 
30). 
 
The BwO can be seen as a magical utopian ideal where the body is free to experience 
the affects of pure intensities, without interference from ordering functions, and free 
to mix and meld with other bodies without organs in a collective, egalitarian, and 
unstructured way that eschews completion and revels in creation. It is against 
organisation and representation. It is positive in that it is playful, transformative and 
not concerned with lack, except for the lack of a subjective and stable “I”. 
 
While Deleuze, Guattari and Artaud all focus attention on the creative process of 
destablisation and a body opposed to centring, Artaud also seeks the kind of freedom 
(from the badly constructed body and controlling society) that might allow a body 
without organs to arrive at a new authenticity. This is in line with his Gnostic view of 
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the world as a false creation that is presided over by evil. Deleuze and Guattari are 
more concerned with continual becoming and transformation, where even the 
boundaries between bodies can become deterritorialised and fluid. This is both a 
magical condition in its seeming impossibility, but can also be seen as a magical 
experience in a polyphasic consciousness sense because it promises a state that is free 
from cliché and beyond the control of the rational organism. 
 
In Free Theatre’s production, the body without organs informed a significant portion 
of the text and concepts. Dr Frankenstein quoted text from A Thousand Plateaus and 
Artaud’s play was quoted by The Fly, an undercooked creature born of decay and 
obsessed with shit, Artaud’s pre-eminent image of the abject material that informs our 
bodily existence. The Fly emerged from circus silks suspended from the ceiling, 
screaming and squirming through its early hatching, physicalising the affective 
intensity of its creation as it descended. Artaud feels that words are a barrier to the 
mind and an insufficient means of expression, and as Dolphijn outlines, Artaud’s 
attack is against the Word of God as the organisation of Judgement (2011, 21). In The 
Theatre and Its Double, Artaud insists that the theatre should build a concrete 
language of its own that plays with words as well as using incantatory rhythms, cries 
and screams, all of which is intended to appeal, first and foremost, to the senses 
([1938] 1958, 37). Affective intensity, rather than words, drives the Theatre of 
Cruelty. 
 
The abject condition of The Fly prompted Dr Frankenstein to apologise to the 
audience and pronounce it to be “a bit of a mess.” He acknowledged that the 
prototypes were still works in progress but seemed unable to grasp the fact that the 
so-called ‘abnormalities’ of the creatures were their most striking features; they were 
all monstrous in either physical or social terms (or both).29 In this way the production 
                                                
29 This recalls Susan Stryker’s writing in 1994 comparing the transsexual body that has been 
altered by medical science with the monster’s predicament in Shelley’s Frankenstein. Stryker 
feels an affinity with a monster that is full of eloquent rage at its ostracisation from society but 
who also heralds a dangerous freedom. She writes, “I whose flesh has become an assemblage of 
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clearly positioned Dr Frankenstein’s drive for perfection as a deluded one, and in 
doing so, suggested that he, rather than his creations, may in fact be the real monster. 
 
Also suspended above the audience on circus silks were the characters of Ariel and 
False Maria, who began life as a formless double-yoked egg. The dance of birth that 
heralded their formation and subsequent separation was entirely realised 
aerobatically. In Metropolis, False Maria is an evil robot created by a mad scientist. I 
would posit that she can also be seen as Homunculus from Goethe’s Faust, an 
unnatural creature brought to life in a lab by Wagner’s alchemical magic and the 
demonic presence of Mephistopheles.30 Wagner can be compared to Dr Frankenstein, 
as he tells Mephistopheles that procreation is a poor method of making a human being 
and that his alchemical creation is superior. He states, “Wenn sich das Tier noch 
weiter dran ergötzt, So muβ der Mensch mit senen groβen Gaben, Doch künftig 
höhern, höhern Ursprung haben” (Goethe in Fielder 1943, 77.15-17).31 Likewise, 
Homunculus can be compared to Dr Frankenstein’s monster, not only because s/he 
(an hermaphrodite) is created unnaturally and calls Wagner “father” the way the 
monster refers to Dr Frankenstein, but also because s/he too can be seen as Wagner’s 
demonic double. Mephistopheles and Homunculus refer to each other as “cousin” and 
Homunculus is able to see into, and interpret, Faust’s dream while he is still 
dreaming, suggesting a link with the unconscious.  
 
In Goethe’s Faust and Cultural Memory, Bruce MacLennan points out that 
Homunculus is little more than a brain trapped in a glass flask, endowed with 
                                                                                                                                            
incongruous anatomical parts, I who achieve the similitude of a natural body only through an 
unnatural process, I offer you this warning: the Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust it 
to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks the groundlessness of the 
privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my expense. You are as constructed as me” (Stryker 
[1994] 2006, 247). 
30 It is Faust’s servant Wagner who makes Homunculus, but Edinger suggests he is unsuccessful 
in animating it until the arrival of Mephistopheles, whose mere presence brings it to life (1990, 
61). 
31 “What if the beasts still find it their delight, In future man, as fits his lofty mind, Must have a 
source more noble and refined” (Goethe [1831] 1959, 100). 
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intelligence but lacking a proper physical body – a fitting description of the “minimal 
embodiment” of robotic artificial intelligence. He writes, “[Artificial intelligence] 
systems are not literally disembodied – existing only in a mental realm – for 
computers are physical objects, but they are minimally embodied; they have trivial 
bodies capable of only impoverished interaction with their environments, like brains 
in vats” (2012, 192). Homunculus is a glowing fire spirit who hovers in the air inside 
his phial, just like the suspended False Maria who was lit with neon throughout the 
extended birthing sequence. 
 
Once birthed, False Maria reached the ground and began to talk and dance, uncanny 
in her mix of lifelike and robotic gestures. She realised her consciousness with lines 
from La Mettrie’s Machine Man (1747) declaring the human body to be a machine 
that winds itself up like a clock. La Mettrie’s materialist view of the body as stable, 
ordered and regulated is the opposite of the body without organs. Both False Maria 
and Homunculus can be likened to a brain in a vat in the sense of minimal 
embodiment endowed with intelligence but lacking sensory systems. But Homunculus 
does not settle for the straitjacket that confines and keeps him/her from physically 
experiencing the world and can therefore be seen to strive after a more ambitious and 
magical project than an automaton. 
 
In Goethe’s Faust, Homunculus smashes his/her flask and spreads his/her essence 
into the sea at the throne of Galatea. Durrani says he “proves unstable and unwilling 
to live in the ‘real’ world” (2004, 147). This sounds like the kind of charge that used 
to be levelled against Artaud when he was alive, as he himself acknowledges in the 
conclusion to his radio play. Similarly, the suicide of Homunculus can be seen as a 
rejection of his badly constructed minimal-body and a desire to create an alternative 
body without organ-isation. He breaks his flask seeking freedom from his glass shell 
and union with nature and the divine. As he spreads his essence into the sea he is 
transformed in a way that is literally fluid and entirely deterritorialised in the 
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Deleuzian/Guattarian sense, fulfilling their assertions that there is freedom in defying 
completion and choosing instead to mix and meld with others in unstructured ways. 
 
A companion to Artaud’s radio play was found in the Nick Cave song, Higgs Boson 
Blues (2013), which Dr Frankenstein sang towards the end. The lyrics bear witness to 
blues guitarist Robert Johnson’s legendary pact with the Devil, in which he 
exchanged his soul for musical ability. The song displays a degree of fatigue at our 
empty distractions and rails against systems of order. We are looking for the God 
particle, the Higgs Boson, but meanwhile are creating hell. In questioning the wisdom 
of the scientific search for the God particle, Faustian priorities are also questioned. To 
destroy the mystery of creation risks opening Pandora’s box to a host of unforeseen 
consequences and risks de-mythologising the world in favour of cold, hard science.  
 
At one point, Dr Frankenstein proudly displayed “Tiki,” a found creature from Maori 
mythology. Dr Frankenstein explained:  
 
Ah, now this one I can’t claim credit for. I didn’t create him. I found him 
in these parts actually. But he has helped me towards perfection because, 
as with my third principle, here we have an example of a culture that 
does not bury its body in books but expresses it in song and dance. Do a 
little dance for them Tiki. 
 
The dance that followed reenacted the making of the first woman, Hine. In this way, 
Tiki could be seen as a shaman, bringer of sacred knowledge. Essentially, he taught 
Dr Frankenstein the value of polyphasic consciousness: in this case, the value of 
singing and dancing rather than getting lost in words. Falkenberg, too, can be seen to 
take theatre back to the magical experience of its shamanic roots, with Dr 
Frankenstein’s lab as the cave. 
 
The production thus began with the wordy TED Talk but increasingly the show itself 
metamorphosed into its own kind of body without organs. That is to say, it began with 
the organising principle of the ‘word’ but increasingly dissolved into a polyphony of 
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overlapping performances of song and dance. As the singing and dancing was 
positioned at all corners of the theatre, the affective intensity enveloped and included 
the audience, as Artaud intended theatre to do. In this way, the entire production 
became a body without organs, rejecting all forms of finality and judgement, and 
reveling in a “constant magic” of visceral and open-ended creative becoming.  
 
Artaud understood that his suffering was not his alone and encompassed the fabric of 
society. Thus, he wanted to turn everything on its head, to dance “wrong side out” 
(Artaud [1947] 1976, 571). Also dancing ‘wrong side out’ were Dr Frankenstein’s 
creatures when they decided towards the end, in true Frankenstein fashion, to turn 
against and annihilate their maker. The energy of the monsters transformed into an 
amorphous mix of limbs in a collective frenzy of bodies that felt and danced their 
experience rather than talked about it. The creatures circled and overwhelmed Dr 
Frankenstein, dragging him to the ground where they destroyed or united with him in 
a ritualised dance, taking up again the rebellion from the Maori creation myth that 
began the production. Dr Frankenstein’s lab/cave had brought forth a shamanic ritual 
in which the production itself also became its own body without organs that had taken 
over. Free Theatre’s Dr Frankenstein disappeared with his monsters under the pile of 
snow, and in this way, the production ended, somewhat like Shelley’s novel, with Dr 




Faust Sonnengesang (Fritsch, 2012/2015) 
I will conclude this thesis alongside a discussion of Faust Sonnengesang (Faust Song 
of the Sun), a six-hour film-poem in two parts released in 2012 and 2015 by German 
filmmaker and playwright Werner Fritsch. The film encapsulates many of the ideas 
discussed so far in this thesis, within the myth of Faust which has underpinned the 
work. It also points towards the future in interesting ways, allowing me to bring the 
arguments to a close. I will not focus on the spiritual meditations in the film, but will 
concentrate my exploration on both the magical within the diegetic reality, and the 
magical aesthetic experience of viewing the film, as the impact of its affective 
intensities can be seen to open a new vista onto a contemporary understanding of the 
magical experience.  
 
In 2008 Free Theatre performed three of Fritsch’s plays in Christchurch while the 
playwright was present: Faust Chroma,32 Nico Sphinx of Ice and Enigma Emmy 
Göring. Faust Chroma was adapted by Peter Falkenberg and Free Theatre for its New 
Zealand setting, but was first performed in Germany in 2000 as Chroma: Farbenlehre 
für Chamäleons. The play centres around one of Germany’s most successful actors, 
Gustaf Gründgens, who was famous for his role as Mephistopheles in Faust, but 
whose life could be compared to the character of Faust, as he made a pact of his own 
with the Nazis when Göring appointed him head of state-run theatre. This left him a 
compromised figure. In 1963 Gründgens gave up acting and embarked on a world 
trip, but died suddenly in his hotel room in Manila, Philippines, in what was a 
suspected suicide. Faust Chroma begins in Manila with Gründgens’ life flashing 
before his eyes in the form of a ‘last film’. Fritsch writes: 
 
I wanted to discuss the Faust myth in the light of the biography of Gustaf 
Gründgens who played Mephisto in four different German states – on the 
                                                
32 Faust Chroma ran for two seasons in Christchurch and toured to three additional New Zealand 
cities. It has been one of the company’s most successful and award-winning productions.  
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stage of the Fronttheater in the First World War, in the Weimar Republic, 
under the Nazis, and after the Second World War. But this also failed to 
satisfy me, as it looked back into the past – instead of looking square AT 
the present, let alone the future. It seemed to me important to transform 
this material, which is ultimately an archive into which Goethe poured 
the essence of thousands of books, into our Now. By which I mean that 
for me transforming material into the Now does not mean transforming 
historical facts philologically, but poetically – into our present age.  This 
means reformulating it afresh with one’s own language, and fermenting it 
by means of one’s own experience (2009, 1). 
 
Faust Sonnengesang is a Goethean project for Fritsch that brings together text and 
footage from many of his artistic endeavours, including the Free Theatre production 
of Faust Chroma, and sections based around the texts of Nico Sphinx of Ice and 
Enigma Emmy Göring. The structure of Faust Sonnengesang is a ‘last film’ like Faust 
Chroma, or as Fritsch puts it, the film “we see when we close our eyes forever” 
(2013, 4). In this way, the entire film can be seen to take place in an altered 
dreamstate, although the intensity of the often abstract imagery signals another 
iteration of the more deeply altered state of shamanism. I have discussed caves as 
both proto-cinematic and shamanic spaces, and Fritsch writes, “Faust (Everyone) is 
going through the labyrinth of his life. He is going through a cave” (ibid, 5). In 
Goethe’s Faust and Cultural Memory, Susanne Ledanff describes the precursor to the 
film, which was a multimedia installation designed as a “picture cave” and presented 
with a triptych of screens on stage (2012, 157). Fritsch explicitly links the spatial 
architecture of this installation with caves and the “oldest images of mankind (rock-
paintings)” (Fritsch 2009, 4). Much of the footage from this installation is also in the 
film in some form. Fritsch’s poetry is recited throughout in a rhythmic manner by a 
number of actors (including Fritsch as Faust) in a way that lulls the spectator into a 
meditative, hypnotic or even trance-like state. This is assisted by abstract imagery that 
is buoyed by constant movement and often frenetically paced. The overall effect is to 
challenge a rational grasping of the material and reaches instead towards deeper 




Fritsch tries to move away from the old magic of Faust while searching for a new 
kind of magical aesthetic experience. In an effort that would seem at home with Jung 
and Bergson’s concepts of intuition, he asks, “What happens when a film enables 
concentration and consciousness instead of the typical media cocktail made of 
diversion and catastrophe? Faust Song of the Sun is the beginning of an awakening” 
(2013, 4). He specifically encourages the spectator to experience the film in an 
intuitive, polyphasic manner that broadens the perceptual frame, a way of looking 
differently that aims to let, “the synapses in the mind of the audience enter new 
connections and [rewire] both parts of the brain” (ibid, 6). I will treat it as a journey 
that winds its way through a labyrinth of ideas that I can apply to my understanding of 
polyphasic consciousness as a magical aesthetic experience.  
 
The film’s images span five continents, corresponding to the five fingers of the hand. 
In this way Fritsch makes a connection between the literal definition of ‘Faust’ as a 
‘clenched fist’ that he wishes to metaphorically open out (2009, 2) in order to look to 
other cultures for “different kinds of knowledge” (Fritsch 2013, 5). Like the Maori 
mythology discussed in Chapter Three with regard to Frankenstein, this is a 
polyphasic attitude that rejects the monophasic rationalism of Western culture as the 
font of all knowledge. Fritsch ‘opens the fist’ onto a new contemporary understanding 
of the connection between ourselves and our images, and ourselves and the myth of 
Faust.  
 
The signature effect in the film is what Fritsch refers to as the “Faust-Keil” (hand-
axe), where the camera becomes a body-part and is handled in the “Gestus” of a 
distinctive slicing effect (ibid); that is to say, shapes literally slice through the frame 
and metaphorically slice through rational thinking. This technique is produced when 
the camera is treated organically, often handheld, and panned, tilted, zoomed or 
waved about chaotically. The typical material filmed using this technique is bright 
lights against a dark setting, such as city lights or the sun rising out of the sea. A 
significant after-image streak is created by filming bright lights in a low-light setting 
 116 
and moving the camera swiftly. The imagery is subsequently slowed down in post-
production so that the after-image streak becomes the focus and appears to make the 
bright objects dance from one momentarily static form or pose to another. In this way, 
the imagery is almost totally abstracted, recalling, for example, the kind of play of 
lines and light seen in a Len Lye “scratch” film. The “Faust-Keil” technique is 
deceptively simple and can be created with a basic camera and editing programme. I 
have argued that simple magic is often the most effective and Fritsch uses minimal 
equipment compared to the more complex technological-based magic discussed in the 
previous chapter. But his aim lies away from technology, as much as it can for a film. 
He wants to “portray the ‘real world’ in a new shape” (ibid, 6). Ordinary images are 
thus made strange and destabilising in the proprioceptive sense, promoting instead an 
immersive perceptual event that privileges affect, sensation and deterritorialisation, 
components that I have argued (in relation to Morin, Bergson and Deleuze) support 
the experience of film as magical in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Like Lekce 
Faust, escapism is resisted and meaning is open-ended. As discussed in Chapter One, 
this throws the emphasis onto the situational within the viewing experience. 
 
The “Faust-Keil” technique could also be understood as Fritsch making for himself a 
body without organs in the Artaudian/Deleuzian/Guattarian sense. He means to use 
this technique to make the visual material corporeal (ibid) and in this way his organic 
and frenetic use of the camera becomes an extension of himself, like an organ on the 
outside of the body. In Free Theatre’s Frankenstein, the body without organs was 
seeking freedom from the automatic reactions of a badly constructed body, from 
cliché and social systems of control, leaving it free to multiply in creative ways. I 
argued that the body without organs is a magical utopian ideal where the body can 
revel in the affects of pure intensities. Artaud argues that the body without organs will 
overturn stability and “dance wrong side out” (1976, 571). In its perceptually 
destabilising but still playful approach, this is what Fritsch’s “Faust-Keil” technique 
intends to do.  
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The “Faust-Keil” imagery can also be appreciated in terms of synaesthesia. In Paul 
Elliott’s article on film theory and neuroscience, he points out that synaesthesia used 
to be understood as a “sixth sense” (2010, 7) but recent neuroscientific research has 
moved away from such definitions and brought it more into the realms of what I 
would call the expanded awareness of polyphasic consciousness. It is a multi-sensory 
perceptual experience informed by one’s lived memory that is unique to each 
synaesthete, but might mean that shapes have a taste or smells are tactile. In 
Synaesthesia: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Baron-Cohen and Harrison 
explain it as “occurring when stimulation of one sensory modality automatically 
triggers a perception in a second modality” (1997, 3). A critical point is that the 
experience is not imagined; it is the way the brain of the synaesthete operates. Brian 
Massumi writes: 
 
In synesthesia, other-sense dimensions become visible, as when sounds 
are seen as colors. This is not vision as it is thought of cognitively. It is 
more like other-sense operations at the hinge with vision, registered from 
its point of view. Synesthetic forms are dynamic. They are not mirrored 
in thought; they are literal perceptions. They are not reflected upon; they 
are experienced as events” (2002, 186). 
 
Research suggests that synaesthesia is a universal process of perception that most of 
us grow away from. Elliot writes that it “can provide us with snapshots of how our 
brains work before cognition orders our world and constructs the reality that we are so 
used to” (2010, 7). This is especially significant for polyphasic consciousness as a 
magical aesthetic experience because it lies in an expanded zone of awareness that is 
broader than the experience of monophasic rationalism and speaks to the moment of 
perception as it directly affects the body. Synaesthesia is thought to reside in the 
limbic system (lower animal brain) but higher cortical processes mask this kind of 
perceiving for non-synaesthetes. While it appears to affect everyone, only 
synaesthetes are consciously aware of this affect. Elliot extends its implications into 
film when he states: 
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Cytowic’s thesis, that we might all be experiencing synaesthesia below the 
level of our consciousness, means that, when we watch a film for instance, 
our minds can be having one experience whereas our bodies and our limbic 
systems could be having another, altogether different one; one that is 
rooted in our past, in our sensual memory and in synaesthesia. It also 
means that the image of the spectator as the detached voyeur who merely 
witnesses visual images before him or herself has to be re-drawn to 
accommodate the experiences of the body and the animal brain (2010, 9). 
 
While it is obviously not possible to know what every viewer is experiencing in his or 
her limbic system whilst watching a film (although an individual’s response can be 
tested), there is a commingling of the senses in Sonnengesang that could be seen as a 
synaesthetic widening of the perceptual experience. 
 
Massumi suggests a kind of hyperreal intensity is in operation for the synaesthete, 
which naturally forces a perceptual abstraction (2002, 189). The “Faust-Keil” 
technique creates an intense, dancing play of colours in the way light and movement 
is abstracted. A stained-glass window is frequently returned to and turned into a 
kaleidoscope of bright colours as the camera tilts and zooms wildly whilst images 
swim in and out of focus. In Chapter One I cited a study that suggests we exaggerate 
colour in our memories, transforming it, even hallucinating that it is a more intense 
shade than it really is (ibid, 210). The colour-images in Sonnengesang are often 
exaggerated and intense in their abstraction, revealing a visual correspondence 
between the senses that usually remains unconscious.  
 
In Sonnengesang there is a synaesthetic coupling of visual information. “Faust-Keil” 
images have been superimposed (one of the signature magical cinematic tricks of 
Méliès), to create a coupling that is nearly constant throughout the film. Vertical 
dancing lights filmed using the “Faust-Keil” technique are overlaid with contrasting 
horizontal imagery, such as a landscape filmed from a moving vehicle. An alchemical 
double-play is evident as Fritsch plays with the fundamental duality at the heart of 
alchemy: sun and moon, male and female, fire and water, sulfur and mercury, light 
and dark, active and passive, high and low. The alchemical wedding of their union 
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strives towards balance and harmony. At one point, for example, a streaky sun and 
moon are superimposed over one another and appear to dance together in chaotic 
rhythms of freedom and becoming. Characters are also doubled: Mephisto and Faust, 
Mephisto and the female Mephista, Dante and Virgil, Fritsch and Faust. 
 
One scene with coupled characters takes place in a cave, which, as mentioned earlier, 
can be understood in mythical terms as a liminal space that offers (metaphorical) 
entry into a variety of magical realms such as the dreamworld, the underworld, the 
domain of the Mothers, or facilitates the exploration of the unconscious or a shamanic 
trip. The cave can also represent the labyrinth of Faust’s frustrated striving. In this 
particular scene from Sonnengesang, the silhouettes of Virgil and Dante slowly walk 
side-by-side towards the camera and into the blackness of the cave. They are at first 
only seen in the far distance, with hands and arms periodically merging into one, the 
synaesthetic joining of touch and vision. The joining of two senses in this way can be 
seen to facilitate entry into the consciousness-altering experience of synaesthesia.  
 
The imagery in Sonnengesang can also be understood in terms of Deleuze’s crystal 
image. Just like Heart of Glass, the film takes place in the magic of its own 
(dream)world, where real and virtual, ‘truth’ and ‘deception’ are indistinguishable and 
become instead a reality of its own making. Here the freedom and illusory qualities of 
Deleuze’s ‘powers of the false’ predominate, unbound to the old Faustian narrative, or 
to filmic conventions such as continuity editing. There are explicit crystals: close-ups 
of icicles, references to crystalline waves and light dancing on water that is 
transformed into sparking sun crystals. Crystals are traditionally used for hypnosis 
and the imagery in these sequences suggests just such a perceptually expansive 
altered state.  
 
Morin argues that cinematic images on screen are not practically lived – the spectator 
is out of harm’s way. What we now know about mirror neurons, however, may signal 
an interesting update from Morin’s 1950s view of cinema. In Paul Elliott’s article on 
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film theory and neuroscience, he explains that recent research into mirror neurons 
suggests that to some degree we experience in our bodies what we see on screen, that 
our cellular and neurobiological structures are physically altered (2010, 10).  
 
In 1996 Rizzolatti et.al. reported their findings into mirror neuron testing on monkeys. 
They write, “In area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex there are neurons that 
discharge both when the monkey performs an action and when he observes a similar 
action made by another monkey or by the experimenter” (131). There is some 
scepticism that the same phenomenon applies to humans,33 although there appears to 
be clear evidence that it does (see for example Gallese et.al. 2004 and Stevenson 
2013). Theatre and performance studies scholars such as Bruce McConachie (2013), 
Naomi Rokotnitz (2006) and Rhonda Blair (2008 and 2016) argue that it has profound 
implications for our understanding of empathy, affect and embodiment, and suggest 
that there is a symbiosis at the neuronal level between actor and observer; that without 
doing anything except watching, a spectator experiences an impact on the body below 
the level of awareness that corresponds to the action onstage or onscreen. In Theatre 
& Mind Bruce McConachie describes it as a kind of “mind-reading.” He writes, 
“sensorimotor coupling works together with imaginary transposition to facilitate the 
early stages of empathy – to allow one person to sense the emotions and read the 
intentions of another” (2013, 16). Just like the universality of shamanic abilities 
discussed in Chapter Two, or the telepathy discussed in Chapter Three, it would seem 
that yet another experience previously thought to be a kind of magic (mind-reading in 
this case) can now be seen as a natural part of the perceptual process. When Morin 
argues that “the permanent source of the imaginary is participation” ([1956] 2005, 
207) he could not have known in the 1950s that specular engagement could be quite 
so physically affective. 
 
                                                
33 Watt Smith even goes so far as to write (in 2016), “To this date no direct evidence of mirror 
neurons in humans exists. And although the consensus among neuroscientists is that humans 
almost certainly do have a mirror system in the brain, there is growing scepticism about some of 
the claims made about it” (18). 
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In his article on film and neuroscience, Elliott cites a human study from the 
University of Rome, which is worth noting here. He writes: 
 
Aglioti’s subjects were shown videos of needles being pushed into the 
hands of volunteers on screen and the resulting neurological activity was 
measured using transcranial magnetic stimulation. At the same time the 
excitability of the subject’s own hand was measured as well as a muscle 
that had no role in moving it. The results showed that subjects 
experienced a reaction in their own bodies that corresponded to the 
images they witnessed on screen (2010, 11). 
 
In Faust Sonnengesang, there is footage of Fritsch’s trip to Manila, which he 
undertook in the footsteps of Gründgens. There he filmed a Catholic re-enactment of 
the Good Friday crucifixion. Men are shown carrying the cross, being whipped across 
the back, nailed to a cross and strung up.34 Fritsch states in the narration that the nail, 
hammer, blood and flagellation are all real, but in an article about Fritsch’s work, 
Sinead Crowe points out that the “Filipino flagellant” is also a performer and the 
practice has increasingly become a tourist attraction, “an example of the 
commodification of authenticity” (Crowe 2007, 409). Authenticity is certainly the aim 
of these images. I have discussed authenticity as it relates to Herzog’s concept of 
“ecstatic truth” and Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty. This view of the magical aesthetic 
experience is through physicality, either by doing it for real or partaking in the 
performance, so as to experience it first and foremost in the body.  
 
Yet there is editorial stylisation of this footage in Sonnengesang. Diegetic sound has 
been muted in favour of poetic narration and choral music, and the images have been 
slowed down and edited. In order to better understand how the magical functions 
when the ‘truth’ of this documentary footage is mixed with the ‘deception’ of its 
stylisation, I will compare this section of Sonnengesang with the crucifixion scene in 
                                                
34 This footage was also used in Free Theatre’s production of Faust Chroma, and plays above the 
character of Gretchen as she describes torture that includes having nails driven into her body. In a 
further layering, the footage from this section of Free Theatre’s play is one of several scenes from 
Faust Chroma that recurs in Sonnengesang. 
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Mel Gibson’s 2004 film The Passion of the Christ. Here, pain is displayed in 
Hollywood realism. For most of the film, the spectator is subjected to graphic, explicit 
and close-up violence as it is meted out on the body of Christ in his final hours.  
 
I want to compare the sequence in the two films where the first nail enters the hand. 
In Sonnengesang, there is an anticipatory close-up of a nail, the hammer and the hand, 
and then a cut to a long shot of the whole body of a young man lying tied to a cross. 
This long shot is then held throughout the sequence in which the hammer comes 
down and the man loses control to the pain – his mouth opens in a silent cry of agony 
while his face squeezes tight and one leg jerks violently. The Passion has a similar 
close-up where the nail is placed in the middle of the hand, but the sharp point is 
highlighted as it is placed with rough force against the skin. As the hammer is raised 
the camera is placed under it looking up, so it falls towards the viewer, accompanied 
by the sound of swelling music and audible hammering. Several flashbacks provide 
some relief from the violence and frequent reaction shots individually show Mary, 
Magdalen and John’s distress. There is also a close-up of a grimace on Christ’s face – 
he displays pain but does not lose control like the Filipino man – rather, we see the 
stoic bravery of the Hollywood hero.  
 
Elaine Scarry points out in The Body in Pain that it is not possible to know someone 
else’s pain; it can only be experienced for oneself (1985, 4); an experienced truth. The 
Passion imagines Christ’s crucifixion. But for the Filipino man, it is unimaginable – 
hence why it must be experienced. Only by doing it for real can he understand a little 
of what Christ is believed to have experienced. In this way, authenticity is not 
something one can just imagine but must be experienced through the body. Fritsch 
has stated that the real pain in these images contrasts with the actor who only portrays 
pain (Crowe 2007, 409). The Filipino man is not an actor. Even if the Black Friday 
crucifixions have become a tourist attraction, they are not performed for the audience. 
The mirror neuron experiment, where the needle was real, suggests that watching 
Fritsch’s real crucifixion footage would provoke an affective reaction in the spectator. 
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But this is a side effect for Fritsch, who is not presenting these images for the purpose 
of affect. By contrast, affect is everything for Gibson’s The Passion. 
 
To understand how this affect functions, I will briefly review Morin’s argument that 
all cinema can be seen as fundamentally magical. This is due to the way our 
perceptual process responds to filmic techniques such as doubles, metamorphoses and 
montage, and the part played by our imagination in bringing magical thinking into 
this process. But once these cinematic images developed into the normal and clichéd 
language of film, what had been a significant affect dulled into what Morin calls 
affective-participation. Magic became sentiment and heart-felt feelings, no longer 
reified, alienated and powerful. The order of image-affect-idea breaks down at the 
point of affect, which now becomes all pervasive and is turned into a commodity.  
 
While I do not mean to suggest that Gibson is trying to be magical in The Passion, it 
can be seen in this way at least at the basic level of doubles, montage and 
metamorphoses. But it also employs Hollywood clichés so as to concentrate on 
repetitive and affective images that are designed to provoke a sentimental response. 
This applies to many Hollywood films but is especially evident in the excess of 
clichés in Gibson’s imagery. The film purports to show what ‘really’ happened to 
Christ but only repeats clichés of pain and sentimental reaction shots. In this way it 
can be linked to the magic of ‘deception’ as it disguises itself as ‘truth’. Extending 
this thinking one step further, the imagery also fetishises the destruction of Christ’s 
body, and can therefore be seen as ‘black’ magic. As we learned from Jung and from 
Doctor Faustus, the demonic uses ‘deceptive’ and destructive magic for the purpose 
of distraction and for entertainment. 
 
By contrast, Fritsch’s imagery of the Black Friday crucifixions does not try, first and 
foremost, to provoke sentimentality. There are no reaction shots informing us how we 
are supposed to feel. The Black Friday crucifixions show us a ‘truth’ - they are real, 
but the stylisation works towards a deeper ‘truth’ than clichés of brutality and 
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sentimentality. Fritsch uses the imagery in his search to understand why this kind of 
devotion takes place and what can be learned from presenting such imagery. In this 
way Fritsch maintains the magical order of image-affect-idea. The magic that results 
seeks to raise consciousness rather than to revel in destruction and can therefore be 
seen as ‘white magic’. 
 
What Fritsch appears to want to destroy is the sentimentality and brutality attached to 
our worn and relentless images of tragedy. He asks, “How do we escape from the 
images of tragedy that had [sic] been dominating us for centuries?” (2013, 4). There 
are many such examples in Faust Sonnengesang. Old movies show the horror of a 
headless body or images of hell, and documentary footage of Hitler can be seen in the 
segment on Emmy Göring. But Fritsch uses such imagery to highlight the ways in 
which they have been turned into empty distractions and entertainments. He seeks to 
overcome such tired repetitions, to move beyond them to consider a fresh approach to 
the Faustian issue of striving for the contented moment. In Goethe’s play, Faust will 
lose his wager with Mephistopheles if he wishes to hold on to a moment of 
contentment.35 Fritsch rejects the negative and destructive elements of striving and 
dissatisfaction and instead seeks an affective intensity of pure sensation that alters 
spectatorial perception of the moment – a magical aesthetic experience in the 
polyphasic sense. “This is a film of the Now,” Fritsch says at the beginning of 
Sonnengesang, but, as Ledanff states, it is the ‘Now’ of an “experience which 
transcends the present, for the spectator” (2012, 149, emphasis mine). 
 
In re-envisioning the moment, Fritsch seeks a new kind of striving. He writes, “Faust 
Song of the Sun is the attempt – against all ruling common sense – to maintain once 
again a certain human vision, or at least fulfilled moments” (2013, 4). This is 
informed, he says, by the philosophies of Gebser’s Ever-Present Origin,36 Hannah 
                                                
35 “Werd ich zum Augenblicke sagen: Verweile doch! Du bist so schön! Dann magst du mich in 
Fesseln schlagen, Dann mag die Totenglocke schallen” (Goethe [1808] 1961, 184.1699-1702).  
36 In The Ever-Present Origin (1985), Gebser outlines a series of structures of the historical 
development of human consciousness. The first is the archaic, characterized by zero-dimensional 
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Arendt’s natality37 and Ernst Bloch’s utopian theories from The Principle of Hope. 
While a detailed discussion of each of these theories is outside the scope of this thesis, 
I would briefly like to consider Bloch’s approach to Faust, which Hedges describes in 
Framing Faust as “the most serious and extensive counterweight to negative Faustian 
figures” (2005, 191). Human happiness is the aim for Bloch’s philosophy. Hedges 
writes: 
 
Central to this utopian project is Bloch’s vision of the homecoming – life 
on earth finally made livable. For him, Faust’s best quality is not that he 
is eternally unsatisfied or endlessly striving – this he regards as a 
“Schwindel, Hölle” (swindle, hell); instead, his greatness comes from the 
circumstance that he has a vision of a better world, but one that remains 
continually in progress – humanity’s unfinished work as a dialectical 
process (2005, 192). 
 
Bloch sees Faust’s utopian ideal as a wishful landscape, an ideal that humanity has 
not yet arrived at ([1954-59] 1986, 2:811). He shifts the aim away from limitlessness 
onto a striving that works towards the “highest good” (ibid, 3:1016). In the process he 
privileges the phenomenological experience of the ‘Here and Now’ as a fulfilled and 
authentic moment (ibid). Ledanff argues that Fritsch seeks to shift the magical focus 
in Faust towards ‘white’ magic as he aims for a utopian ‘Now’ (2012, 162). Fritsch 
has re-envisioned the ‘Now’ as an embodied and potentially numinous experience, 
and reoriented the focus of Faust’s striving onto the search for what I would call a 
magical aesthetic experience in the polyphasic consciousness sense. Older versions of 
                                                                                                                                            
identity and original wholeness. The second is magical, a one-dimensional unity, where the 
concepts of anthropo-cosmomorphism, collectivity and timelessness stand out. This is followed 
by the third structure, the two-dimensional mythic stage, where the boundary between subject and 
object solidifies and an awareness of inner life develops. It is described as an irrational mode of 
experiencing that ushers in the experience of time, particularly as it relates to retrospection. A 
three-dimensional mental structure follows, which is perspectival and associated with 
wakefulness, spatiality and rationalisation. The present is described as a four-dimensional sphere 
of integral consciousness. Among its characterizations is a contracting of consciousness, as well 
as a transparency, depth, intensity and an awareness of the whole (Rosen 2006, 152-157). 
37 Arendt’s concept of natality involves a creative freedom and is concerned with, “the universal 
human capacity for fresh initiative” (Benhabib 2010, 5). Fritsch writes, “ ‘Natalität’… is the word 
that the great Jewish philosopher, Hannah Arendt, gave the art of opposing the predictable, 
terrifying mechanics of history in order to turn it around” (2009, 1). 
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the myth saw Faust eternally dissatisfied or using nefarious means, including the 
magic of the Devil, to fulfil his every desire. A move away from limitlessness, greed, 
and the supernatural, amounts to a fundamental shift in Faust and one that requires a 
different approach to the demonic.  
 
This has also been a motivating aim of mine throughout this thesis – to look through 
theatre and film for ways of discussing and approaching the topic of the magical that 
could emancipate it from ‘black’ magic. We have seen how the demonic has been 
linked with both the Jungian unconscious and the use of ‘deceptive’ magic for the 
purpose of distraction and destruction, as in Free Theatre’s Doctor Faustus. Jung 
argues that “[b]y understanding the unconscious we free ourselves from its 
domination” (1967, 44.64). Dealing with subterranean realms such as a shaman would 
encounter, or dealing with Mephistopheles in the guise of oneself, as in Lekce Faust, 
or fighting one’s imaginary bear, as in Heart of Glass, can lead to positive outcomes 
in the quest for a whole and healthy psyche. It is not as simple as cutting off the 
demonic – as we have seen, it is the demonic that can effect a necessary re-evaluation, 
“Part of that force which would / Do evil evermore, and yet creates the good” (Goethe 
[1808] 1961, 158.1336). It is the ‘deception’ that disguises itself as ‘truth’, or the 
‘deception’ that is used for destructive purposes, that is negative in a ‘black’ magic 
sense.  
 
Bloch sees the demonic in Goethe’s Faust neither as supernatural nor the unconscious 
in a psychological sense, but as political. He writes, “For [Goethe] the demonic is not 
the dark per se but the dark which exercises power. Seductive or dominating power 
and a power of fascination, which causes terror and desire together, attraction through 
terror” ([1954-59] 1986, 3:989). Rather than greedy striving he sees a ‘positive 
demonic’ in the form of Mephistopheles as, “the facilitator of Faust’s struggle for 
self-knowledge” (Hedges, 2005, 197). Fritsch’s aim can similarly be seen as 
redefining the Faustian task for the 21st century when he declares that 
“Mephistopheles or Mephista appear, not genuinely vicious, but how Faust imagines 
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them to be” (2013, 5). The final scene ends with Mephisto and Mephista taking 
Faust’s hands as they emerge into the ‘New’. As Fritsch writes, “It’s not the world 
coming to an end; it’s rather the coming of a new way of thinking and seeing” (ibid, 
4).  
 
Similarly, images of fire receive fresh concentration and an alternative reading, 
compared to its use as apocalyptic imagery in Doctor Faustus, Heart of Glass and 
Into the Inferno. Fritsch acknowledges its destructive potential and associations with 
hell, but seeks to overturn these (literally, in the case of volcanic imagery that is 
flipped upside-down) and focuses instead on its en-lightening and transformative 
properties.  
 
Faust Sonnengesang can be seen to defamiliarise our perceptual process with its 
abstract “Faust-Keil” imagery and its affective intensities. The film feels as if it 
deliberately tries to lose the viewer in the proprioceptive sense; that is to say, to throw 
the viewer out of his or her rational mind in order destabilise habits and forge a new 
way through the old Faust material. This is where the new synapses and connections 
are formed that Fritsch is after.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In the Introduction, I stated that I hoped to find a sense of the magical that was more 
significant for its immanence than its transcendence. I have argued that the 
broadening of perceptual processes, taking a polyphasic rather than monophasic 
attitude to accessing knowledge and experience, can bridge the gap between the 
‘truth’ of neuroscience and the ‘deception’ of magical thinking. A polyphasic 
approach does not need to resort to supernatural magic when one can apply 
explanations derived from research in neuroscience. 
 
This approach to magic as an aesthetic experience is not just to be imagined. For 
Herzog and Artaud, a physically rigorous experiential approach is required. This is 
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harder work than the easy distractions offered by Hollywood or what Artaud calls 
“gratuitous” theatre ([1938] 1958, 24). Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, Bergson 
“methodological intuition,” Jung’s “constructive method” and the practice of 
shamanism as Clottes and Lewis-Williams describe it, all involve courageous 
application. Artaud writes, “If our life lacks brimstone, i.e., a constant magic, it is 
because we choose to observe our acts and lose ourselves in considerations of their 
imagined form instead of being impelled by their force” (ibid, 8). This kind of 
magical experience, where there is a polyphasic attitude to consciousness, with deep 
immersive concentration and creative becoming, tries to reinstate a “constant magic” 
back into theatre and film, hoping to regain some of the power of the shamanic rituals 
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